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PREFACE 
During the late nineteenth. century no solution to the so-called "Indian 
Problem" was mentioned more often than education. Policymakers believed that 
the attempt to transform Indians and bring them into American society could be 
most effectively achieved in the classroom .. Particular emphasis was given to 
reservation boarding schools where students could be separated from their families 
for as long as ten months a year and exposed to a wide variety of academic and 
practical lessons. In the ordered environment of the boarding school, discipline, 
habits of industry and hygiene, vocational training, and cultural reorientation 
would combine to produce a changed race. Armed with the skills and knowledge 
necessary to forge new lives, Indians would be able to take their place in the 
American mainstream. 
It was an ambitious but flawed plan. Indian education usually sounded 
better in theory than it was in fact. Despite the rhetorical flourishes of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, in reality the program never really enjoyed the kind of 
success that reformers and policymakers envisioned. Although they depended on 
it to bring Indians into the American mainstream, government officials rarely gave . 
the Indian school system the support it needed. The failure to do so had 
enormous implications. It meant that the government's ambitious hopes for 
civilizing the tribes according to Angloamerican values would never be fully 
lll 
realized; worse, it made it possible for Indians to maintain their cultural identity in 
varying degree on reservations across the country. 
Given the importance attached to schools in the campaign to transform 
Indians, it is surprising that historians have given them relatively little attention. 
Major off-reservation schools such as Carlisle and Phoenix have attracted notice, 
but reservation schools have not. This is unfortunate, for reservation boarding 
schools were the critical link in the government's civilization program, yet we know 
little about them or the students who attended them. This study is an attempt to 
examine how education worked on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation in western 
Oklahoma during critical period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
c~nturies. Created in 1869 by the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, the Kiowa-
Comanche Reservation was home to some of the most troublesome Indians on the 
Southern Plains. The Kiowas and Comanches were among the last of the region's 
tribes to accept reservation life, and even after agreeing to it, they proved to be a 
difficult, recalcitrant people. Determined to settle and civilize them according to 
Angloamerican notions of work and culture, the United States government 
promised a school and teacher for every thirty school-age Kiowa and Comanche 
children, of whom there were about 600. Convinced of the urgency of introducing 
those tribes to Christianity, farming, and private property, the government 
promised extensive support for such endeavors. Indeed, here was a laboratory in 
which to test the effectiveness of the forced assimilation campaign spearheaded by 
the schools. 
One of the reservation's three boarding schools was located at Rainy 
Mountain, about thirty miles west of the agency office at Anadarko. The school 
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operated between the fall of 1893 and the spring of 1920 and in most respects was 
a typical reservation boarding school serving a typical collection of Indian 
children. By combining a vocational education program with limited academic 
instruction, the Rainy Mountain School sought simultaneously to educate and 
transform the children who enrolled there. Hailing such an approach as nothing 
less than an emancipation from a backward life, government officials regarded 
schools like Rainy Mountain as gateways to civilization. The sixth-grade education 
available there guaranteed an independent, self-sufficient future for a race of 
people elevated out of savagery by the lessons of discipline and hard work. At 
least that was how the Indian Office saw it. 
It was never that simple. Government negligence and Indian resistance 
combined to hamper the program from the very beginning. Understanding why 
the Indian Office proved reluctant to support the Indian schools offers insight into 
the nature of policy making during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries; it also reveals important limitations in the definitions that 
contemporaries attached to terms like· "civilized Indians" and assimilation. 
Knowing how Kiowa children fared at Rainy Mountain has important uses beyond 
an understanding of the facts of Indian education; it also addresses issues of 
cultural identity and survival that historians have been reluctant to discuss. 
Chapters one and two are a summary of the policy decisions and 
developments that created the Indian school system during the nineteenth century. 
Chapter three introduces the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation and examines the 
early history of schooling there by placing it in the wider context of the 
reservation's somewhat difficult circumstances. Chapter four turns to Rainy 
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Mountain School and is a discussion of it early years. Chapter five focuses on 
student life at the school and rests heavily on oral history. Interviews with former 
students from the, Rainy Mountain, Riverside, and Fort Sill boarding schools form 
the basis for exploring day-to-day life in the schools. Chapter six examines the 
changing attitudes inside the Indian Office during the Progressive era that marked 
a redirection of educational policy. Such changes eventually doomed Rainy 
Mountain. Chapters seven and eight assess the school's last ten years and its 
closing. 
Because this study employs terms that often resist objective definition, it 
seems well to clarify a number of them. Euroamerican refers to the western 
European ideas on race and culture that influenced Indian affairs in America from 
the sixteenth century forward. Anlgoamerican refers more specifically to the 
cultural milieu produced by the British colonial experience. The dangerously 
objective terms "civilization" and "civilizing" are used in the context of Euro and 
Angloamerican policy making based on ideas that government officials universally 
accepted. These included an emphasis on the revealed truths of Christian (usually 
Protestant) religion, the assumed superiority of Western culture, and the widely 
shared belief that elevating Indians from their savage state into something 
approximating the heritage of the West was justifiable and benevolent. 
"Assimilation" and "acculturation" are used as measurements of cultural change 
and adaptation. The former describes the total transformation of Indians 
envisioned by policymakers; the latter describes the accommodation that actually 
occurred. 
Historians have debts. I express my sincerest thanks to Dr. George Moses, 
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who agreed to assume direction of this project from Dr. W. David Baird. Dr. 
Baird encouraged me to attend Oklahoma State and was instrumental in directing 
my training as a historian of American Indians and the American West. Although 
he was not able to see this project through to completion, Dr. Baird deserves my 
gratitude and much of the credit for my understanding of American Indian 
history. Dr. Moses has directed this dissertation with great thoughtfulness and 
encouragement. His sharp editorial skills and understanding of American Indian 
history have contributed more than he knows to this study. To Drs. Paul Bischoff, 
Donald Brown, Richard Rohrs, and Michael Smith of Oklahoma State University, 
I wish to extend my deepest gratitude for helping to direct my graduate education 
and for bringing their considerable intellectual acumen to this dissertation. I also 
take pleasure in acknowledging the cooperation of the staff at the Oklahoma 
Historical Society's Division of Indian Archives, particularly to William Welge, 
who first suggested Rainy Mountain as a topic, and to Judith Michener who was 
unstinting in her help at the archives. 
Without the help and support of many Kiowa people, this project would 
not have been possible. I am especially indebted to Parker McKenzie, whose 
knowledge of Rainy Mountain School gave me a rare insight into his life as a 
student there nearly ninety years ago. I cannot fully express my thanks to the 
members of the Harry Tofpi, Sr., family. Their willingness to make me and my 
wife part of their family has taught me about the richness and vitality of Kiowa 
life today. 
Finally, my wife Mary has endured the project longer than she should have 
had to endure it but has been unfailingly supportive during the months required to 
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finish it (except when the muffler fell off of the car). Her editorial skills and 
sense of good history have helped to make this project worthwhile. 
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CHAPTER I 
"THE GRAND OBJECT:" THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS OF INDIAN EDUCATION 
On a clear, windy afternoon in August of 1990, ninety-two-year-old Parker 
McKenzie, a Kiowa Indian from Mountain View, Oklahoma, pointed to the 
ramshackle remains of the Rainy Mountain Boarding School and said, "that was 
where I got my start." The ruins to which he pointed lay in the center of what 
had once been the campus of a reservation boarding school. Between 1893 and 
1920 it started hundreds of young Kiowas like McKenzie toward what the 
government hoped would be a transforming experience. Here, in a remote corner 
of the sprawling Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, government teachers struggled for 
nearly three decades to make the vision of a new Indian race a reality. Crowded 
into the school's dormitories and classrooms, generations of Kiowa children toiled 
to become the sort of civilized, competent citizens that the government wanted 
them to be. Working in the shadow of the mountain after which the school was 
named, young Kiowas were encouraged to work diligently toward becoming 
culturally indistinguishable from the whites who surrounded them. 
The price of their transformation was the forfeiture of what made them 
Indian. Youngsters like McKenzie were to emerge wholly changed and 
permanently transformed. The goal was to prevent them from "going back to the 
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blanket," a term of derision applied to backsliders who could not resist the 
temptation of returning to native ways. Once given the liberating experience of 
the school, youngsters were to return to their communities as beacons of change 
and examples of proper living. Schooling was intended to do much more than 
simply inculcate Indian children with white .educational goals, it would be the 
definitive moment in the metamorphosis of a people. Writing to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1899, Rainy Mountain Principal Cora Dunn 
spoke bluntly of the school's mission: "Our purpose," she wrote, "is to change them 
forever." 1 
Despite the certitude that Dunn and her colleagues brought to Rainy 
Mountain, the process would rarely be so straightforward. Exigencies of time and 
distance, limited support, and small budgets would all combine to make Rainy 
Mountain School, and others like it, struggling outposts in the Indian educational 
system. The Kiowas, too, would stamp the school with a peculiar mark, for not all 
or even most of the 'children who attended there ever succumbed fully to the 
government's hopes. Many, like Parker McKenzie, emerged from the school ready 
to move into the non-Indian world to lead meaningful lives as acculturated 
Indians. Yet, they did not forget or give up what had made them Kiowa. Despite 
the best efforts of its teachers, Rainy Mountain School produced students who 
learned English but retained Kiowa, accepted non-Indian values but combined 
them with their own, took jobs in the white community but did not become wholly 
part of it. Ironically, though Rainy Mountain functioned precisely in the way that 
many administrators hoped it would, it did not destroy Kiowa culture among its 
students. It helped; in fact, to ensure its survival. 
Rainy Mountain School was part of a system of government boarding 
schools operating on reservations all across the country in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Collectively, they served as the government's primary 
agency for Indian cultural transformation. Speaking in 1895 at the Lake Mohonk 
Conference, an annual meeting of Indian reform advocates begun in 1883, United 
States Commissioner of Indian Education W. N. Hailmann preached a philosophy 
that reached back to the age of Jefferson. "Give us your children," he implored 
Indian parents. "We will give them letters and make them acquainted with the 
printed page .... With these comes the great emancipation, and the school shall 
give you that."2 The "great emancipation," or something akin to it, was summed 
up by Hailma:nn and his colleagues as the inevitable absorption by white America 
of its Indian wards. The process entailed a complete cultural, intellectual, 
spiritual, and material transformation. It was to be a transformation that replaced 
what most whites regarded as depraved and savage institutions with ones that 
faithfully mirrored ( or at least as faithfully as crude savages could) the Christian 
mores that dominated American thought. 
Most policymakers and reformers hoped to produce a truly assimilated 
Indian population, that is, one that was culturally indistinguishable from its white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant model. As envisioned by the Indian office beginning in 
the late eighteenth century, native values and institutions would be replaced by 
Euroamerican ones. Policymakers agreed the little if anything in Indian culture 
was worth saving and deemed the process they envisioned both prudent and 
humane. It was, after all, sometimes necessary to save the Indians from 
themselves. Indeed, the alternatives were stark. To many observers, the choice 
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was between the uplifting experience of schools and the gospel, or the extinction 
that was the fate of all backward races. To civilize them therefore, meant 
exposing them to the rudiments of the Christian faith, to habits of industry and 
Euroamerican agriculture, and to the discipline and self-discovery of the 
schoolroom. Enlightenment optimism suggested that such change could be 
effected by manipulating environmental and institutional influences. Such 
thinking, however, proved to be badly flawed. 
In reality, what occurred in most places and at most times was 
acculturation, a process that entailed something less than the total reordering of 
native society desired by whites. Instead of radical change, contact usually 
produced accommodation and change on both sides. Though they were usually 
loath to admit it, Euroamericans quickly discovered that natives were 
extraordinarily able to resist change when it threatened their sense of identity.or 
cultural foundations in ways that would destroy them as a people. For their part, 
Indians often engaged in a pattern of response that embraced certain things, such 
as trade goods or alliances or even religion, but did not do so in ways that 
fundamentally changed their sense of identity. Of course, most tribes had been 
doing this sort of thing for generations; contact with Euroamericans meant simply 
that the pace accelerated and came to include developments that had not existed 
in pre-Columbian times. Thus, acculturation through syncretic institutions and 
value systems, and not outright assimilation, characterized the Indian world.3 
That rarely happened. It certainly did not occur to the degree envisioned 
by the Indian Office. For the Kiowa children who attended Rainy Mountain 
School, acculturation meant accepting the rhythm and routine of the boarding 
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school but not the core of its value system. In sociological terms, they did not 
internalize its lessons or take up its cultural baggage, but combined useful 
elements of it with the more meaningful Kiowa culture that defined them as 
people. In doing so they carefully and willfully joined elements of both cultures, 
neither wholly surrendering theirs nor completely taking on that of whites. It was 
this syncretic culture that allowed them, and continues to allow them, to survive in 
an occasionally hostile environment. 
Although the process of assimilation as the government saw it embraced a 
variety of means, none was more important, or problematic, than education. Of 
the government's various programs it alone promised a systematic, uniform 
standard against which progress could be measured. Schools could be built 
anywhere and everywhere; they could be opened to students of all ages; they could 
accommodate both boys and girls; and they could act as the most powerful engine 
possible of the cultural transformation that policy makers devised for Indians. 
More importantly, education targeted children, those who were most vulnerable to 
change and least able to resist it, or so the government thought. Education, as 
Robert Utley has observed, "represented the most dangerous of all attacks on 
basic Indian values, the one most likely to succeed in the end because it aimed at 
the children, who had known little if any of the old reservation life."4 Hailing the 
classroom as the laboratory of permanent change, reformers, educators, and 
politicians alike believed that "education is essential to civilization." In 1892 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas.J. -Morgan boldly stated that there were 
"no insuperable obstacles in the way of blending Indian children with white 
children."5 Moreover, success in the.classroom promised to smooth the ,way for a 
new kind of Indian, the sort who would not be identified with any kind of "Indian 
problem." Who could not see literate, scripture-quoting Indian children and 
believe that the future was in good hands? No other institution left reformers so 
convinced, according to Frederick Hoxie, that "they had a method of molding 
people anew."6 
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Unfortunately, rhetoric rarely matched reality. The years during which 
Rainy Mountain operated were unique for their optimism and general support of 
reform. And even then there were problems so serious that they crippled the 
Indian schools. The long view, moreover, reveals an ambiguous attitude and sense 
of cynicism concerning Indian education. And, by extension, it raises troubling 
questions about race, assimilation, and the real versus imagined goals of the 
Indian service. From the age of Jefferson through that of Wilson, the government 
implored, pleaded, and forced Indians to give up their children and place them in 
schools. Yet once they got· them, the government was more often than not at a 
loss to make good on its promises. This was especially so at out-of-the-way 
schools such as Rainy Mountain, where the contradictions of Indian education 
were painfully revealed. In reality, Indian schools rarely managed to achieve the 
kind of total transformation envisioned by policy makers. Though scores of 
children may have left government schools stripped of their ethnic identity, many 
more resisted the efforts to surrender their culture. Large numbers of them, 
therefore, kept some degree of control over their cultural identity. Boarding 
schools such as Rainy Mountain succeeded most· often in introducing Indian 
students to a new way of life that did not come· at the expense of what made them 
Indian. 
7 
Ironically, hundreds of Kiowas left Rainy Mountain with many of the skills 
they were intended to learn, but they lived their lives based on cultural institutions 
and values that largely withstood the government's assimilation programs. Far 
from solving the Indian problem, Rainy Mountain rarely ever had the chance to 
remold its students into new citizens. Two reasons account for the limited 
success: insufficient support from a government that almost never matched its 
rhetoric with meaningful action, and significant resistance from the Kiowa 
community. Kiowa parents were willing to place their children in school but 
nevertheless made sure that language, culture, and institutions remained intact to 
one degree or another. The history of Indian education in general, and of Rainy 
Mountain in particular, reveals not only a government at odds with itself over 
educational policy and administration, but more importantly an Indian community 
that resisted as much as it could the twin goals of assimilation and absorption. 
The civilizing policies· of the period during which Rainy Mountain operated 
were the products of a process that reached back more than two centuries. ( The 
impulse to civilize the tribes after the fashion of other christian Euroamericans 
characterized Indian-white relations from the very beginning.)Obviously there 
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were differences in approach. The Spanish, for example, employed an approach 
that can only be described as cruelly.oppressive,.and which, in relative terms, 
treated Indians more harshly· as a rule than did the French or British. Though 
there were lapses by both sides, British-Indian relations during the formative 
colonial era, for example, ran largely according to such thinking. American 
leaders generally accepted the British approach after the Revolution and based 
subsequent decisions on it for a century to come. Both the ideology and 
administration of the British system, in fact, became staples in the American 
approach to the Indian question. Instead of developing a policy that strove to 
destroy the tribes, the United States opted for one driven by the determination to 
civilize natives according to Enlightenment optimism. It was a policy aimed at 
transforming the nation's Indian wards from rude sons of the forest into self-
sufficient yeoman farmers. Although officials argued about the degree to which 
this might actually be possible, the merit of such an approach enjoyed general 
support. Overall, American policy makers in the early national period and the 
years that followed rejected the attempts at extermination with which they have 
been charged ever since. "Among the responsible and respected public figures in 
the first decades of United States developments," notes historian Paul Prucha, 
"there was a reasonable consensus that was the underpinning of official policy 
toward the Indians." And that "reasonable consensus" meant civilizing and 
assimilating Indians, not killing them.7 The only problem was that for much of 
the period under review, policymakers neither clearly defined nor consistently 
enacted the measures they felt were necessary to civilize and assimilate the tribes. 
At a bare minimum American leaders envisioned a process entailing the 
radical cultural transformation of natives from their original state into one 
approximating the culture of other Americans. This would be accomplished 
through instruction in reading, writing, Euroamerican agriculture, domestic arts, 
and the Christian religion.8 Though it was a policy that reflected a narrowly 
defined sense of cultural worth, it generally also rested on the notion that 
benevolent paternalism could successfully replace inferior and imperfect native 
values with the more enlightened ones of the West. Left to their own devices, 
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Indians could only be expected to lead degenerate lives that threatened not only 
their own well-being but also that of their civilized white neighbors. The cultural 
superiority that had helped to produce the age of conquest now loomed as a 
staple in the difficult transition for Indians from savagery to civilization. 
The answer to such a crisis was the introduction among the tribes of 
learning, industry, discipline, and Christian morality. That such a state of affairs 
might only be achieved forcibly was beside the point; as Kiowa children learned at 
Rainy Mountain, what they were getting was good for them, whether they liked it 
or not. More importantly, such thinking appeared early in the colonial era and 
became a staple of the American government's long-term Indian policy. Accepting 
it as an obligation to extend the fruits of civilization to Indians, the government of 
George Washington's day established patterns that extended virtually unchanged 
to future generations of policymakers. Writing to Francois-Jean Chastellux in 
1785, for example, Thomas Jefferson argued that "the proofs of genius given by 
the Indians of N. America, place them on a level with whites in the same 
uncultivated state .... I believe the Indian then to be in body and mind equal to 
the white man."9 It was a bold statement, one that confirmed a largely generous 
spirit toward Indians, at least as far as the Sage of Monticello was concerned. As 
long as they lived peacefully and accepted· certain requirements of a civilized 
lifestyle, there was a place for Indians in the republic. Resistance meant well 
deserved punishment, but Jefferson and his colleagues believed that coercion 
would rarely be necessary. Though the optimism of the Jeffersonian position 
would be battered heavily in the decades to come, nothing ever quite managed to 
eclipse it. Believing that Indians could and should be brought into civilized 
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society, Jefferson was an eloquent advocate for policies that sought peaceful 
solutions to the Indian question. Settle them, school them, above all teach them 
to farm and the issue would resolve itself. As for the remnant that resisted time 
would eventually rid the country of it as well. 
The church and the schoolroom were the twin agents of transformation in 
the nineteenth century. By then, each had been deemed indispensable to the 
other in the work at hand. Since the days of John Eliot in Massachusetts Bay, 
determined missionaries had stood firfi!. in their belief that faith without 
intellectual growth was seed on rocky soil. · As Margaret Szasz has argued in her 
work on colonial Indian education, the injunction to educate Indians was taken up 
with great fervor in the British colonies. Indian education "lay at the cutting edge 
of cultural interaction in the sixteenth and· seventeenth centuries. . . . Colonial 
Euroamericans and Indians deemed ... education as the ultimate tool for 
achieving cultural change among Indian people." Whether in Puritan New 
England or the Carolinas, one of the highest callings for colonial missionaries, 
Szasz argues, was to teach, and thus to civilize, the Indians.10 
But that was not all. What good would it serve to have literate but 
unregenerate natives? Surely education must aim toward some greater purpose. 
Thus the relationship between education and salvation was as clear for Indians as 
it was for Puritans in Massachusetts. Writing in 1823, for example, Thaddeus M. 
Harris made reference to that earlier era and told his listeners that "the Gospel, 
plain and simple as it is, and fitted by its nature for what it was designed to effect, 
requires an intellect above that of a savage to comprehend. Nor is it all to the 
dishonor of our holy faith that such men must be taught a previous lesson, and 
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first of all be instructed in the emollient arts of life. "11 Here, then, were the two 
necessary components of a godly, civilized life. The school would provide the 
training, the church the guidelines and examples. 
Although advocates of the Gospel and literacy among the Indian might 
disagree over which should come first - prayer book or spelling book - the goal 
was universal, a transformed (usually Protestant) native who, according to Robert 
Berkhofer, would be brought "not merely to unite with the white man in the 
worship of God, but cooperate with them in the business of agriculture and trade" 
as well.12 It was an important idea, for missionaries and teachers reflected 
universally the substance of policy. It was also an enduring idea, deeply 
influenced by the New England ethos of an educated elect. Separation of church 
and state would have no meaning in Indian education from either an ideological 
or institutional point of view. From the beginning, the transformation of the 
Indians rested squarely on cultural institutions and values that combined carefully 
the forces of education and Christianity. Sanctioned by the government, such an 
approach was designed to produce a particular kind of assimilated Indian. 
Together, the church and school came to be the most influential and critical 
agents of change until the middle of the twentieth century.13 
Schools like Rainy Mountain operated as government-run, publicly-funded 
institutions. In reality, they often resembled the mission schools in which teachers 
labored to educate and co'nvert, and where, notes Paul Prucha, it was difficult to 
know where one ended and the other began. Education was deliberately 
immersed in religion and vice-versa. For those who worried about the 
constitutional separation of church and state ( and the critics were so few as to be 
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invisible), proponents could always buttress their approach with the solemn 
assurance that joining church and school together was surely not the same thing as 
sanctioning one religion over another. As long as one was not a Catholic 
interested in joining what was, and remained, a Protestant-dominated policy, this 
defense was acceptable. Not surprisingly, says Robert Berkhofer, "missionaries 
found themselves, as one confessed, 'entirely unable to separate religion and 
civilization."' Thus, a good Indian was a copy of a good white man. "In the 
f 
school and in the field," noted one ~ethodist missionacy(our aim was to teach 
the Indians to live like white people~4 Anything less was unacceptable. 
l . 
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Policymakers measured worth by the degree of change and adaptation; the 
absence of meaningful change meant a sort of cultural and moral deficiency that 
was intolerable. An educated, Christian (usually Protestant) Indian was the 
unalterable goal. 
( By far the most promising source for teaching Indians "to live like white 
\-
people" was a school system that could subject every Indian child to rigorous 
indoctrination. Hoping to remold youths before the uncivilized life became too 
deeply developed,)nissionaries like Gideon Blackburn promised to solve the 
i 
problem if given the proper tools. Writing in 1807, Blackburn assured a colleague 
that his task was "not only to rescue the rising race from savage manners, but also 
to light up beacons, by which the parents might gradually be conducted into the 
same field of improvement."15 What other course could offer the salvation of an 
entire race? Moreover, such an approach maintained the already close 
association between Christian missions, the education of Indians, and evolving 
national policy. Such a relationship effectively promoted a benevolent solution to 
the Indian question. By advocating education early in the lives of Indians, 
Blackbum and others also set a precedent that survived well into the twentieth 
century. 
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The formative period in Indian education was anything but systematic and 
often proved to be little more than a patchwork effort. For all of their 
confidence, education advocates often had an imperfect sense of direction. The 
most important early attempts came from the mission schools and private 
academies, the forerunners of a government supported Indian education system. 
Because the private academies and mission schools aimed at "piety ... traditional 
learning, and ... industrious work habits," writes Prucha, the government happily 
and actively supported them.16 And because they reflected an already significant 
tradition handed down largely from the New Englanders, such schools represented 
an important and venerated tradition. Moreover, the combination of practical 
knowledge leavened with Christian values promised results that answered the most 
pressing criticisms of Indian life - indolence and unchristian savagery. 
The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was 
prominent among the various groups which petitioned the government for· 
permission to build schools. Few groups equaled its prestige and energy in 
endeavoring to build schools. Moreover, its approach to schooling Indians 
reflected the standard philosophy. In 1816 it requested authority to open its first 
school, which it did at Brainerd, Tennessee. Led by Cyrus Kingsbury, arguably 
one of the most eminent proponents of an Indian school system during the era, 
Brainerd became a model for the schools that followed it. Addressing the 
function of the school as he saw it, Kingsbury wrote to the Board in November 
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1816 and informed them that: 
I considered it to be the grand object of the present undertaking to impart 
to them that knowledge which is calculated to make them useful citizens, 
and pious Christians. In order to do this, it appeared necessary to instruct 
them in the various branches of common English education; to form them 
to habits of industry, and to give them a competent knowledge of civilized 
life.17 
Kingsbury petitioned the government for approval of his school on the grounds 
that extending such lessons to Indians was "not only a dictate of humanity, and a 
duty enjoined by the Gospel, but an act of justice. "18 Such sentiments became 
the stock and trade of Indian schools across the country by the end of the century. 
To make such a vision a reality, Kingsbury and others petitioned the 
government for aid. What they wanted was government assistance sufficient to 
underwrite dozens of Indian schools throughout the country. The system for 
which missionaries clamored found remarkable support at high levels inside the 
federal government .. Thomas L. McKenney, the Superintendent of Indian Trade 
from 1816 to 1822, was notable in the early attempt to develop an Indian school 
system. Like Kingsbury, he was an ardent proponent of Christianization and 
education and saw in them the most promising solution of all to the Indian 
question. He sought openly to align church and state to accomplish the task. 
Indeed, he so thoroughly advocated such a system that according to Paul Prucha, 
McKenney usually "sounded ... more like a missionary than a public official."19 
Already committed to using the well-entrenched factory system as a 
civilizing influence, McKenney viewed Indian schools as natural additions to such 
a program. He urged the expansion of the factory system to "serve the great 
object of humanity" by using it to encourage cultural transformation. With 
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Jefferson, he believed that fostering economic dependence among the tribes could 
be used ultimately as leverage in the attempt to force assimilation. Jefferson 
thought that using the system to encourage large debts among Indians might prove 
expedient in forcing land cessions and other concessions. Of course, such 
developments were counted on to drive a cultural wedge into the tribes. 
McKenney saw an Indian school system as another component in a program 
designed to transform the tribes humanely and quickly. And to accomplish the 
task, he advocated seeking out missionary societies that would run the schools 
under his supervision. Profits from the factory system ought to be used, said 
McKenney, to create "a monument more durable and towering than those of 
ordinary dimensions, a monument as indestructible as justice, interesting as 
humanity, and lasting as time."20 
The necessity of political compromise denied McKenney the comprehensive 
school system he wanted, but he did not come away empty-handed. And what he 
got became the foundation of a nationwide Indian school system. On March 3, 
1819, an act "making provision for the civilization of the Indian tribes adjoining 
the frontier settlements" became law.21 The "Civilization Fund," as it was called, 
provided an annual appropriation of $10,000 to be distributed at the President's 
discretion to the various mission societies engaged in work among the Indians. It 
was a modest sum, even by the day's standards; still it would push forward the 
work of schooling and civilizing as never before. Though it was clearly better than 
nothing, McKenney and others scoffed at the sum. When queried by the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs as to what he thought a fair appropriation should be, 
he replied emphatically: "One hundred thousand dollars, annually. It is little 
enough since we got the Indians' land for an average of two and three quarters 
cents the acre."22 The relatively meager appropriation of 1819 belied the 
government's professed intention to elevate its wards to meaningful participation 
in white society. From the very beginning, rhetoric ran aground on the shoals of 
political expedience and partisanship. 
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Despite the dearth of funds, the precedent had been set by a Congress 
apparently ready to solve peaceably the Indian question, if such a thing was 
possible. Progress was glacially slow, but proponents could point yearly to results 
that deflected all but the most determined critics. By 1824, five years after the 
act's passage, twenty-one Indian schools were open, eighteen of them under the 
auspices of the civilization fund. Moreover, Indian students seemed capable, and 
occasionally eager, in their pursuit of a formal education. "The acquisition of an 
English education," reported the House Committee on Indian Affairs in 1824, 
"exceeds the most sanguine expectations that had been formed."23 Rising to the 
challenge, McKenney, following his appointment as head of the Office of Indian 
Affairs, issued what Prucha describes as a "blistering circular" to superintendents 
and agents reminding them that it was their duty to "sanction and second this plan 
of renovating the morals and enlightening and improving these unfortunate 
people." Apparently, McKenney's broadside had some effect; by late 1824 he 
listed thirty-two schools with 916 students. Six years later, fifty-two schools held 
1512 students.24 
Although hardly comprehensive, here was proof to critics and advocates 
alike that the classroom was the best path to civilization and the solution of the 
vexing Indian question.25 He could not accurately predict the legacy of his early 
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work, but McKenney had in fact laid the foundation for a philosophy that within a 
generation would become the unquestioned centerpiece of the government's 
assimilation program. Within a decade and a half, virtually all treaty provisions 
would regularly authorize annuities for education and obligate the government to 
provide educational facilities and opportunities for.its wards. Yet, at its birth, the 
system also reflected a supreme irony. By 1830 Congress would vote for Removal. 
In doing so it exposed the two poles of Euroamerican attitudes: the first was 
inclusionist and strove to absorb Indians at the price of their culture; the other 
was exclusionist and sought to move them beyond the boundaries of Euroamerican 
civilization. If McKenney laid the foundation, there were already dangerous 
cracks. Never particularly well directed, Indian education soon faced a deeply 
ambivalent environment that hobbled it even more thoroughly. 
Out on the Southern Plains the Kiowas were still largely an unknown and 
undisturbed people. Indeed, not until the 1830s did the white frontier begin 
materially to interfere with their lives. But plans were already being established 
and confirmed that would challenge the autonomy and independence of tribes like 
the Kiowas. Although the establishment of Rainy Mountain School lay sixty years 
in the future, what Jedidiah Morse called "the grand object ... the work of 
educating . . . nearly one half a million Indians . . . [ a task] great, arduous, and 
appalling" was under way.26 An era had begun from which few could escape. 
They could not yet know it, but the Kiowas and their world would shortly begin to 
change and wither, and their children would find themselves in schools that 
promised salvation if they would agree to destroy what made them who they were. 
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CHAPTER II 
"IT IS A REMEDY FOR BARBARISM:" THE CREATION 
OF AN INDIAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 
Though far from being systematic or comprehensive, the fledgling Indian 
school system established during the first third of the nineteenth century 
continued to gain strength and stature over the next four decades. Its role in the 
struggle to transform the tribes, especially those on the Great Plains, became 
unassailable by the time of the Civil War. Commenting on the situation as it 
appeared in 1866, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis Cooley asserted that 
education was virtually "the only means of saving any considerable portion of the 
race from the life and death of [the] heathen."1 Cooley's observation, made in the 
wake of the opening of the trans-Mississippi West, underscored the urgency of a 
civilizing agenda that came to rest increasingly on education. Indeed, the 
responsibility of the government to protect and assimilate the West's Indian 
multitudes helped to ensure the survival of the bureau's Indian school system. 
The opening of the trans-Mississippi West beginning in the 1830s and the 
existence there of some 360,000 Indians confirmed the need to implement policies 
that could first contain and later transform those people. Though the military 
played an important role in pacifying the region, the army rarely if ever dominated 
government relations with the tribes. Indeed, even in the years immediately 
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following the Civil War when the army's primary task was safeguarding the way 
west, the military almost never dictated policy but rather responded to it. Less 
confrontational, more benevolent efforts came to typify post-war policy. To be 
sure, the threat of military confrontation was often present; the reservation system 
and its array of programs were much more important to the policy kit than the 
army. 
Opening the trans-Mississippi West to extensive Euroamerican settlement 
inaugurated a new kind of Indian problem, one that differed in kind and scope 
from anything experienced in the East. The 360,000 Indians in the West differed 
profoundly from eastern peoples in ways that made the solution to the problems 
they posed enormous. The diversity and military strength of the western tribes, 
for instance, posed serious threats to the orderly movement of the· line ·of white 
settlement. The so-called "Indian Barrier" across the west was palpably real in 
some regions, especially in such places as Texas, where the Kiowas and 
Comanches hampered exploration and settlement for much of the period between 
1830 and 1870. Civilizing the West's Indians according to leaders of federal 
policy, as opposed to simply exterminating them, continued to be the government's 
goal; but the magnitude of the task and its urgency made the situation somewhat 
different from anything previously attempted.2 
Among the various western developments that influenced policymakers and 
reformers in the years immediately after the Civil War, two were especially 
important for their effect on Indian education .. They were the reservation system 
and U.S. Grant's Peace Policy. Each played a central role in the development of a 
systematic Indian school system. The reservation provided the locale and 
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population, and the Peace Policy provided ideology, rationale, and administrative 
framework. Together they represented the benevolent paternalism that came 
increasingly to characterize the government's civilization program in the late 
nineteenth century.3 
The idea of reservations was hardly new. Indeed, reservations had been 
used in one form or another and with varying degrees of success all over North 
America since the colonial era. As early as 1763, for example, the Proclamation 
Line that followed the crest of the Appalachians had designated white from Indian 
land and had been intended to segregate potentially hostile communities from one 
another. The steady westward movement of white settlers flawed the idea from 
the beginning, but policy makers clung to variations of it for the next century and 
a half. The creation of Indian Territory in 1825 stood as the logical if somewhat 
unwieldy extension of such thinking; untold thousands of Indians might be 
relocated there with rights granted in perpetuity thus guaranteeing a permanent 
Indian domain. The removals of the next decade confirmed the practicality of 
such thinking. In fact, agreement was general that the combination of systematic 
land cessions coupled with removal to the trans-Mississippi West would solve the 
Indian problem once and for all. Though some pockets of resistance survived in 
the East, removal seemed to settle the issue; few whites contemplated the need 
for similar operations in the future as it seemed unlikely that the West would ever 
be filled by whites. Since the 1820s the West had been stigmatized an arid 
wasteland fit for the Indians who knew no better way of life. Removed there, 
they would be out of the way of whites and safely isolated. 
Removal treaties during Andrew Jackson's presidency did not necessarily 
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point to a reversal of the government's policy assumptions. Assimilation remained 
the long-term goal and was to be achieved through the same sort of agencies and 
plans as before. On the other hand, removal revealed a deep sense of ambiguity 
concerning the nature of the process and the time necessary for carrying it out. 
With little of Jefferson's Enlightenment faith in the essential goodness of Indians, 
Jacksonians assigned assimilation secondary importance. Once the primary task of 
removal had been achieved, only then might missionaries, teachers, and others 
begin the laborious process of transformation. Responding to Cherokee concerns 
in 1835, for example, Jackson spoke clearly: 
I have no motive, my friends, to deceive you. I am sincerely desirous to 
promote your welfare. Listen to me therefore while I tell you that you 
cannot remain where you are now. Circumstances that cannot be 
controlled ... render it impossible that you can flourish in the midst of a 
civilized community. You have but one remedy ... and that is to remove to 
the west .... And the sooner you do this the sooner will commence your 
career of improvement and prosperity.4 
The solution to the Indian problem which removal represented was illusory. 
Even before the plan was an established fact other events had begun to open the 
West to white settlement. The opening of the frontier called into question the 
very policy of leaving the trans-Mississippi West largely to the tribes, for the 
government soon discovered that far from being a wasteland, much of the West 
was mineral-laden and rich in raw materials. And all of it lay under the control of 
Indians who were not much interested in being shuffled off to Indian Territory. 
Ironically, the eve:qts that pushed open the West were simultaneous with 
the triumph of removal. The opening of the Santa Fe (1821), Oregon (1834), 
California (1841), and Mormon (1847) trails spurred overland migration and 
brought tens of thousands of non-Indian settlers westward into Indian country. 
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The Texas revolution of 1836, the annexation of Oregon in 1846, and the Mexican 
Cession of 1848 confirmed American claims on the West and initiated a new era 
of state building and expansion. Between 1840 and 1860 alone more than 300,000 
settlers pushed beyond the fabled 100th meridian and established themselves all 
across the so recently maligned West. Suddenly the comfortable assumptions of 
the J acksonians fell apart in the face of new realities. The concentration of 
thousands of eastern natives inside the Indian Territory, so recently lauded as the 
supreme achievement of Indian policy, paled in comparison to the problem of 
controlling and civilizing the West's vast Indian population.5 
Not surprisingly, the solution to the We_st's Indian question appeared in a 
modification of previously tested ideas and policies. The regional reservations that 
eventually dotted the West, for example, were not an entirely new concept. 
Richard White has observed that the reservation system which emerged after the 
Civil War "was an improvisation .... Reservations evolved on an ad hoc basis as a 
way to prevent conflict and enforce a separation of races."6 Yet, they also 
reflected the Jeffersonian notions of benevolent paternalism and peaceful, if 
coerced, assimilation. As institutions of near total control (at least in theory), 
reservations could be counted on to bring the acculturative powers of church, 
school, and state to bear on all Indians, especially the young. 
In the trans-Mississippi West, the process of subduing Indians and bringing 
order to the region was unwieldy. Thus assumptions guiding it changed 
repeatedly, especially with regard to the details of Indian policy. Prior to the 
1850s, for instance, policymakers believed in what Ray Allen Billington has 
labeled "One Big Reservation" modeled after Indian Territory and located at some 
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geographically convenient spot. The rapid extension of the frontier, however, 
brought remarkable levels of resistance from the tribes and led to the conclusion 
that a simplistic solution like another Indian Territory would never succeed. "The 
mass migration across the Plains," wrote Billington, "the development of freighting 
and express lines, the plans for transcontinental railroads all demonstrated during 
the early 1850s that the policy of 'One Big Reservation' was destined to speedy 
extinction. "7 
Indeed, as early as the 1840s serious discussions in Washington suggested 
the establishment of not one but two Indian territories. A northern counterpart 
to the one already established on the Southern Plains would place the tribes out 
of the way of whites and would, like its model, facilitate the march toward 
civilization. "It may be said," noted Commissioner of Indian Affairs William 
Medill in 1848, "that we have commenced the establishment of two colonies for 
the Indian tribes . . . one north, on the headwaters of the Mississippi and the 
other south, on the western borders of Missouri and Arkansas."8 Moreover, added 
the commissioner one year later, concentrating the tribes would remove the 
temptation on their part to eke out a living according to traditional ways, or to 
resist "concentrating and applying themselves with any regular or systematic effort 
to agriculture and other industrial pursuits." Calling them colonies instead of 
reservations, Medill's plan aimed generally at placing Indians on small tracts of 
land, safe from white contact, where they could be taught Angloamerican farming. 
Robert Utley has commented that such a policy "met both moral and practical 
objectives," for it simultaneously cleared the plains and advanced the work of 
regenerating the tribes.9 
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Determined to inaugurate such a policy, the Indian Bureau engaged in a 
series of negotiations across the Plains that produced two significant treaties. In 
September 1851 government officials induced the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, 
Crow, Gros Ventre, Assiniboine, Arikara, and Shoshone people to accept fixed 
tribal boundaries spelled out in the Fort Laramie agreement. Two years later 
similar terms were reached with the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches at the 
Treaty of Fort Atkinson. Although not reservations in the sense that later came 
to define them, the territory defined by the two treaties surely reflected the spirit 
and intent of government policy; Utley has observed that although not intended 
specifically to facilitate "control and civilization of the Indians ... they laid the 
foundations for future reservations."10 In time, the colonies, as Medill called 
them, would give way to dozens of smaller reservations onto which tribes were 
collected, either singly or in manageable numbers. By the early 1860s 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole took it as an article of faith that 
systematic reservations represented "the fixed policy of the government .... The 
change from savage to civilized life," he wrote, 
is very great and is, at best, beset with difficulties .... As the ultimate 
object . . . should be to better their condition, it will be my duty . . . to . . . 
secure for them reservations ... as will ... remove the obstacles in the way 
of their advancement, and present to them the greatest inducements to 
abandon savage and adopt civilized modes of life.11 
By the close of the Civil War a national system of reservations designed to 
accelerate the civilizing process had won the support of policymakers and 
reformers. Government officials and interested friends of the Indian alike agreed 
generally that such a system promised the best hope for civilizing and saving, 
30 
literally, the nation's Indian wards. Treaty negotiations reflected a clear intent to 
use reseivations as the pivotal component in the civilizing process. Agreements 
made with the major Plains tribes at Medicine Lodge Creek and Fort Laramie in 
1867 and 1868, for example, provided what government officials believed were 
conditions for peaceful coexistence and gradual change.12 Reviewing the 
situation as it appeared at the end of the 1860s, the Board of Indian 
Commissioners noted that "the policy of collecting the Indian tribes upon small 
reseivations ... seems to be the best that can be devised."13 
Along with the belief that reseivations provided the solution of the Indian 
question came a notably optimistic, even philanthropic, tenor in the language of 
policy. Advocates of reform tended generally to see enormous promise in the 
reseivation system and its various programs and had a sense of enthusiasm and 
energy that was unmatched in later years. The most well known of the programs 
and plans in this era was the Peace Policy, an approach reflecting what Frederick 
Hoxie has defined as "the widespread interest in transforming Indians into 
'civilized' citizens. Fueled by the memory of the Civil War and a self-serving 
desire to dismantle the tribal domains, politicians and reformers fashioned an 
elaborate program to incorporate Native Americans into the nation."14 
Unfortunately the enthusiasm would not last much beyond the turn of the century. 
Still, the decades following the Civil War marked a high point in Indian reform. 
Rainy Mountain School was established as a result of this concern for reform; 
thirty years later it closed when the energy driving that reform played itself out 
and schools like it fell victim to an official pessimism and the redefinition of what 
assimilation meant in the modern world.15 
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Grant's Peace Policy reflected a peculiar concern for humanitarian reform 
inside the Indian Office and among outside observers as well. Driven in part by 
the climate of moral reform that had appeared during the war over the issue of 
slavery, the crusading fervor of the era was easily transferred to Indians and their 
plight. Having dealt successfully with slavery's blight, reformers turned their 
attention to Indian affairs - a topic that caused passions to run high. No one 
could reasonably deny that there was cause for alarm, nor could the Indian service 
boast of a particularly clean or honorable record. The Sioux uprising of 1862, the 
Sand Creek debacle two years later, and the general state of unrest and violence 
all across the frontier pointed to a potentially disastrous situation. Indeed, as 
Prucha has observed, by 1865 Indian affairs in the West "were at a crisis."16 
How to solve the crisis without resorting to extreme or costly measures? An 
important turning point came in early 1865 when Congress created the Doolittle 
Commission. Named for the Wisconsin senator who chaired the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, the Doolittle Commission spent two years 
investigating conditions on reservations and in communities all across the West. 
Its report, issued on January 26, 1867, was a near indictment of the Indian service 
and called for an end to the "aggression of lawless white men." It also called for 
systematic inspections of reservations and decried their unbelievably tawdry 
conditions. It provided important momentum and renewed vigor for reform and 
rejected the idea that force could solve the dilemma. The Doolittle Commission 
marked the start of a new approach to Indian affairs that emphasized peace and 
justice. Moreover, it stood in bold contrast to the demands of some military 
authorities who sought a quick and decisive application of force against the tribes 
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and who hoped for military control of the reservations.17 
Buttressed by a general suspicion of the army's ability to pacify the West, 
civilian reformers soon gained near total control of Indian policy making. 
Following the publication of the Doolittle report in 1867, for instance, Congress 
moved quickly in support of more peaceful approaches to Indian affairs than ever 
before. On July 20, 1867, it established the Peace Commission, a careful 
combination of military and civil leaders whose major task was to determine the 
cause of unrest on the frontier. Given the authority to write treaties and even to 
designate reservations, the commission combined military firmness with 
humanitarian leniency in the hope of producing permanent solutions to the benefit 
of Indians arid whites alike. The commission's first reports of negotiations with 
the Sioux and Cheyenne on the Northern Plains, for instance, boasted that it had 
attempted "the hitherto untried policy ... of endeavoring to conquer by 
kindness."18 In fact, the treaties signed at Medicine Lodge Creek and Fort 
Laramie in 1867 and 1868 seemed to herald a new approach. Although the peace 
they brought was temporary, the treaties, and the mood that they represented, 
suggested a more progressive spirit among white policymakers who sincerely 
hoped to inaugurate a more peaceful era.19 
Indian policy reform quickened in 1869 following Grant's elevation to the 
presidency. Hardly an expert on the Indian question, the new president proved 
willing, even eager, to entertain various suggestions pertaining to Indian affairs. 
The turning point occurred in January 1869 when a delegation of Quakers 
approached Grant with the seemingly novel idea of basing Indian policy on 
peaceful rather than adversarial relations. Appoint men with strong religious 
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convictions, they told Grant, and a more enlightened and successful policy would 
follow, the benefits of which would redound to the whole country. "Gentlemen," 
Grant is reputed to have replied, "your advice is good. I accept it. ... If you can 
make Quakers out of the Indians, it will take the fight out of them. Let us have 
peace."20 Four weeks later Grant uttered the words which thereafter identified 
the policy. "All Indians disposed to peace," he.said, "will find the new policy a 
peace policy." But so none could mistake his intentions, Grant also added a 
warning: "Those who do not accept this policy will find the new administration 
ready for a sharp and severe war policy." Grant followed this with the 
appointment of ten men "eminent for their intelligence and philanthropy .... to 
exercise joint control with the Secretary of the Interior" as members of a group 
called the Board of Indian Commissioners. Like the Peace Commission, this 
group had potentially far-reaching powers that allowed them to "concern 
themselves with the whole range of policy, especially the performance of 
superintendents and agents." In truth, the board had little direct power beyond 
oversight of contracts and annuity disbursements. Pursuing the new approach with 
enthusiasm, Grant handed an increasingly large share of control to the Peace 
Commission, Board of Indian Commissioners, and other groups that joined in the 
Peace Policy's direction. By 1872 some seventy-three agencies were in the hands 
of various church groups, leading to what Prucha has said was a policy that ought 
to have been called the "'religious policy' instead of the Peace Policy."21 
The Peace Policy became the benchmark of federal policy until the late 
1880s. In spirit it represented the benevolence of a government trying to do right 
by its Indian wards. At its best, it promised and occasionally delivered more 
34 
enlightened policies than otherwise would have been the case. At its worst, it 
symbolized the lack of vision and absence of understanding that crippled the 
Indian Office for most of the late nineteenth century. Initially little more than a 
broad articulation of what reformers generally wanted, the policy finally gained a 
sense of definition in 1873 when Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano 
outlined its provisions in his annual report. The program had five major 
components. First, reservations would remain the centerpiece of the government's 
civilizing program. They were, Delano insisted, places where "humanity and 
kindness may take the place of barbarity and cruelty." .. Second, discipline ought to 
be swift and severe but it ought to be joined·to humane treatment as well, 
"thereby teaching ... that it is better to follow the advice of the Government, live 
upon the reservations and become civilized, than to continue their native habits 
and practices." Third, there had to be strict accountability for funds and the 
supplies purchased with them. Fourth, "competent, upright, moral, and religious" 
agents· should be employed and lead the way in running the agencies. Fifth, 
churches and schools would be built to help Indians attain the comforts and 
benefits of a Christian life and "thus· be prepared ultimately to assume the duties 
and privileges of citizenship."22 
It was a program that reflected the belief that having failed to settle the 
Plains thus far, "the time had come," according to historian Robert Trennert, "for 
the sword to give way to the spelling book. "23 In general, then, the Peace Policy 
and the post-war years represented a determination to reject confrontation and to 
emphasize kindness and justice. Limited in its ability to achieve that kind of 
change, Prucha has argued that the Peace Policy nonetheless succeeded in 
35 
"arousing public opinion in support of the Indians and the need for fair 
treatment. "24 
By the time of Grant's administration, then, critical ideological and policy 
decisions were in place that dominated the Indian service for the next three 
decades. With the reservation as a laboratory of change, and a more benevolent, 
largely civilian directed civilizing agenda at hand, the solution to the Indian 
question seemed but a matter of time. Even more important, the most promising 
component of the plan was already tried and tested: Education for the Indian 
masses soon became the hallmark of Indian policy for the decades to come. 
The time had come to make good on the promise of civilizing the Indians. 
Policymakers in Washington generally agreed that education pointed the way 
toward the quickest, most enduring success. "Any plan for civilization which does 
not provide for training the young," wrote Commissioner of Indian Affairs Edward 
Smith in 1873, "is short-sighted and expensive .... Four or five years of this 
appliance of civilization cures one-half of the barbarism of the Indian tribe 
permanently."25 Advocates of Indian education believed the schools to have 
unique, even fantastic, qualities when it came to the transformation of Indians. 
Writing in 1889, United States Commissioner of Education William T. Harris 
observed that: 
the new education for our American Indians as it has been founded in 
recent years by devoted men and women, undertakes to solve the problem 
of civilizing them by a radical system of education not merely in books, nor 
merely in religious ceremonies, but in matters of clothing, personal 
cleanliness, matters of dietary [sic], and especially in habits of industry.26 
Indian education pioneer Richard Henry Pratt put the matter more bluntly when 
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he said that on the matter of civilizing Indians "I am a Baptist because I believe in 
immersing the Indians in our civilization and when we get them under holding 
them there until they are thoroughly soaked. "27 
The rhetoric of Indian education reveals a righteous certitude. Nothing 
seemed more important than the moral transformation that awaited Indians in the 
schools. Indeed, it was just that kind of far-reaching change that most education 
officials privately and publicly admitted was the crux of the program. Without a 
thorough footing in the values and ideas of Americanism, Indian students would 
never really become part of the mainstream; 
Real momentum for a comprehensive Indian education system came during 
the tenure of Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz (1877-1881). An outspoken 
advocate of sweeping reform and of a nationwide reservation school system, 
Schurz outlined his vision in 1877. His program included much of what reformers 
had already identified as critical for a successful educational program: the 
exclusive use of English language instruction; compulsory education; an extensive 
system of boarding schools; manual and industrial training for the boys, domestic 
training for the girls, and religious training for all. Moreover, instead of dallying, 
Schurz urged the government to commit significant funds to such a program and 
to accept·the burden of doing so for at least the next decade and a half.28 
In 1880 Schurz decried the disgraceful lack of support for education on 
many reservations and noted how the commissioner's report for the same year 
described the "utterly.insufficient ... means at the disposal of the department." 
The commissioner went on to state that in 1880 fully "15,000 Indians at seventeen 
agencies have no treaty school funds whatever." Surely the importance of having 
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at least one boarding school at each agency "need not be argued," especially when 
at no more than fifteen out of sixty-six agencies could the government be said to 
have made adequate provision. Echoing Schurz's call for action, the commissioner 
concluded that "the necessity for increased and increasing appropriations ... is 
manifest and urgent.''29 
Schurz gained legitimate acclaim for his attempts to clean up the fraud-
ridden Indian office and to build a national Indian school system. By far the most 
important and successful advocate for Indian schools, however, was Thomas 
Jefferson Morgan, a man Prucha has called "the first significant national figure in 
the history of American Indian education" and to whom is given much of the 
credit for creating educational policies that shaped the coming generations of 
students.30 Beginning with his appointment in 1889, Indian education assumed 
absolute primacy in the government's civilizing program. 
An ordained Baptist minister and professional educator, Morgan brought 
administrative experience and a reformer's zeal to the Indian Office. Announcing 
in 1889 that the "anomalous position heretofore occupied by the Indians in this 
country cannot much longer be maintained," Morgan embarked on a program that 
he promised would "turn the American Indian into the Indian American.''31 
Speaking to the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian in 1889, 
Morgan outlined his philosophy of Indian education: 
When we speak of the education of the Indian, we mean that 
comprehensive system of training and instruction which will convert them 
into American citizens .... Education is the medium through which the 
rising generation of Indians are to be brought into fraternal and 
harmonious relationships with their white fellow-citizens,and with them 
enjoy the sweets of refined homes, the delight of social intercourse, the 
emoluments of commerce and trade, the advantages of travel, together with 
the pleasures that come from literature, science, and philosophy, and the 
solace and stimulus afforded by a true religion.32 
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Admitting that "this civilization may not be the best possible," Morgan nonetheless 
believed that it was the best the Indians would get. "They cannot escape it," he 
concluded, "and must either conform to it or be crushed by it." For those who 
embraced it and willingly entered the classroom, Morgan promised nothing less 
than a new future. "Nothing ... is so distinctly a product of the soil as is the 
American school system," he said. In the schools, "race distinctions give way to 
national characteristics" and produce generations who honored the same 
institutions, celebrated the same heritage, and worshipped the same God.33 
In his ·annual report for 1891 Morgan issued a comprehensive, ten-point 
plan designed to create a lasting Indian school system. He called it "A Settled 
Indian Policy."34 First, the Indian school system should be comprehensive and 
should offer the fullest educational opportunities to the largest possible number of 
students. "Nothing less than universal education should be attempted,11 he had 
insisted in a separate opinion. Without it Indians were "doomed either to 
destruction or to hopeless degradation."35 Universal education, moreover, should 
conform to the course of study used in public schools, which was where Indian 
students should ultimately complete their educations. 
Second, Morgan demanded "definiteness of aim." He lamented the fact 
that "there has been more or less confusion in the public mind as to precisely what 
the Government is aiming to accomplish." Actually, the goal was unmistakably 
clear: It was "to incorporate the Indians into the national life . . . as Americans . . 
. enjoying all the privileges and sharing the burden of American citizenship. . . . 
[This] should be inculcated as a fundamental doctrine in every Indian school." 
Indians had to be made to understand "that their future lies largely in their own 
hands." Accepting that responsibility meant prosperity and happiness; neglecting 
it meant that they would be "swept aside or crushed by the irresistible tide of 
civilization, which has no place for drones, no sympathy with idleness, and no 
rations for the improvident." 
Points three and four addressed the plan's administrative structure. 
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Dismayed by the chaotic bureaucracy of.the Indian service, Morgan reminded his 
audience that "we cannot gather grapes from thistles nor figs from thorns," and 
called for "clearness of outline" in the bureau's offices. Indians were a backward 
race, Morgan· observed, and thus the situation demanded clearly thought out 
policies. Only fortitude and careful direction, he concluded, could close "the 
dreary chasm of a thousand years of tedious evolution." Bureaucratic wrangling 
could only produce the sort of misdirection and hand-wringing widely believed to 
be typical of the Indian service. But clearness of outline also included flexibility, 
something that Morgan defined loosely as the adaptation of means to ends. 
Acknowledging that not all Indians were alike, and that single-minded policies 
could not work equally well in all places, the commissioner advocated specific 
goals and plans according to immediate circumstances. 
Fifth, the commissioner addressed the issue of what he called justice. For 
him this did not mean protecting Indian rights but reflected instead the notion 
that what he was doing was just, righteous, and quite necessary. Justice for 
Morgan implied the paternalism that had long influenced the Indian Office; thus 
when he spoke of justice he spoke more in terms of accepting an obligation to do 
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right by his wards than he did of protecting their lives or property. "We do not 
ask that they concede anything of real value to themselves," he wrote, ''but only 
that for their highest welfare they abandon their tribal organizations . . . and 
accept in lieu thereof American citizenship." Of course, such pronouncements 
reached to the heart of paternalism by defining "real value" as nonexistent in 
native culture. After all, as one of Morgan's successors observed in 1899, "the 
well-known inferiority of the great mass of Indians in religion, intelligence, morals, 
and home life," simply necessitated taking the children so that they might be 
guided "to the proper channel. "36 
The approach championed by Morgan meant that resistance by Indians 
justified coercion. The matter of justice was· clear to him; he had the 
responsibility to ensure that Indian children got useful educations. Indians, on the 
other hand, were responsible for accepting the opportunity. Writing to the 
Secretary of the Interior on the matter, Morgan observed that: 
I do not believe that . . . people, who, for the most part, speak no English, 
live in squalor and degradation, make little progress from year to year, who 
are a perpetual source of yxpense to the Government ... a hindrance to 
civilization and a clog on our progress; have any right to forcibly keep their 
children out of school to grow up ... a race of barbarians and semi-
savages. We owe it to these children to prevent, forcibly if need be, so 
great and appalling a calamity from befalling them.37 
Morgan underscored this idea in point six by announcing that firmness was 
critical in all that the Indian schools attempted. The government had certain 
obligations and could not shirk them. Like most of his coileagues, for example, 
Morgan saw no particular problem in requiring parents to enroll their children nor 
in administering severe·punishment to those who resisted. Morgan brooked no 
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dissent on the issue and used it often as an illustration of how important it was for 
the government to stand firm in its resolve. If his plans were followed to the 
letter, compulsory attendance meant that in only a couple of years the bulk of 
Indian children would be in school and thus well on their way to transforming an 
entire race. "Two or three years I think will suffice," he wrote in 1890, ''when all 
Indian youth of school age ... can be put in school."38 Firmness on this 
essential point translated into future success for educated Indian youth. The idea 
fit nicely with the overall government plan which called for allotment, citizenship, 
and liquidation of the Indian estate - which collectively meant the solution of the 
Indian problem. 
Insisting that such powers ''belong unmistakably to the prerogatives of the 
National Government," Morgan .pleaded only for what he called "a reasonable 
opportunity ... whereby [Indian] children can be lifted onto a plane where they 
will have an equal chance." There could be no discussion of the matter .. As with 
so much of what Morgan espoused, his absolute sense of moral and cultural 
superiority made any alternative untenable. To his critics he responded that he 
was being firm for the good of the Indians~ who did·not perhaps clearly 
understand what was in their best interests. Any other course was sure to cause, 
and probably deserved, failure. And to those who might be tempted to stand in 
the way of progress, Morgan issued a stern warning: "If, after this reasonable 
preparation, they are unable or willing to sustain themselves, they must go to the 
wall. It will be survival of the fittest." It was a chilling prospect, but one that 
revealed plainly just how important the issues were. 
Despite the unyielding nature of his rhetoric,.in point seven Morgan 
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demanded humanity in all that the Indian service did. "For the sake of the history 
we are making as a Christian nation," he wrote, "we should treat them not only 
justly and humanely, but with as much generosity as is consistent with their highest 
welfare. This we are doing." Future generations of historians would find much 
about Morgan's moral posturing that seemed hypocritical or even dishonest. Still, 
when viewed in the larger historical context of the late nineteenth century and the 
values that determined race relations then, Morgan's philosophy sought a humane 
solution. 
Eighth, the commissioner demanded "radicalness," which he defined by 
saying that if his plans were taken at full value and implemented completely, 
sweeping success awaited the country. He wrote: 
If we purpose [sic] to educate Indian children, let us educate them all. If 
we look to the schools as one of the chief factors of the great 
transformation, why not establish at once enough to embrace the entire 
body of available Indian youth ...• If there ,could be gathered by the end 
of 1893 ... nearly all of the Indian children and they be kept there for ten 
years," the work would be substantially accomplished; for ... there would 
grow up a generation of English speaking Indians, accustomed to the ways 
of civilized life .... Forever after ... the ... dominant force among them. 
Radical application of a kind not yet attempted meant radical change. Get them 
in school, keep them there, erase completely any vestige of their culture, inculcate 
in them American values and ideas, and then release them to an independent life. 
Finally, Morgan insisted on two mutually dependent ideas that tied the 
whole vision together - stability and time. One without the other doomed the 
system to failure. Stability meant trained professionals in the schools, 
administrative competence, able leadership, and a bureau that was politically and 
personally beyond reproach. Chafing at the mediocrity that afflicted so much of 
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his bureau, Morgan called for higher standards and cautioned against moving too 
· quickly. It might take a full decade for the fruits of his labor to appear. (Schurz 
had predicted that it would take at least fifteen years.) Yet nothing short of a 
devotion to the long-term plan would do. Given enough time, he argued, 
education would ''bring the young Indians into a right relationship with the age in 
which they live, and put into their hands the tools by which they may gain for 
themselves food and clothing and build for themselves homes." 
Morgan's vision embraced much that reformers considered sacrosanct -
English language use, disintegration of the tribes, the . end of segregation, 
preparation for citizenship and independence. In the end, he believed that Indian 
students would realize that their new way of life far exceeded anything that the 
old life had to offer. Failure to achieve the goals he set for himself and the 
Indians would amount to nothing less than a moral disgrace. According to the 
Lake Mohonk Conference in 1885, ignoring the imperative to save the Indians and 
educate them amounted to nothing less than the continuation of "the National 
dishonor of supporting ignorant and .barbaric peoples in the heart of a Christian 
civilization."39 It was this devotion to the transformation of a people that created 
schools like Rainy Mountain and took the crusading zeal of Thomas Morgan out 
to the remote corners of the nation's reservations. 
Morgan's successors also expressed absolute faith in educating Indians. 
According to the bureau's annual reports there seemed no end to the 
opportunities and possibilities in Indian schools. Each year the solution edged a 
bit closer, the end to the Indian problem became a bit surer as more and more 
Indian children were drawn under the influence of the classroom. In 1895, for 
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instance, Commissioner Daniel M. Browning reported that the tribes had already 
recognized that "the old order of things has passed away ... and that only by 
educating his children can the Indian compete with the white man in the struggle 
for life .... The most effective means for this end are those exerted through a 
wise educational plan."40 Three years later, Commissioner William A. Jones was 
even more emphatic: "Education is the greatest factor in solving the future status 
of the Indian." "No parent, whether red or white, has a moral or legal right to 
stand in the way of his child's advancement in life; no nation has a similar right to 
permit a portion of its embryo citizens to grow up in ignorance and ... vice."41 
And in 1900, Commissioner of Indian Education Dr. W. N. Hailmann observed 
that education made the Indian "ethically a better individual," who was "more 
persevering, more persistent, more thoughtful."42 
Schools pointed the way toward a self supporting Indian population and an 
end to the reservation system and government services for Indians. In 1899, 
Commissioner Jones observed that: 
It is essential that the education of the present generation of young Indians 
... prepare them to take and properly appreciate their share of the 
common land belonging to themselves and parents .... The entire 
educational system ... is therefore predicated upon the final abolishment 
of the anomalous Indian reservation system.43 
Two years later the Indian office solemnly reported that "education and 
civilization are practically synonymous," and that the schools were "doing a great 
work in preparing the way for emancipation from reservation life."44 
Those sorts of pronouncements not only justified the government's 
program, but also made clear what the consequences of resistance would be. If 
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the relationship between education and civilization was plain, so too was that 
between resistance and extermination. The urgency with which administrators 
spoke reflected alternatives that were stark indeed. "There is no one who has 
been a close observer of Indian history," wrote Commissioner Hiram Price in 
1881, "who is not well satisfied that one of two things must eventually take place, 
to wit, either civilization or extinction."45 Twenty-two years later the official 
opinion had not changed. Indeed, by the turn of the century it had become 
perhaps even more insistent. "There are only two phases of the Indian question," 
wrote Commissioner Francis Leupp in 1903: 
One, that the American Indian shall remain in the country as a ... study 
for the ethnologist, a toy for the tourist, a vagrant at the mercy of the state, 
and a continual pensioner upon the bounty of the. people; the other that he 
shall be educated to work, live and act as a reputable, moral citizen, and 
thus become a self-supporting, useful member of society .... To educate 
the Indian ... therefore, is to preserve him from extinction.46 
Regarding the work in which they were involved as the most morally urgent 
exercise ever presented a civilized people, reformers looked time and again to the 
common school as the source of enduring change. Dr. W. N. Hailmann had 
called education the "great emancipation." Those who agreed with him believed in 
the absolute imperative to save Indians froin themselves and the barbarity that 
inhibited their advancement. Speaking in 1901 to the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, Annie Beecher Scoville, a teacher in the Indian schools, summed 
up the prevailing wisdom of the era as neatly as any government report ever did: 
If there is an idol that the American people have, it is the school. What 
gold is to the miser, the schoolhouse is to the Yankee. If you don't believe 
it, go out to Pine Ridge, where there are seven thousand Sioux on eight 
million acres of land ... and find planted ... thirty-two school houses, 
standing there as a testimony to our belief in education. . . . It is a remedy 
for barbarism, we think, and so we give the dose .... The school is the 
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slow match ... it will blow up the old life, and of its shattered pieces [we] 
will make good citizens.47 
The rhetorical and philosophical utterings of education leaders, however 
optimistic they were, would only work if a school system capable of enforcing 
goals and standards actually existed. By the early 1880s policymakers were 
designing a comprehensive system of day and boarding schools where Miss 
Scoville's dose of humanity could be administered. In 1899 the commissioner's 
annual report reviewed the status of the Indian schools and discussed briefly the 
various components that made up the system. Commissioner Jones reported that 
a wide variety of schools made up the system. Nonreservation boarding schools, 
reservation boarding schools, reservation day schools, independent day schools, 
" 
state and territorial public schools, contract schools, and mission schools made up 
the vast majority of the institutions into which Indians were placed, with by far the 
greatest numbers going to reservation day and boarding schools.48 Designed to 
provide opportunities for virtually all Indian children, the system reflected the 
importance placed on exposing children to systematic training. After all, children 
represented the most likely sources of success in assimilation - they knew least of 
the old ways and if placed into schools at an early age could be remolded 
completely. Such thinking had been standard fare since the days of the Peace 
Policy. 
Morgan was the architect of a systematic, comprehensive school system that 
began to take shape during his tenure commissioner. His four-tiered approach 
proposed a collection of schools that roughly resembled American public schools. 
At the bottom were reservation day schools within easy distance of reservation 
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communities, and which operated like primary schools. With an average capacity 
of thirty pupils, the day school introduced youngsters to white values and 
institutions, serving in Commissioner William Jones' words as "an object lesson to 
the Indians who daily visit it."49 Often located in fairly remote locations where 
more extensive facilities were rare, the day school taught rudimentary skills in 
domestic arts, hygiene, and discipline. "These schools bring a portion of the 'white 
man' civilization to the home of the Indian," observed the commissioner in 1898. 
"As a rule, industrial training on a small scale is adopted [for boys ... whereas 
girls are] taught in a simple way the adornment of the home and the purity of 
home life. Unconsciously the little one bears with her back to the rude tepee ... 
some small portion of the civilization with which she is in contact.1150 
For the youngsters forced to attend them, day schools served as the 
foundation for future education at the boarding school, where one commissioner 
loftily suggested, "the superstructure" of education was added.51 Because they 
took "the little ones from the very heart of barbarism," noted Commissioner 
Browning in 1895, "these schools perform serious work in the educational plan."52 
Moreover, day schools aimed not just at children, but at parents as well. Indeed, 
all of the Indian schools were intended to serve as object lessons for parents and 
pupils alike. Day-school teachers were expected to visit camps of Indian families 
and to "instruct the women in the care of their homes."53 Lessons imparted to 
children were intended to filter down to parents so that those exposed to the 
rhythms and lessons of the day school might find it more difficult to undo its 
lessons. Aware of the need to counter any resistance, Commissioner Browning 
commented in 1896 that because "the day school is as much an educator of the 
father and mother as of the child," it could be counted on to help convince 
parents of the necessity of putting their children into school.54 
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Although less expensive and more numerous than other types of Indian 
schools, day schools gave way wherever possible to the single most important type 
of school in the system, the reservation boarding school. Boarding schools were 
the bedrock of the government's assimilation program. Calling them "the gateway 
out from the reservation," Morgan promoted them tirelessly. According to him, 
they taught Indian children the one thing that barbarism could not stand: "the 
marvelous secret of diligence."55 Carl Schurz also recognized the importance of 
the boarding schools. "Mere day schools upon the Indian reservations have ... 
proved insufficient," he wrote in 1880. "They do not withdraw the pupils from the 
influence of their home surroundings .... To this end boarding schools are 
required .... In fact, it is just as necessary to teach Indian children how to live as 
how to read and write."56 
Boarding schools kept students closely supervised for an average of ten 
months a year and thus controlled them to a degree not possible in the day 
schools. The lessons learned in boarding schools served a two-fold purpose. One 
was to provide students with the discipline and training they would need to lead 
successful lives. The reservation boarding school, said the commissioner in 1899, 
"presents daily object lessons ... and forms a stepping stone from camp 
conditions to home life ... boys and girls are taught the ... advantages of 
civilization, presented ideals for emulation, and a desire is awakened for a more 
moral and profitable existence."57 Boarding schools were not intended to 
produce legions of professionals or even of well educated students; their highest 
purpose was to civilize the children, give them a dose of religion, and provide 
them with sufficient skills to break away permanently from the old tribal life. 
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A second objective made the boarding school a role model· for the 
reservation community it served. Like day schools, an important part of the 
boarding school-program lay in its ability to influence entire communities. "The 
agency boarding school," wrote Morgan in 1881, "is the object lesson for the 
reservation."58 The more parents knew about the boarding school, reasoned 
administrators, the better. Rather than operating beyond the reach of parents, 
reservation boarding schools in fact generally encouraged visitation and were not 
tightly segregated from the rest of the community except in times of illness or 
emergency. In that way, parents might both see and appreciate for themselves the 
degree of change being wrought by the school. If they were overwhelmed by it, so 
much the better, for then administrators would have less to fear from parents who 
might once have been tempted to undo what their children were learning. There 
was also always the possibility that parents might actually take pride in what their 
school was doing. The Kiowas, for example, generally showed great enthusiasm 
for Rainy Mountain and in time came to consider it a critical part of their tribe's 
continued success. Parents eagerly visited the campus and overall the Kiowa 
community took great pride in the school. 
Parental support and interest no doubt contributed to better relations and 
increased enrollments, which were exactly what the Indian office wanted. In 1896, 
Commissioner Browning argued that "the Indian as a rule looks upon the 
reservation school as peculiarly his own, and by a wise system of visitation on the 
part of the parents is kept in touch with the older Indians. These schools are the 
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backbone of the Indian education system, and their influence in uplifting the tribal 
life ... is wonderful."59 Two years later Commissioner William A Jones was 
equally emphatic: "The institutions present themselves to him as an object lesson 
of the power and influence of the General Government; they appeal to him 
through his children, and awaken any smoldering sentiments for the betterment of 
his and their condition."60 
A revealing assessment of how important these schools were comes from 
the annual statistics of the Indian office for the years between 1877 and 1911. In 
1877 only forty-eight boar.ding schools were open. The total budget appropriation 
for Indian education was a mere $20,000, a sum that also supported 102 day 
schools. A decade later 117 boarding schools were operating with an enrollment 
of 8,020 pupils. The budget had increased to $1,211,415. By 1897 15,026 students 
attended 145 boarding schools and total appropriations had more than doubled to 
$2,517,265. In another decade the numbers were 173 boarding schools, 21,848 
students, and an education budget of $3,925,830. Until the 1920s when the 
government began to retrench and boarding schools fell out of favor, the trend 
was universally toward growth. This environment produced Rainy Mountain, and 
the school's entire life ran through the decades when boarding schools were 
heralded as the most important key to civilizing young Indians.61 
Beyond the reservation, educational opportunities fell off sharply. The 
great bulk of Indian children who received any sort of education in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries got it in reservation schools. Yet, in 
every community there were students who showed promise. For those relatively 
few, off-reservation boarding schools offered better training and the opportunity 
51 
to experience, even in limited fashion, the outside world. They could be held up 
as examples, as beacons of hope for the thousands of other youngsters in 
reservation schools. And, most importantly, they could furnish whites with 
examples of successful assimilation. 
Richard Henry Pratt was the architect and leading advocate of off-
reservation boarding schools. While serving as commandant at Fort Marion, 
Florida in the 1870s for a group of Southern Plains Indians incarcerated for their 
role in the Red River War he began a prison school. The Kiowas, Comanches, 
and Cheyennes for whom Pratt created his prison school were the forerunners of 
a bold plan.62 After trying out his ideas at Fort Marion and later at Hampton 
Institute in Virginia, Pratt received permission in 1879 to open a boarding school 
for Indians at the abandoned army barracks in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Carlisle was 
the first of more than two dozen such schools scattered across the country by the 
end of the century. Housing up to one thousand students, off-reservation 
boarding schools emphasized industrial and domestic training, but at higher levels. 
Instruction was better, facilities generally were superior to anything found on 
reservations, and students were the best the other schools had to offer. The off-
reservation boarding school, reported Commissioner Browning in 1895, "should 
stand in relation to the regular Government school as the college to the high 
school. ... The brightest and most efficient higher grade pupils are recommended 
by school superintendents ... in the nature of a promotion. "63 
Moreover, because the off-reservation schools were usually located close to 
"civilized centers," as tlie commissioner said in 1898, they could be counted on to 
expose students to the possibilities and realities of the outside world. "Their 
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principal advantages lie in contiguity to white civilization and in bringing together 
at one place Indian children of diverse tribes," wrote the commissioner in 1902. 
"These advantages are of great benefit, and round out the education begun in the 
reservation day and boarding schools."64 Through the outing program, for 
instance, which placed students with white families and businesses in the 
J 
community, off-reservation boarding schools proposed to create generations of 
talented and ambitious graduates who would never go back to the blanket; even at 
schools like Carlisle and Phoenix, with student bodies of more than one thousand 
students, many of whom spent significant time with whites, only a fragment of the 
total Indian school population had contact with the outside world. To correct 
that, the Indian office introduced plans in 1890 to transfer large numbers of 
Indian children to local public schools. In doing so, the government might 
gradually reduce its involvement in the expense of maintaining a separate Indian 
school system, and Indian children would be placed into mainstream schools. 
There, reasoned advocates of such plans, the process of assimilation would be 
quickened and more thoroughly accomplished. 
Thomas J. Morgan spoke enthusiastically in favor of the idea. As the 
logical conclusion to reservation education, Morgan hoped to see the day when 
Indian children would attend public schools - which was where they belonged -
instead of reservation schools. Public schools would do for Indians "what they are 
so successfully doing for all the other races in this country," said Morgan, 
"assimilate them."65 Such thinking was consistent with the larger vision of 
liquidating tribal domains, closing reservations, and ending government services to 
the tribes as soon as possible. Once reservation schools were gone ( and the day 
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was coming, announced the bureau), Indian children would have no choice but to 
attend public schools. 
In theory the plan was reasonably sound. In reality it operated poorly in 
most school districts. Though bureau statistics suggest a monumental shift in 
policy after the 1910s, those numbers are illusory. In many, if not most, local 
districts, the notion of accepting Indian pupils was not popular. As the Rainy 
Mountain example will show, both Indians and whites resisted the attempt to force 
Indian children to leave reservation schools. In the end, schools like Rainy 
Mountain were simply closed. The move forced Indian parents either to enroll 
their children in public schools or to bear the cost of transporting them to more 
distant reservation schools. Many Kiowas found that prospect repugnant because 
it meant taking their children to Fort Sill School, where they would be forced to 
live with Comanches. 
By 1899, nearly a decade of effort had netted contracts with only thirty-six 
public schools. Space was available for 359 pupils, but only 167 were actually in 
attendance. "Theoretically the placing of Indian youth in the public schools ... is 
a most admirable expedient for breaking down prejudices," commented the 
commissioner in 1899. But the lamentable truth was that the government would 
still have to accept responsibility for laying the foundation of education for Indian 
children.66 Only a year earlier, in fact, the Indian office had been forced to 
admit that "the plan ... does not appear to meet with much success" and noted 
that a decrease of more than one hundred Indian students had been reported in 
public schools.67 
By about 1910, however, the situation had changed dramatically. At the 
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tum of the century, the momentum of reform had begun to decline, and with it 
went the optimism of the preceding decades. No longer willing to champion the 
cause of Indian education as the source of change, policymakers adopted a more 
pessimistic posture. Although reservation schools survived the shift in attitude, 
their numbers were severely reduced. The bureau adopted a much less benevolent 
attitude concerning its responsibilities. Rather than spending millions for schools, 
the social Darwinists who ran the Indian bureau in the 1910s and 1920s sought to 
roll back expectations and facilities. The shortest course with regard to education 
lay in transferring Indians to public systems, where they could disappear into the 
mainstream. And the quicker that was done the better. "Progress is being made 
in the important work of more closely connecting the Indian schools with the 
public schools," asserted Commissioner Robert G. Valentine in 1910. He went on 
to remind them that above all public schools were "a definite means of promoting 
the assimilation of the Indians into American life."68 Two years later the 
commissioner described the process as "probably the most noticeable example of 
what is believed to be the 'final step' in the education of the Indian youth" and 
reported that out of 46,131 Indian children in school, 17,000, or nearly 30 percent 
were in public schools.69 By 1921 the commissioner could report that "the 
placing of all Indian children in the public schools is the ultimate aim. In a 
majority of the states we meet with the heartiest cooperation.'170 
Statistics bear this out. In roughly decade-long increments between 1890 
J 
and 1920, for instance, the trend is clear. In 1899, 20,522 Indian students 
attended schools. More than 16,000 of them attended reservation or off-
reservation schools and only 167 were enrolled in public schools. By 1912, 46,131 
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Indian children attended schools. But by then a decisive shift had begun. A total 
of 24,341 Indian youth were in reservation or off-reservation schools, and, as 
noted earlier, 17,011, or nearly 30 percent attended public schools. By 1921, 
62,764 Indian children were enrolled in schools. Fewer than 24,000 were in 
reservation or off-reservation Indian schools; 33,250 attended public schools.71 
For small boarding schools like Rainy Mountain this shift proved fatal. Unable to 
combat the changing philosophy of the Indian office and unable to survive the 
retrenchment of the 1920s, small reservation boarding schools were closed. The 
great experiment that had begun with Schurz and Morgan was largely over by the 
close of the 1920s. The bureau continued to operate schools, but its goals were 
low and its scope severely limited. While it lasted, however, the fervor for 
educational reform produced remarkable results, none moreso than for the 
Kiowas, for whom Rainy Mountain School was to become a beacon of hope. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE KIOWAS AND THEIR AGENCY 
In the minds of many nineteenth-century Americans, the austerity of the 
Southern Plains seemed so complete that the region deserved the epithet of Great 
American Desert. Like the Spanish who preceded them, and likewise found little 
that seemed worth having, many Americans in the mid-nineteenth century 
preferred to ponder the open plains from a safe distance. Those forced to cross it 
did so as quickly as possible, for the most desirable lands lay farther to the west in 
California. Much of the West and its seemingly savage hordes deserved the 
isolation with which popular opinion had relegated them. The boundaries of that 
part of the West, to borrow Richard White's phrase, seemed to be walls and not 
doors.1 Behind the walls lay an uncertain combination of natives, environmental 
extremes, and enormous space. Better, perhaps, to leave it be. 
Reality proved to be somewhat different from the stereotype and illusion of 
the West. By the 1850s, in fact, the Staked Plains of Texas and the Cimarron 
Valley of western Indian Territory had been revealed to be more valuable than 
once presumed. Indeed, since the opening of Texas in the mid-1820s, the 
Southern Plains received more attention with each passing decade. Despite 
hostile weather and conditions, the region began to flourish by the 1850s when 
cattle interests and then farmers opened it up. The Southern Plains, far from 
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being a wasteland, had usable natural pastures and an abundance of land. It was 
hard land, to be sure, but it was no desert. With a careful application of 
technology and capital, it might be transformed into a prosperous place. 
And yet it was hardly that simple. Before the region could be opened and 
settled, there lay the considerable task of controlling and pacifying its Indians. 
This meant coming to terms with fairly small but remarkably determined tribes 
that occupied much of the area between the Rio Grande and Platte rivers. Horse-
mounted, assertive, occupying vast territories, tribes such as the Comanches, 
Kiowas, Southern Cheyennes, and Arapahoes were examples of the challenge 
facing other settlers on the Southern Plains. The government had to control these 
kinds of tribes through the Peace Policy and reservation system if the region was 
to be opened. 
In the vanguard of Indian resistance were the Kiowas and their allies the 
Comanches. Never numerous - together they numbered fewer than 4,000 during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. - they nonetheless raised a determined 
resistance to the opening of their territory. Observers who spoke of an Indian 
barrier across the Texas, Indian Territory, arid Kansas frontier were not always 
stretching the truth. Although they were outnumbered and on the defensive from 
an early date, the tribes of the Southern Plains proved to be a serious threat to 
the Euroamerican settlement of most of the region. They defied attempts to 
collect them onto reservations until the late 1860s and early 1870s, surrendering as 
William T. Hagan has described the process only by fits and turns.2 For the 
Kiowa people, the line of frontier settlement that reached the Red River country 
of western Indian Territory by the 1850s posed serious threats to their autonomy 
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and isolation. As it was for other neighboring tribes, the freedom of the Plains 
was in fact ending quickly, moreso than any of them could really know. 
The earliest eighteenth-century accounts of the Kiowas place the tribe in 
modern western Montana on the headwaters of the Yellowstone River. Tribal 
historians and oral accounts speak of Kiowa ancestors among the Sarsi and Cree 
Indians and of the earliest known Kiowa hunting grounds between the headwaters 
of the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers.3 Sometime before 1750 the tribe 
migrated to the south and east until it reached present western Oklahoma, where 
it settled. Kiowa tradition explains that the move began in the wake of a dispute 
that produced a permanent split. One group moved to the west and out of 
recorded history. The other, from whence came the modern Kiowas, moved east 
to the Black Hills of present eastern Wyoming and western South Dakota. There, 
around 1700, they met and allied with the Crow, Northern Cheyenne, and 
Arapaho tribes.4 By way of their relationship with those tribes, the Kiowas were 
exposed to the material and social culture of the Plains. Most important was their 
introduction to the horse and buffalo culture, for through it the Kiowas developed 
into a Plains people whose institutions and values prepared them to become a 
dominant force once they moved south to the Red River. 
Although it is uncertain when the transition to the horse and buffalo 
culture began, it was nevertheless well underway by the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Evidence suggests that the tribe was trading for mounts as early as 1700. 
Anthropologist Francis Haines believed that the Kiowas acquired enough horses 
to make the transition to the buffalo culture by 1725. James Mooney cited 
Spanish sources indicating that mounted Kiowa war parties were common by the 
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late 1740s.5 
The acquisition of horses and the transformation that followed reshaped 
the Kiowas completely. Most notably it led to a level of prosperity and 
institutional growth previously impossible. Moving from the fringe of the Plains 
signaled one of the formative moments in Kiowa history. For then they 
encountered and established relations with the dominant powers of the Central 
and Southern Plains, eventually taking a place among them as a leading force. 
Moving out onto the Plains brought them into touch with the Lakotas, 
Comanches, and Northern and Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes. Pushed 
south out of the Black Hills by the Lakotas after the mid- eighteenth century, the 
Kiowas lingered briefly on the south fork of the Platte River; they then moved 
south across the Republican and Smokey Hill rivers and settled near the Arkansas 
River. There they claimed territory reaching into the Red River country. 
Between 1790 and 1806, the Kiowas and Comanches joined forces and opened the 
way for a formidable Indian presence all the way to the Rio Grande and the 
Hispanic and Pueblo Indian settlements that lay in its valley.6 
By 1834 the Kiowas strengthened their position in the region by reaching 
accords with the Osage, Lakota, and Pawnee tribes. Six years later they did the 
same with the Southern Cheyennes. With their borders now secured through a set 
of informal alliances, the Kiowas and Comanches established dominance on the 
Southern Plains by controlling most of present western Texas and Oklahoma and 
portions of eastern New Mexico. To the northeast they pushed back the Wichita 
Confederacy, to the southwest the Tonkawas, and to the west the Utes, Navajos, 
and Apaches. By mid-century, then, the Kiowas were in control of vast stretches 
67 
of the region. 
The material and social culture of the Kiowas generally reflected that of 
the other horse and buffalo tribes on the plains. Anthropologist Jerrold Levy 
maintains that in addition to developing the well-known material culture of Plains 
tribes, the Kiowas also went through an important period of political and 
institutional change. "Differences in wealth and status developed," writes Levy, 
and a leadership hierarchy was formed "that united the bands in. one political 
(tribal) entity with tribal wide ceremonies and warrior associations whose 
membership cut across band divisions.'17 Unlike many other Plains tribes, the 
Kiowas enjoyed a rare sense of tribal identity made possible in part by a relatively 
small number, and in part by unusually fluid and complex kinship pattems.8 
The primary political unit of the pre-reservation period was the band, or 
topadoga, which operated under the direction of a headman, the topadold. Seven 
of these bands are known to have existed: Arikara (k'at'a, or biters), Elks (ko-qui), 
Kiowa proper (kae-qua), Big Shields (kinep), Apaches (semat, the Kiowa-
Apaches ), Black Boys (konta'lyui, also called Saynday's children or sindiyui), and 
the Pulling Up Band (k'uato, said to have been exterminated by the Lakota in the 
late eighteenth century. )9 These bands typically consisted of the families of 
several brothers and sisters and were led by an .elder brother. The most senior 
brother of the core family became the topadold. Descent was bilateral, often 
patrilocal, and familial ties were characterized by sororal polygamy - marriage by 
one husband to sisters, and the levirate - the taking of a widow by her brother-
in-law. Thus the Kiowa family was the smallest unit in Kiowa society, but it was 
also usually an extended group bound closely together by social and political 
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conventions that ensured adequate levels of labor and prosperity for the group.10 
A distinguishing element in Kiowa social and political organization was the 
presence of named social ranks and the use of hierarchical warrior societies. No 
other Plains tribe practiced the status ranking typical of the Kiowas. A 
deliberately uneven distribution of wealth, usually in the form of pony herds, 
characterized the Kiowa system. This wealth was used to determine social and 
tribal status. Although an inequitable distribution of wealth was not uncommon 
among other Plains tribes, only the Kiowas formalized the status that derived from 
such an arrangement. Onde ongop, the first rank, consisted of the most eminent 
topadoki, warriors, and men of great wealth provided they had good war records. 
The next rank, onde gupai, included the rest of the men who possessed horses in 
number beyond that required for subsistence. Levy describes members of this 
rank as "lesser topadoki ... , most medicine men; and some of the more successful 
younger warriors." The third rank, ko.an, owned few horses and rarely had the 
herds necessary for joining war parties, but constituted a sort of respectable poor 
who were often courted by the higher status groups. Kaan members were usually 
young men eager to rise to other ranks. Finally, the lowest class occupied a status 
called dapom. Frequently considered misfits and outcasts, the dapom were usually 
regarded as lazy and shiftless.11 Deference toward members of the onde groups 
was the rule, but upward mobility was possible. Members of upper groups could 
occasionally breach social or tribal conventions with little fear of retribution. 
Given the relationship of wealth and status to the pony-based economy, it was just 
as possible to lose rank if the herds were thinned or lost.12 
Contact with Euroamericans came in the wake of the Spanish settlement of 
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the Southwest. Although the Spanish knew the Kiowas and had suffered 
depredations at their hands and those of the Comanches, the Spanish frontier was 
a relatively isolated one and did not pose a substantial threat to the autonomy of 
the tribes. This changed very quickly after the turn of the nineteenth century 
when the line of Angloamerican settlement crossed into the Mississippi Valley. 
The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 added the Kiowa homeland to the United States; 
the establishment of Indian Territory in 1830 immediately adjacent to the Kiowa 
domain further complicated the matter. The first notable contact between the 
Kiowas and Angloamericans occurred in the summer of 1834 when the Kiowas 
joined other tribes from Indian Territory to meet with the famous Dragoon 
Expedition of Henry Dodge. Discussions at the junction of Elk Creek and the 
north fork of the Red River led the following August to the Treaty of Camp 
Holmes and a formal declaration of peace and friendship between the Kiowas, 
Comanches, Wichitas, Creeks, and Osages. Tardy in their attendance at the 
signing ceremonies, the Kiowas did not actually sign until May 26, 1837.13 
In the meantime, contact accelerated as traders and settlers pushed beyond 
the 100th meridian and into Kiowa country. In 1834, for example, Charles Bent 
opened a trading post on the Arkansas River in the southeast corner of what 
would become Colorado. One year later, Auguste Choteau built a post on the 
Canadian River and attracted Kiowa, Comanche; and Wichita interest. Two years 
later, in 1837, he opened the first post in Kiowa territory on Cache Creek, three 
miles west of what became Fort Sill. William Bent followed in 1844 with a trading 
concern near Kiowa country located on the South Canadian River in the Texas 
Panhandle.14 The relative is'olation of the Kiowas and their neighbors eroded 
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steadily in the 1840s and 1850s as the line of white settlement pushed westward. 
And as a result, relations, which were never particularly good, became increasingly 
strained. 
By the 1850s alarm grew over Indian depredations on the Southern Plains. 
Texas settlements bore the brunt of the raiding, but Mexican towns came in for 
their share as well. As violence flared, a solution was more urgent with each 
passing year. When a line of frontier forts intended to pacify the region by the 
early 1850s failed to do so, the government began earnest attempts to negotiate 
lasting peace through the careful application of goods, annuities, and, of course, 
reservations. The first major agreement with the Kiowas occurred in July 1853 
with the signing of the Treaty of Fort Atkinson. The treaty secured the protection 
of settlers moving onto the Southern Plains via the Santa Fe Trail and other 
routes. Annuities were promised to the Kiowas, Kiowa Apaches, and Comanches 
in return for the safe passage of settlers and for the establishment of roads. and 
military posts. Despite their apparent significance for both sides, none of the 
famous Kiowa calendars recorded the negotiations. In any event, the agreement 
did little to improve the general situation on the Southern Plains.15 
In the wake of the Fort Atkinson Treaty, in fact, hostilities escalated. 
Kiowa-Comanche raiding parties continued to traverse the region and reports 
indicated no significant reduction in the level of violence. Indeed, Kiowas rarely 
felt bound by treaty provisions designed to restrict their movements; some 
interpreted the Americans' willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness. Fort 
Atkinson was an indication of the cavalier attitude that most Kiowa men had 
toward such settlements. The Atkinson discussions pointed up the difficulty in 
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getting tribes, or even portions of them, to accept the restrictions and agreements 
that white negotiators placed at the heart of such treaties. They were often 
products of the manipulation of certain willing headsmen who, for their part, were 
usually more interested in annuities and trade goods than in peace settlements. 
Treaties like the ones signed at Fort Atkinson were badly flawed from the very 
beginning and promised much more than either side was able to deliver. 
At any rate, conditions continued to be dangerous as the 1850s came to a 
close. The American Civil War years worsened an already poor situation. In the 
West the army had to deal not only with rebels but also with recalcitrant Indians. 
Having never gained satisfactory control of the Southern Plains to begin with, the 
federal government now faced the unhappy prospect of confronting not one but 
many enemies in the West. By 1863 a general state of war existed between the 
United States and most of the region's major tribes. Engagements at Adobe 
Walls, New Mexico in the summer of 1864 where Kiowas and Comanches battled 
Kit Carson, and the notorious Sand Creek, Colorado massacre by Chivington's 
volunteers in the autumn of the same year highlighted the situation. Both sides 
wearied of the standoff, and by the fall of 1865 Kiowa emissaries joined with other 
tribal representatives to discuss peace with United States authorities on the Little 
Arkansas River near present day Wichita, Kansas. On October 17 and 18, the 
Kiowas, Kiowa-Apaches, and Comanches agreed to relinquish all territorial claims 
in Colorado, New Mexico, and Kansas and to move to a protected reservation in 
western Indian Territory. Again, however, the treaty failed to represent the 
majority of tribesmen, and Comanche spokesmen bitterly reminded the 
government of its failure to live up to previous agreements. As with other treaty 
negotiations, Little Arkansas seemed more like a cease fire than a permanent 
solution.16 
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To no one's surprise, the tenuous peace fell apart almost immediately. The 
death of Dohasin, an influential headman who had signed the treaty at Little 
Arkansas and who had promoted peace, left an important void. Equally troubling 
was the factionalism between peace advocates led by Kicking Bird and a collection 
of raiders led by Lone Wolf and Satanta, both well known for their prowess as 
fighters. Under Satanta's influence, large numbers of young Kiowas left the 
reservation, repudiated the Little Arkansas agreements, and returned to their 
raiding. 
Increasingly concerned by the level of violence across the Southern Plains, 
the government made yet another attempt in the fall of 1867 to secure a 
settlement with the Kiowas and their neighbors.17 In meetings held at Medicine 
Lodge Creek, Kansas, the Peace Commission - created in 1867 by Congress and 
empowered to deal specifically with the western tribes - meant to have a 
definitive answer. The region's most important tribes, with whom the government 
was beginning to lose patience, assembled to hear the commission's offer. 
Instructions from Washington gave the commission power to clear the area, 
arrange reservations, and pacify the tribes. Yet it meant to do so, it said, fairly 
and judiciously. As if to satisfy the tribes that it had their interests at heart, 
Commissioner John B. Henderson announced that he had come "to hear all your 
complaints, and to correct all your wrongs."18 
Three days of discussions produced a treaty. The usual pronouncements 
concerning perpetual peace and friendship were made. Boundaries for a Kiowa-
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Comanche-Kiowa Apache reservation were detailed, and annuities were 
guaranteed for the next two decades. The treaty promised an agency and staff to 
attend to the needs of the tribes for the life of the agreement. Important plans 
for allotment and inducements to encourage it were included, as were the usual 
comments on education and civilization. These were all standard fare. The 
document reflected the dominant assumptions of the era and accurately 
represented the American government's intentions. It served as a blue print for 
the transformation of the Kiowas. Provisions for education, farming, and 
allotment, for example, revealed the sweeping changes in,store. In its emphasis 
on accelerating the assimilation of the tribes the agreement reflected what Prucha 
has noted was the central goal of reformers and policymakers alike·- a 
Protestant, civilized, Indian.19 
Kiowas and Comanches who attended the meetings gave mixed responses 
that, at best, reflected an ambivalentattitude about what was happening. The . 
lofty rhetoric of the commission notwithstanding ("We wish you to live," said 
Henderson, "and we will offer you the way"), most of the Indian audience was 
unimpressed. The outspoken leader Satanta reminded the group that his people 
were making grave sacrifices. "All of the land south of the Arkansas belongs to 
the Kiowas and Comanches," he said, "and I don't want to give away any of it .... 
I love to roam over the wide prairie ... but when we settle down we grow pale 
and die." Two years later, Kiowa agent Lawrie Tatum reported that Satanta 
admitted that "he took hold of that part of the white man's road that was 
represented by the breechloading gun, but did not like the ration of com; it hurt 
his teeth." Speaking for the Comanches, Ten Bears said he was happy to have the 
gifts and annuities but expressed reluctance over accepting a reservation. "I was 
born where there were no enclosures," he said. "I want to die there and not 
within walls .... The white man has the country which we loved."20 It was not 
an encouraging reaction. 
74 
As William T. Hagan has argued, Kiowa and Comanche skepticism was 
well founded. Despite its impressive tone and authority, the Treaty of Medicine 
Lodge Creek reflected not so much a desire to solve the Indian problem through 
peace and humanitarian reform as it did a desire to open the Kiowa-Comanche 
country to white settlement. In fact, the purpose of the treaty was to clear Indians 
out of the way, not to worry at length about what should be done with them. 
Neither the treaty nor the government that sponsored it created the conditions 
necessary for the transformation of the Kiowas and Comanches. Worse, Hagan 
has written that the commissioners themselves participated knowingly "in a 
mockery of true bargaining" by writing a treaty that purported to reflect the will of 
the tribes involved. It is likely that only a handful of tribesmen truly understood 
the treaty's provisions, a fact that commission members knew. In reality, the 
treaty did not promote peace at all, but, according to Hagan, was used to "give the 
stamp of legitimacy to United States efforts to concentrate the Indians and open 
the region to white exploitation." Thus, the primary aim of such negotiations was 
rarely to civilize Indians. Instead, they served to reduce the threat to frontier 
settlements and to facilitate the expansion of railroads and other interests. This 
critical flaw crippled the Medicine Lodge agreement from its inception. The 
government made promises that it would not keep, promises that according to 
Hagan it never intended to honor. It was a specious document, and the civilizing 
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program it outlined would prove it.21 
At the heart of that program lay the schools and teachers promised by the 
treaty - one each for every thirty pupils on the reservation. "The necessity of 
education is admitted," noted Article 7, especially on so-called "agricultural 
reservations."22 How deeply the government would honor the commitment 
remained to be seen. Coming as it did in the era of the Peace Policy and public 
concern for humanitarian programs, reformers hoped that some poli,cymakers 
would embrace the cause. A few officials actually took the task to heart, 
believing, as did Thomas Battey, that Indian schools "seemed like a holy 
experiment."23 Before long several schools dotted the reservation. This fledgling 
reservation school system, however, was falsely encouraging, a fact best revealed 
through a brief examination of the reservation in its formative years. 
Control of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency passed to the Quakers in 1869 
when responsibility for the Central Superintendency, in which the agency was 
located, came to them under the provisions of the Peace Policy. The first agent 
for the tribes was Lawrie Tatum, a forty-seven-year-old Iowa farmer appointed in 
May 1869, a fact Tatum reportedly discovered in a newspaper story.24 A 
thorough-going Quaker whose temperament meshed perfectly with the 
humanitarian goals of the Peace Policy, Tatum faced an enormous task. Before 
him were more than 6,000 Indians from ten tribes speaking nine languages and 
occupying an area the size of Connecticut. An earnest and eager agent, Tatum 
soon discovered that the kind of enlightened conduct in which he so deeply 
believed was badly out of step with the overwhelming realities of the reservation. 
In 1872 he wrote that through inspired and thoughtful leadership "the witness of 
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God in their hearts would be reached." Unfortunately for Tatum, the task would 
prove to be a nearly impossible undertaking.25 
A portent of the future came shortly after he took office. A brief 
inspection of the agency convinced him that its needs were so great that significant 
increases in budget and supplies were necessary. On August 21, 1869 he wrote to 
the Indian Office to say that he needed twenty-seven farmers and fourteen cooks 
for the current year in order to fulfill his obligations to the tribes. Moreover, he 
continued, those numbers would have to be increased to eighty and thirty, 
respectively, for the coming year. Tatum also requested 25 wagons, 160 mules, 
and 120 plows, all of it necessary to provide the "fostering and protecting care of 
the government" to which the tribes were entitled.26 
Tatum's requests exceeded $200,000 - a figure that went far beyond 
anything authorized in the Medicine Lodge Treaty, and well beyond what the 
Indian Office could provide. The commissioner's response was coldly emphatic: 
The Medicine Lodge Treaty guaranteed one farmer, not twenty-seven. Tatum 
would have to make do with what he had. His other requests were turned down 
as well, probably by a clerk who wondered just who this Quaker farmer thought 
he was. When Tatum continued to push for larger budgets and greater support, 
Commissioner Francis A. Walker tersely reminded him in 1872 that "the United 
States have given them a noble reservation, and have provided amply for all their 
wants. "27 It was an inauspicious beginning to be sure. 
Forced to make do with what little they had, Tatum and his successors 
forged ahead with programs intended to support the civilizing agenda of the Peace 
Policy. By making the tribes farmers and stockmen, and by using the influence of 
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schools, churches, and other Angloamerican institutions, agents hoped to lead the 
tribes as quickly as possible to new lives. In the meantime, rations and annuities 
not only provided them with basic necessities, but also served as a discouragement 
to the raiding in which too many tribesmen still engaged. It was a daunting task. 
As Hagan's analysis of the Comanche experience reveals, agents rarely gained 
control of the reservation. Although in theory they possessed what Thomas J. 
Morgan described as "semi-despotic powers," few agents ever managed to master 
the complexities of the reservation environment This was due in part to the 
determined resistance of the tribes. In a revealing passage in his study of the 
Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, Hagan has argued that "the typical agent learned 
to avoid trouble by not pushing the civilization program too hard and thus setting 
his Indians against him." An 1870 report from Tatum suggests that Hagan is 
correct. Tatum commented to the commissioner that annuity payments ironically 
represented an incentive to ignore agency policies because if the Indians behaved 
themselves they feared the reduction of such goods. "They repeatedly told me 
that ... the only way to get a large amount was to go on the war path awhile, kill 
a few white people, steal a good many horses and mules, and then make a treaty 
and they would get a large amount of presents and a liberal supply of goods for 
that fall."28 Similar stories and accounts of failing programs were staples of 
subsequent reports. 
The fact that most agents were usually of poor caliber only made the 
situation worse. Tatum was an exception to the rule, and even he found the 
situation beyond his ability. Agents usually showed less fortitude and initiative 
than Tatum. Many were nothing more than political hacks for whom the agent's 
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job was a political reward. The situation improved somewhat when army officers 
replaced civilian agents at the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation by the 1890s. Until 
then a procession of malcontents, incompetents, and ill-suited appointees plagued 
the agency. With the exception of the Quaker agents, most of them were 
wretched failures. Between 1885 and 1893, for example, five men served as agent 
and in the process created conditions that were generally so miserable that the 
agency earned a well deserved reputation as one of the nation's worst. Although 
not the worst of the lot, J. Lee Hall was typical. He confided that he had entered 
the Indian service to get rich. Lee did not succeed in that hope, but he was 
indicted twice by grand juries for fraud, misappropriation of funds, and 
drunkenness during his tenure. The author 0. Henry is said to have based a 
character on Hall, whom he described as "blond as a viking, quiet as a deacon, 
dangerous as a machine gun." Methodist minister J. J. Methvin, a missionary on 
the reservation, remembered Hall somewhat more charitably as "a great man in 
ruins on account of drink." Other agents hired relatives, cut deals with cattle 
interests or railroads, and took bribes from traders and businessmen. Though 
some were genuinely good men, too many were not.29 
This was unfortunate, for the Kiowa-Comanche Agency was a large and 
important one with pressing troubles and unruly occupants. The Medicine Lodge 
agreement did little to control them. Leaders like Satanta, Big Tree, and Satank 
continued to raid with near impunity and regarded the reservation with disdain. 
In 1870 Central Superintendent Enoch Hoag reported that the principal troubles 
in his region came from the Kiowas, Comanches, and Kiowa-Apaches. Two years 
later the Commissioner of Indian Affairs characterized those tribes as "wild and 
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intractable .... Even the best of them have given small signs of improvement." 
Exasperated, the commissioner went on to say that in light of continued raids and 
trouble making by those tribes, "the point has been reached where. forbearance 
ceases to be a virtue." More urgently needed than anything was "a wholesome 
example which shall inspire fear and command obedience." Tatum confirmed 
Hoag's dreary evaluation when by admitting that "the Kiowas and a few hands of 
the Comanches are uncontrollable by me."30 Though official reports eventually 
began to offer more optimistic assessments, especially after the end of the Red 
River War in 1875, the agency did little more than muddle through for the first six 
years of its existence. Reviewing its lackluster performance in 1884, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs regretfully described the agency to the Secretary 
of the Interior as "an unhappy failure," a fact that few knowledgeable observers 
could deny.31 
Across the reservation the government's civilizing programs were failing. 
Schools were nonexistent. Stock raising programs fizzled. Attempts to get Kiowas 
and Comanches to farm met little success. So little was being achieved that most 
of the agency's Indians found it relatively easy to resist assimilation, or, at the very 
least, to accept it in ways and on terms that did not mean forfeiting their sense of 
cultural identity. In 1875, seven years after Medicine Lodge, Hoag reported that 
the number of Indians on the agency wearing citizens clothing stood at eight. The 
number of houses occupied by Indians was eight. And only sixty of an estimated 
six hundred school-age children were receiving instruction at the agency's only 
school. Far from transforming the tribes, the reservation produced increasingly 
dependent Indians mired in poverty and subjected to one after another of the 
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worst agents in the service. The promises made at Medicine Lodge unraveled 
more rapidly every year. Some had seen it coming and had warned against it. In 
1871, less than two years after the signing of the treaty, Hoag told his superiors 
that though the Peace Policy was working, "its beneficial results, in some instances, 
have been seriously crippled by want of promptness on the part of the 
Government."32 Nowhere was the want of promptness more keenly felt than the 
Kiowa-Comanche Agency. 
The schools intended to civilize Kiowa children after the fashion of other 
American children operated in this environment. Like much of the rest of the 
reservation's programs, schooling met with indifference, poor support, and 
inadequate funding. Despite the lofty rhetoric of the Indian Office and 
humanitarian reformers, the truth is that what little the schools accomplished 
came usually in spite of, and not because of, government direction. Schools like 
Rainy Mountain stood as testimony to the casual attitude of a government that 
liked to pride itself on a progressive approach to the Indian question. In reality, 
few examples more clearly illustrate the limitations of reform; few examples more 
clearly reveal the distance between rhetoric and reality. 
Required by the Medicine Lodge Treaty to provide a school and teacher 
for every thirty school-age children on the reservation, the government struggled 
from the beginning to make good on its obligation. At no point during the 
agency's existence were there sufficient school facilities. The government never 
came close to providing anything resembling enough schools for the six-hundred 
children who were entitled to them. Tatum reported in 1870 that his agency had 
no schools and he did not expect to get any in the foreseeable future. "There 
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have been no funds either to build houses or sustain teachers," he noted. 
Moreover, he found the restrictions on building schools one at a time a ludicrous 
idea. Requiring one school to have thirty students before the next could be put 
up was an unreasonable requirement. Many rural, white districts had fewer than 
thirty students in them, he noted, but schools went up anyway. If education was 
the key to civilization programs, why force helpless Indian children to endure 
crippling regulations ?33 
The first attempt at a school began in February of 1871 when Josiah 
Butler, a Quaker, and his wife Elizabeth, opened a small boarding school near the 
agency at Fort Sill. Though it would come to be known as the Kiowa School, it 
initially attracted mostly Caddoes and Wichitas. Kiowas did not attend it regularly 
or in significant numbers until some three or four years later. During its first 
term Butler's school was home to a total of twenty-four children. His scholars, as 
he liked to call them, attended school five days a week, four-and-a-half-hours a 
day. Butler used what he called "object teaching" and concentrated on spelling, 
reading, and writing. Elizabeth Butler taught sewing and domestic skills to the 
girls; her husband arranged work for the older boys at the agency saw mill on 
Saturdays for fifty cents each per day. The children were fed, lodged, and clothed 
at the school, which was partly supported by donations from the Society of 
Friends. Invited to see for himself how the children were doing, Tatum visited at 
the end of the first term and reported that the pupils "all showed marked progress 
for the length of time they have been studying."34 As for Butler, it was a modest 
beginning, but he too thought there was great promise in the experiment, provided 
he could get help and support from the tribes and the agency. In his first annual 
report he was careful to mention "the labor, anxiety, patience, and forbearance" 
that had been "necessarily expended." Still, he trusted in God to lead him and 
closed by saying that he knew his labor was not in vain.35 For the next eight 
years his was virtually the only school on the reservation. 
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Others made attempts at opening schools, but none of them provided 
significant help to Butler; in fact, most of them failed. · An instructive example 
comes from the experience of Thomas C. Battey, a Quaker from Iowa who got 
along well with the Kiowas. Battey announced his intention to open a school after 
receiving what he called a sign from the Lord on March 30, 1872. In December 
of the same year he arrived at Kicking Bird's camp, where in a long tent divided 
into living quarters for himself and a classroom for his pupils, he opened a school. 
By his own recollection the Indians regarded the school with some hesitation, and 
Battey found his hands full just managing simple conversation with children who 
did not speak English. In her study of schooling on the reservation, Ida Moore 
commented that "as to the school, as is generally understood the term, it did not 
seem to amount to much."36 Agent J.M. Haworth said much the same thing in 
his annual report for 1873. "Thomas C. Battey has not been very successful in 
keeping up a school ... among the Kiowas," he wrote. But Battey was "much 
encouraged he will convince them to allow a regular school this fall and 
winter."37 He was wrong. 
In the meantime, the agency struggled along and relied on Butler's school 
at Fort Sill as its only viable school house. Butler cheerfully reported that each 
term brought larger enrollments than the previous one. Within two years of its 
opening the school held over thirty students, most of whom, if one is to believe 
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official reports, were making satisfactory progress. In 1875 Kiowas and 
Comanches enrolled their children for the first time, a heartening development. 
Twenty Kiowa children enrolled that year, bringing the school's size to nearly sixty 
students. Ironically, the interest shown by Kiowas in getting their children into 
the school quickly pushed it beyond its limits and contributed to the overcrowding 
that became chronic. Haworth complained to Washington that he could have had 
many more children in school if he had more room, more schools, and more 
teachers. As it was, he could accommodate only about sixty of more than six 
hundred school-age youngsters.38 Every term children were turned away. Even 
when Indian parents tried to pay for the privilege they discovered that there 
simply was not space. One chief reportedly offered a pony to get his child into 
the school, but for lack of space he was refused.39 Why the Kiowas suddenly 
began to support the school is not clear. The growing number of missionaries on 
the reservation probably contributed, as did intertribal jealously. Although they 
did not like their children being schooled in the same rooms, more and more 
Kiowas and Comanches likely realized that keeping their children out of school 
would hinder them in the future. 
From 1877 through 1879 agents reported that the school was filled to 
overflowing and that young children were being sent away with no hope of getting 
the education that was owed them. The situation was becoming so bad that 
Indian parents began to lodge complaints with the agents. Haworth noted that 
"several of the Indians who have children in school have told me that they are 
very anxious for their children to get an education sufficient to become teachers 
among their own people." Others asked repeatedly when their children could 
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expect to be enrolled. Urged by the Indians to build more schools, Haworth 
suggested a solution to the shortage. He proposed dividing the agency into eight 
districts - one for the Kiowa Apaches, three for the Kiowas, and four for the 
Comanches - with a school for each district. By building smaller schools the 
agency could save money and meet the needs of the large majority of children for 
whom there were no schools. There is no evidence that his proposal received 
serious attention.40 
Agents complained repeatedly about the lack of space in the schools. 
Almost a decade after Medicine Lodge, P. B. Hunt reported in 1878 that with 
seventy-five students crowded into the school at Fort Sill the facility was strained 
beyond capacity. Many more students would have gladly attended but could not 
due to lack of space and teachers.41 Clearly, the agency was failing in what the 
government regarded as a critical component of the civilizing process. 
By 1879 matters improved slightly. The consolidation of the Wichita 
Agency with the Kiowa-Comanche Agency in 1878 meant more school-age 
children to worry about, but it also provided an additional school. The Wichita 
School at Anadarko, later known as Riverside School, held about one hundred 
students. Agent Hunt announced plans to improve both it and the Fort Sill plant 
to provide space for some three hundred pupils, nearly double the number then in 
attendance. Still, as he ruefully admitted, some five hundred other children would 
still be without schools. It was the best he could do. In late 1879 a new building 
went up at Riverside; similar improvements to the Fort Sill School followed about 
a year later. In 1887 approval was granted for a separate Comanche school at 
Fort Sill. The deteriorating condition of the Fort Sill School, combined with a 
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reluctance to send their children to school with other Indians, prompted the 
Comanches to insist on a separate facility. The agent was well disposed to the 
idea because the school was a strong bargaining chip with the Comanches. The 
agent noted it made sense to placate the tribe because it was a powerful one and 
''by far the best material out of which to make good citizens." Construction began 
in 1890; the school opened its doors in October of 1892 when thirty-three 
Comanche girls entered. By 1893 the school was filled to its capacity of one 
hundred students. It was an indication that circumstances were changing, for by 
then the Kiowas had gotten approval for a school of their own at Rainy 
Mountain.42 
Despite additional construction and improved facilities, the reservation's 
schools remained desperately overcrowded and poorly run. In 1882, for example, 
the Riverside School suffered a fire; its effects were still being felt two full years 
later when, because of limited repair funds, the school building was near collapse. 
In the coldest weather the agent conceded that "there was actual suffering" among 
the students. In 1885 the agent's official report made the embarrassing admission 
that on balance the schools had accomplished very little.43 
By 1888 agent E. E. White lamented that although the Kiowa-Comanche 
Agency was "a very large and important agency .... it would be hard to imagine 
one with fewer or less adequate facilities." He called the schools "greatly 
inadequate," and reported that the Fort Sill School was so badly in need of repair 
that it was scarcely habitable. One year later W. D. Meyers continued the litany 
of complaints by declaring the Fort Sill School "a disgrace to the government that 
owns it." .. As evidence, he pointed to the sordid state of affairs at the school, 
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whose superintendent had been dismissed for drunkenness and then inexplicably 
reappointed, a fact that Meyers said had "wrecked it for the year." Worse, the 
Kiowas and Comanches were beginning to refuse to send their children to the 
same schools, and had begun to demand their own separate schools.44 On a 
reservation where keeping two schools in working order was proving to be a 
herculean task, it was unlikely that such a request would be enthusiastically 
undertaken. 
The quality of school employees was often mediocre at best. Turnover was 
frequent - four men served as superintendent of the Fort Sill school between 
1885 and 1889. The first, though judged by an investigator for the Indian Rights 
Association to be "a nice well-meaning man; industrious, honest, and all that, and 
would make a good farmer, ... [he] has no faculty for managing a school." His 
successor was fired for drunkenness. The third stayed only a few months and, in 
the words of the Indian office, left after using "objectionable and profane language 
to such an extent as to shock the female employees." The fourth, a twenty-five 
year old Kansan, was removed in 1891 after one of his employees whipped two 
boys so savagely that the two plus a companion fled the agency, were caught in a 
winter storm and froze to death.45 
Teachers proved no better. One inspector described two of the three 
teachers at the Kiowa School in 1887 as incompetent. Only the third, along with 
the matron and seamstress, were worthy of employment. They alone were the 
"grains of salt which save this school from absolute stench." Nepotism was 
rampant, caused partly by the isolation of the agency and the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable help, and partly by agents who knew they could appoint relatives 
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with impunity. The staff of the Kiowa School in 1889, for instance, reflected this. 
The superintendent and one of the teachers were married. One teacher was a 
cousin to the wife of the superintendent. The assistant matron and industrial 
teacher were married, and the cook was the matron's sister. It was no wonder 
that after evaluating the agency's school staff in 1885, one inspector described the 
schools as "asylum[s] for relatives and friends who cannot earn a support 
elsewhere."46 
Private schools were doing little better. Common on reservations across 
the country, mission schools and private academies were slow to appear on the 
Kiowa-Comanche Reservation. They enrolled a relatively small number of pupils 
( agency records suggest combined enrollments of fewer than one hundred pupils), 
and often had brief life spans. An array of religious groups including the 
Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers, and Catholics 
established schools on the reservation beginning in the 1880s.47 In 1888, for . 
example, the Secretary of the Interior notified the Indian Office of a request from 
the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church for 160 acres near Fort 
Sill to carry on "an Indian training school." Two years later Reverend S. V. Fait 
had a church up and announced plans for a boarding school to be opened the 
following year. In February of 1893, Fait informed Commissioner Thomas J. 
Morgan that the Mary Gregory Memorial Mission School was ready to receive its 
first students. Though it had an advertised capacity of twenty, it was some years 
until it reached that number. The school closed in 1897.48 
The Methodists, Baptists, and Catholics were close behind. With the 
support of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, Reverend J. J. Methvin opened 
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the splendidly named Methvin Methodist Institute south of Anadarko in the fall of 
1890. By the spring of 1891 he had sixteen Kiowas and five Comanches in 
class.49 At the same time, Reverend W.W. Carithers of the Reformed 
Presbyterian Church opened Cache Creek Mission among the Apaches and 
Kiowa-Apaches. It remained open until just after Wodd War I. Joshua H. Given, 
a Kiowa educated by the Presbyterians and ordained as a minister, announced his 
intention to build both a church and school.so W. D. Lancaster, a Baptist 
missionary and one of Rainy Mountain's first employees, opened the Lone Wolf 
Mission in September 1890 on the north fork of the Red River with about a 
dozen pupils, most of them Kiowas. The Kiowas liked the school, reported one 
observer, ''because it is located among them. The Government school ... and all 
the mission schools except one are ... in a bunch near the agency at Anadarko." 
Like most of the other small mission schools, however, Lone Wolf attracted few 
pupils and suffered from scanty support. It closed in 1910.,. In addition to these, 
the Catholics ran Saint Patrick's Catholic Mission in Anadarko between 1891 and 
1915, and the Indian office opened the Chilocco Indian School north of Newkirk, 
Oklahoma in 1884. A large off-reservation school of the sort pioneered by Pratt 
at Carlisle, Chilocco served primarily to further the training of students who had 
already been through reservation boarding schools. It cannot, therefore, be said 
to have improved materially the terrible shortage of schools on the Kiowa-
Coinanche Reservation.s1 
Despite the spate of building that occurred in the 1880s, the schools that 
opened during that decade never approached the numbers called for in the 
Medicine Lodge agreement. With a school-age population that averaged around 
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six hundred after 1874, the reservation was entitled to at least twenty schools and 
teachers. It never had more than a half dozen, and half of those were private, 
church-supported efforts. Between 1869 and 1884 the number of school-age 
children actually in school never exceeded twenty percent of the eligible 
population. Even with the addition of Rainy Mountain and the new Comanche 
School by the early 1890s; levels of attendance never approached fifty percent. 
Indeed, as late as 1892, agent George Day could write that among the gravest 
concerns of the reservation's Indians was education, specifically more and better 
schools.52 
The Indian service so completely neglected its duties during the era that to 
fulfill Article· 7 alone of the Medicine Lodge Treaty would have required 
expenditures far beyond the capacity of the government's resources. Hagan, for 
example, has noted that the commissioner's office admitted in 1878 that "if the 
United States simply lived up to its treaty obligations to the Comanches, Kiowas, 
and Kiowa Apaches, it would consume all the educational funds allotted to the 
entire population of the Indian Territory exclusive of the Five Civilized tribes." 
Four years later, Commissioner Hiram Price reported that by his reckoning the 
government had fallen behind a total of nearly $2 million dollars in meeting 
educational commitments for the Kiowa-Comanche agency since the signing of the 
Medicine Lodge pact.53 In his annual report for 1885, Superintendent of Indian 
Education John H. Oberly wrote that with regard to education, "the government 
[has] failed to give effect, in accordance with their letter, to most of the ... 
[treaty] provisions. It may also be stated that Congress annually fails to give effect 
... to most of the still vital provisions." He continued by noting that the · 
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Secretary of the Interior's report for 1884 had revealed that $4,033,700 was 
necessary to fulfill education obligations across the country. On the Kiowa-
Comanche Reservation alone the amount was $245,206, a sum equal to 22 percent 
of the government's entire education budget of $1.1 million for 1885.54 
A report from the Superintendent of Indian Education in 1883 revealed the 
extent of the Indian Office's negligence on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation. 
According to the government's master plan, thirty-two schools erected at a cost of 
$1,000 dollars each were to be built beginning in 1869. The plan also allocated an 
additional $700 per school for teachers, materials, and supplies. In 1884 the 
reservation had only three schools with an estimated total enrollment of 120 
children out bf an eligible pool of more than six-hundred. As noted earlier, the 
government had fallen more than a quarter of a million dollars in arrears. Figures 
for other agencies indicated similar plans and failures. At the nearby Cheyenne 
and Arapaho Agency the total owed was $283,000. For the Crow Agency the sum 
was $262,000, for the Navajos it was $883,000, for the Utes, $255,500, on the 
Sioux Reservation it was an astonishing $1.4 million.55 What had happened at 
the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation was occurring all over the country. The 
problem, of course, was that for the year 1885 the total education budget of the 
Indian service was only $1.1 million. 
Yet year after year the Indian office pointed to education and announced 
that with the exception of annuities, no other component of the government's 
program received as much money. There was truth in that statement, but it was 
not the whole truth. From a budget of only $20,000 in 1877, the annual education 
appropriation had grown to $2.9 million by 1900. The number of schools more 
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than doubled during the period, and the number of students went up seven-fold. 
Yet the numbers were illusory, for nowhere in the country was the government 
meeting its obligations. Most agencies suffered the same kinds of shortages as the 
Kiowa-Comanche agency, and most had only a minority of its children in school. 
In 1880 the commissioner's office stated that at fifty-one of sixty-six agencies fewer 
than 50 percent of the eligible students had classrooms and teachers. It revealed 
that on at least seventeen agencies there were no treaty school funds whatever.56 
From the very beginning the Kiowa-Comanche Agency faced serious 
problems. Funds were limited, progress was slow, and the tribes proved difficult. 
Although the government believed that the agency was an important one it did 
surprisingly little to create a stable, orderly environment. The Medicine Lodge 
agreement promised significant government assistance; its aftermath revealed an 
ambivalent, stingy, and misdirected policy. Thomas Battey's "holy experiment" 
seemed destined for failure. And it was into this maelstrom that Rainy Mountain 
was born. 
92 
Notes 
1. Richard White, It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History 
of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3. 
2. An excellent summary of that process is Hagan's United States-Comanche 
Relations: The Reservation Years (Norman: University Of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 
especially chapters 1-3. 
3. For early Kiowa history see Mildred Mayhall, The Kiowas (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), chapters 1-3. See also Maurice Boyd, Kiowa 
Voices, 3 vols. (Ft. Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1981); James Mooney, 
"Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians," Seventeenth Annual Report, Bureau of 
American Ethnology (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898): Part 1, 
129-445. Though Mayhall's account is accepted as the standard history, it is poorly 
written, contains no ethnographic or cultural material of any value, deals only 
passingly with the twentieth century, and lacks any analysis of the reservation period. 
A.definitive history of the tribe does not exist. 
4. This split, called the "Pulling Out Band Legend," and the subsequent move, 
is described in Boyd, Kiowa Voices, I, 9-10; see also Mayhall; The Kiowas, 9. 
5. Francis Haines, "The Northward Spread of Horses Among The Plains 
Indians," American Anthropologist 40(December. 1938): 429-437; Jerrold Levy, 
"Kiowa," unpublished manuscript in the possession of the author, 2-3; James H. 
Gunnerson and Dolores Gunnerson, "Apachean Culture History: A study in Unity 
and Diversity," in Apachean Culture: History and Ethnology. Keith Basso and Morris 
93 
E. Opler, eds. Anthropological Papers of University of Arizona 21(1971): 16-19; 
Mooney, "Calendar History," 148, 161. 
6. Charles L. Kenner, A History of New Mexican-Plains Indian Relations 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 69-71. 
7. Levy, "Kiowa," 3. 
8. Mooney estimated that for much of the nineteenth century Kiowa 
population averaged between 1,200 and 1,350. Reservation census figures from the 
late nineteenth century confirm such estimates. See Mooney, "Calendar History of 
the Kiowas," 235-237. 
9. Levy, "Kiowa," 9. The Kiowa-Apaches were Athapascans who had lived 
with the Kiowas since the early eighteenth century. Small in number ( about three 
hundred by the mid-nineteenth century), they shared the material culture of the 
Kiowas and lived with them but maintained a distinct identity from the Kiowas. The 
literature on the tribe is sparse. A useful summary is William Bittle, "A Brief 
Account of the Kiowa-Apache," Papers in Anthropology 12(1971 ): 1-34, published by 
the department of Anthropology, University of Oklahoma. 
10. Ibid., 8-10. 
11. Levy, "Kiowa," 11. See also Bernard Mishkin, Rank and Warfare Among 
The Plains Indians (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966); Jane Richardson, 
Law and Status Among the Kiowa Indians (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1966). 
94 
12. For a discussion of the implications of Kiowa law see Richardson, Law 
and Status Among the Ki,owas. 
13. Mayhall, The Kiowas, 61-77; "Indian Treaties and Councils Affecting 
Kansas," Kansas State Historical Society Collections 16(1923-24): 746-772. The text of 
the treaty may be found in Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 
7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), II, 489-491. 
14. Levy, "Kiowa," 23. 
15. The text may be found in Kappler, Indian Affairs, II,· 600-602. For details 
of the treaty see Mayhall, The Kiowas, 185-186; Hagan, U.S. Comanche Relations, 15-
16. For discussions of the conditions on the Southern Plains between 1840 and 1870, 
see Hagan, U.S.-Comanche Relations, especially chapter 1; Robert M. Utley, The 
Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1984), especially chapters 2-6; Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United 
States Anny and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: MacMillan, 1967); Utley, Frontier 
Regulars: The United States Anny and the Indian, 1866-1891 (New York: MacMillan, 
1973); Rupert N. Richardson, The Comanche Barrier to South Plains Settlement 
(Glendale, California: Arthur H. Oark, 1963); William Leckie, The Military Conquest 
of the Southern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. Three works 
are critical for an understanding of the policy decisions of the era: Robert A. 
Trennert, Jr.,Altemative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the 
Reservation System, 1846-51 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975); James C. 
Malin, Indian Policy and Westward Expansion (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
95 
1921); and Alban W. Hoopes, Indian Affairs and Their Administration, with Special 
Reference to the Far West, 1849-1860 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1932). For Kiowa and Comanche relations see W. Stitt Robinson, ed., "The Kiowa 
and Comanche Campaign of 1860 as Recorded in the Personal Diary of Lt. J.E.B. 
Stuart," Kansas Historical Quarterly, 23(Winter 1957): 382-400; M.L. Crimmins, ed., 
"Colonel Robert · E. Lee's Report on Indian Combats in Texas," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, 39(July 1935): 21-32; Michael Tate, "Frontier Defense on the 
Comanche Ranges of Northwest Texas, 1846-1860," Great Plains Journal, 13(January 
1974): 67-77; Brad Agnew, "The 1858 War Against The Comanches," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma, 49(Summer 1971): 211-229; Forrest Monahan, "Kiowa-Federal Relations 
in Kansas, 1865-1868," Chronicles of Oklahoma, 50(Winter 1971): 477-491; Mayhall, 
The Kiowas, especially chapters 5-6. 
16. For details of the treaty see Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 892-895; Mayhall, 
The Kiowas, 204-207; Hagan, U.S.-Comanche Relations, 21-23; Mooney, "Calendar 
History," 48; William E. Unrau, "Indian Agent vs. the Army: Some Background Notes 
on the Kiowa-Comanche Treaty of 1865," Kansas Historical Quarterly, (Summer 1964): 
129-152. 
17. The best description of the negotiations remains Douglas Jones, The 
Treaty of Medicine Lodge (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966). An 
excellent summary of the issues may be found in Hagan, U.S.-Comanche Relations, 
1-43, on which I have relied heavily. See also Mayhall, The Kiowas, but note that her 
account is quite poor. Provisions of the treaty are in Kappler, Indian Treaties, II, 
977-984. 
96 
18. Quoted in Hagan, U.S.-Comanche Relations, 29. 
19. See Prucha's comments in The Great Father: The United States Government 
and the American Indians, 2 volumes (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 
I, 488-500. 
20. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 29,31; Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs (hereafter cited as ARCIA), 1869: 504; Lawrie Tatum, 
Our Red Brothers and the Peace Policy of President Ulysses S. Grant, Foteward by 
Richard N. Ellis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970. Originally issued 
1899.), 29. 
21. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 42-43. 
22. Kappler, Indian Treaties, II, 979. 
23. Ida Cleo Moore, "Schools and Education Among the Kiowa and 
Comanche Indians, 1870-1940," Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1940: 15. 
24. Tatum, Our Red Brothers, 24. 
25. Tatum's account of his experience in the Indian service is in Our Red 
Brothers. See Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, especially chapters 4-8, for 
a revealing examination of Tatum's experiences, experiences that turned out to be 
omens of a failed reservation policy. On the Quaker administration of the agency see 
Lee Cutler,"Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa Agency, 1869-1873," Arizona and the West 
13(Autumn 1971): 221-244; Burritt M. Hiatt, "James M. Haworth, Quaker Indian 
Agent," Bulletin of the Friends Historical Association 74(Autumn 1958): 80-93; Aubrey 
97 
L. Steele, "The Beginning of Quaker Administration of Indian Affairs in Oklahoma," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 19(December 1939): 364-392; idem., "Quaker Control of the 
Kiowa-Comanche Agency," Master's thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1938; idem., 
"Lawrie Tatum's Indian Policy," Chronicles of Oklahoma 24(Spring 1944): 83-98. 
Population statistics come from Tatum's annual report in the ARCIA, 1870: 728. He 
reported these numbers for the tribes under his jurisdiction: Kiowas, 1896; 
Comanches, 2742; Apaches, 300; Wichitas, 260; Caddoes, 500; Delawares, 95; 
Keechees, 100; Tawaconis, 140; Wacos, 140; Hie-en-eyes, 100. 
26. Tatum, Our Red Brothers, 10; Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 
61-63. 
27. ARCIA, 1872: 396. 
28. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 158; ARCIA, 1870: 725. 
29. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, see chapter 8. 0. Henry 
quoted in Dora Neill Raymond, Captain Lee Hall of Texas (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1940): 203; J. J. Methvin, In The Limelight (Anadarko, OK: 
Plummer, 1928): 50. Speaking at the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1893, Merrill 
Gates complained that "under the pretentious name of 'home rule' senators and 
representatives were allowed to dictate the nomination, as agents, of perfectly 
worthless men." Indian service appointments "should cease to be part plunder, 
awarded to partisan workers to build up party interest," Annual Report of the Lake 
Mohonk Conference in ARCIA, 1893: 1017. For an analysis of conditions at the 
Kiowa-Comanche agency in the late 1860s, see William E. Unrau, "Investigation or 
98 
Probity? Investigations Into The Affairs of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency, 1867," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 42(Autumn, 1964): 300-319. 
30. Annual Report of the Central Superintendency (hereafter cited as ARCS), 
1870: 718; ARCIA, 1872: 429, 632. 
31. Hiram Price to Secretary of the Interior, December 27, 1884, cited in 
Hagan, U.S.-Comanche Relations, 165. 
32. ARCS, 1875: 768; ibid., 1871: 876. For discussions of the Kiowa agency 
and reservation experience see Michael D. Mitchell, "Acculturation Problems Among 
the Plains Tribes of the Government Agencies in Western Indian Territory," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma 44(Summer 1966): 281-289; Forrest Monahan, "The Kiowa-
Comanche Reservation in the 1890s," Chronicles of Oklahoma 45(Winter 1968): 451-
463; Martha Buntin, "History of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita Agency," 
Panhandle-Plains Historical Review 4(Spring 1931): 62-78; William D. Pennington, 
"Government Policies and Farming on the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation, 1869-1901," 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1972; Hugh D. Corwin, "Protestant 
Mission Work Among the Comanches and Kiowas," Chronicles of Oklahoma 
46(Spring 1968): 41-57; William Hagan, "Kiowas, Comanches, and Cattlemen," Pacific 
Historical Review 40(August 1971): 333-355. For a comparison of a neighboring 
agency and reservation, see Donald Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: 
Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875-1907 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1976). 
33. ARCIA, 1870: 729. 
99 
34. Thomas C. Battey, The Life and Adventures of a Quaker Among the 
Indians, introduction by Alice Marriott (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1968): 39. For Butler's account of the school see Josiah Butler, "Pioneer School 
Teaching at the Comanche-Kiowa Agency School, 1870-1873," Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 8(December 1928): 482-528. 
35. ARCIA, 1870: 588. 
36. Moore, "Schools and Education Among the Kiowas and Comanches," 16. 
37. ARCIA, 1873: 588. 
38. ibid., 1875: 567; Annual Report of the·Kiowa Agency (hereafter cited as 
ARKA) in the ARCIA, 1875: 775. 
39. ARCIA, 1876: 378-399. 
40. ARKA, 1877: 484. , 
41. ibid., 1878: 557. 
42. Ibid., 1879: 174; ibid., 1880: 197; ibid., 1881: 141-142; ibid., 1887: 164-165; 
ibid., 1892: 386,640; Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 199-200. One source 
suggests that the primary reason for Comanche obstinance was that they "objected 
to their children's attending school with the Kiowa," George Posey Wild, "History of 
Education of Plains Indians of Southwest Oklahoma Since The Civil War," Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1941: 227. See also W. D. Meyer's annual 
report from 1889 when he noted that the Comanches were "still clamorous for a 
school of their own," an attitude which he attributed .to "tribal .prejudice," ARKA, 
1889: 189. 
43. ARKA, 1882: 130; ibid., 1884: 125; ibid., 1885: 311. 
44. Ibid., 1888: 95,97; ibid., 1889: 188-189. 
45. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 195-197. 
46. Ibid. 
100 
47. Muriel Wright, A Guide To The Indian Tribes of Oklahoma (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1951): 174. 
48. ARKA, 1889: 189; ibid., 1890: 188; Kiowa Schools, Microfilm KA 96, 
Indian Archives, Oklahoma 'Historical Society.· 
49. ARKA, 1889: 189; ibid., 1890: 189; Hagan, United States-Comanche 
Relations, 199. 
50. ARKA, 1889: 189; ibid., 1890: 188. 
51. Kiowa Schools, Microfilm 96, Indian Archives, Oklahoma Historical 
Society. 
52. Annual Report of Superintendent of Indian Education (hereafter cited as 
ARSIE) in ARCIA, 1883: 475; ARKA, 1892: 385. 
53. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 134; ARCIA, 1882: 34. 
54. ARSIE, 1885: 83,94; ibid., 1883: 475. 
55. Ibid., 1883: 475-476; .ibid., 1885: 83. 
101 
56. ARCIA, 1918: 177; ibid., 1880: 85-86. 
CHAPTER IV 
"THERE ARE SO MANY THINGS NEEDED:" 
AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING 
As the 1880s came to a close the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation still lacked 
school facilities for the overwhelming majority of its eligible children. And with 
no indication from Washington that any significant change would come in the near 
future, the reservation continued to operate with a handful of schools scattered 
across its expanse. The Kiowas, however, shortly made clear that they were losing 
patience with the government. Repeatedly disappointed in their hopes for a 
school, and increasingly unhappy at the prospect of sending their children to Fort 
Sill or Riverside with Comanches and Witchitas, the Kiowas continued to agitate 
for a school of their own. Because large numbers of Kiowas lived in the 
reservation's more remote districts, they had a strong desire to obtain a school 
that would serve their children.1 
In the summer of 1891 the situation began to change. Acting on the 
direction of the Indian Office, John Richardson, a regional supervisor for Indian 
education, surveyed the Kiowa-Comanche Reservation for a suitable site on which 
to build a new boarding school for the Kiowas. He found a place about thirty 
miles west of Anadarko on a creek at the base of a well-known landmark known 
to the Kiowas as Sep-yal-day, or Rainy Mountain.2 In August 1891, Richardson 
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sent a long letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas Jefferson Morgan 
describing the location.3 From all appearances the site seemed adequate to the 
needs of the Indian Office; Richardson wrote that it was "in the midst of the most 
beautiful scenery" and was amply supplied with water, grass, timber, and native 
stone for building purposes. Good soil was abundant. Importantly, the site was 
"most happily located for health ... no dull lake, marshy swamps or stagnant 
pools lurk within miles of it; nothing that breeds the dread malaria is found here." 
Convinced that Rainy Mountain was perfectly suitable for a boarding school, 
Richardson concluded that the place was "supplied with the purest mountain 
water, fanned by the sweetest of mountain air, it is a veritable 'health resort.' " 
More importantly, support among the local Kiowas was widespread. Owing to 
what he described as a "restlessness in this settlement of Kiowas, for whose. benefit 
the school is to be established," Richardson encouraged the Indian Office to get 
the school into operation as quickly as possible.4 
One week after receiving Richardson's letter, Morgan wrote to Kiowa-
Comanche Agent George Day for his advice on how much land to set aside for 
the school. He also directed Day to contact George Moss, a thirty-seven-year-old 
employee at the nearby Cheyenne Boarding School for the purpose of bringing 
Moss to the school as its first superintendent.5 By the fall of 1891, building plans 
were being prepared and reviewed, Moss was on his way to the Kiowa-Comanche 
Agency, and money had been allocated for construction of a boarding school. 
Finally, the Kiowas would have a place for their children. 
As events turned out, however, the school's beginning proved to be much 
like the rest of its life - slow, mixed ·Up, and poorly administered. Although a 
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contract to erect the school's buildings was made with a local construction firm in 
mid April 1892, nothing else happened at the proposed site through the winter 
and spring of 1892. In early May, Moss wrote to Agent Day, suggesting that they 
meet to discuss various matters concerning the school's establishment. The 
builder, noted Moss, was still waiting for approval from Washington to begin 
construction. "You are aware, of course," Moss reminded Day, "that there is liable 
to be a considerable delay in regard to receiving it [an understatement], so I 
thought it would be a good plan for me to come down and go with you ... to 
select a site for the building." Moss especially wanted to begin fencing the 
school's pastures and fields so that Rainy Mountain's farm could be started.6 
In mid-June, Morgan made inquiries about the preparations for the school. 
Had a site been determined? Was it advisable for a superintendent to report for 
full-time duty? What progress could Day report on the construction of a building 
or the breaking of farm land? Although there was not a finished building at the 
site when Morgan wrote, he shortly directed Moss (who apparently still worked 
full-time at the Cheyenne school) to "enter upon the discharge of your· duties" at 
Rainy Mountain as of July 1, 1892. In mid-July, Day reported that W. D. 
Lancaster, a former missionary from Kentucky, had been hired as the school's 
industrial teacher and farmer, and that John Wolf, a local Kiowa, was employed as 
the school's helper. By October, Moss finally announced that "the building is 
going up nicely now," and that other projects on the grounds were being handled 
as well.7 It had taken more than a year, but the school was taking shape. 
In the late fall of 1892 Morgan wrote once more to Day and made anxious 
inquiries about the state of the school. After reminding the agent that every 
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effort should be made to secure all necessary supplies and hasten the completion 
of the main building, Morgan announced that "it is the earnest wish of this Office 
that the school may be filled with pupils at the earliest practical opportunity." To 
accomplish this, he instructed Day to "meet with parents of children and make a 
thorough canvass among the children of school age and suitable health who are 
tributary to the Rainy Mountain School, and have a thorough understanding with 
the parents and effect such arrangements that you may get the children into the 
school without delay as soon as you are ready to receive them."8 
Morgan's anxiousness to get the school into service as quickly as possible 
ran headlong into the galling realities of the situation on the Kiowa-Comanche 
Reservation. · No students were enrolled that fall, nor in the spring that followed. 
Indeed, in mid-November 1892, nearly a year and a half after approval had been 
granted for the school, John Richardson reported that Rainy Mountain still lacked 
many of its basic necessities. There were no dining, storage, or laundry facilities, 
he reported. A small barn was needed to shelter the school's animals as well as to 
provide training for the boys in industrial and agricultural areas. In an omen of 
troubles, he wrote that "the manner of the water supply should be looked after at 
once, so that there will be plenty of water when the school is opened." A year 
later, W. H. Cox, who replaced Moss as superintendent before the school ever 
opened, reported that a store house and laundry house (including a bath unit) 
were complete. And although a well had been dug, it was not producing adequate 
amounts of water; at the end of August 1894, Cox requested authority to hire a 
crew from Anadarko to dig a new one. The matter of a barn was not satisfactorily 
resolved until more than two years later when Cox's successor, Cora Dunn, asked 
for $550 to build a barn and tool shed.9 The litany of problems to which Cox 
and Dunn referred became typical. 
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Despite those and other troubles, Agent Day and the small staff at Rainy 
Mountain School continued to press ahead in their preparations for the school's 
opening. In early 1893, for example, the Indian Office informed Day that a 
matron for the school was being chosen from the appropriate Civil Service lists. 
Other staff members were also reporting for duty.10 And then disaster struck. In 
February 1893 John Richardson wrote to the commissioner that the Rainy 
Mountain staff was not only inefficient but also dangerously incompetent. "The 
superintendent and the Industrial Teacher of the Rainy Mountain School are total 
failures; indolent and shiftless," he reported. 1:i1 response to the allegations, 
Morgan instructed Day to fire both Moss and Lancaster. "It is ... utterly useless 
to consider the matter of Mr. Moss remaining in the service in any capacity," 
wrote Morgan. "You will notify him that his relief is absolute." The same was 
true of Lancaster, who was to be discharged immediately as well.11 Why the two 
men were so hastily drummed out of the Indian Service is not known. The 
school's administrative records contain no mention of the episode beyond the fact 
that they were fired. It was an inauspicious start, one from which the school 
never really recovered. Although no one knew it at the time, the episode 
involving Moss and Lancaster was a harbinger of a future filled with equally 
distressing developments. 
The Indian Office attempted to straighten the mess out as quickly as 
possible. In early March 1893, W. H. Cox, the assistant superintendent at the 
Albuquerque Training School, received word of his appointment as superintendent 
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at Rainy Mountain. T. W. Miller was hired to replace Lancaster as industrial 
teacher and farmer for the school.12 Cox and his wife arrived on March 17 and 
immediately began to get the school back on track.13 ·under his ,direction a full 
staff was assembled and the school's main building, a two story stone combination 
dormitory and classroom, was readied for use. By fate April Cox informed the 
Indian Office that the school would be ready for occupancy sometime in late May. 
Owing to the nearness of the summer vacation period, however, the decision was 
made to delay opening until the fall. 14 
Over the course of the spring and fall Cox ,continued to hire his staff. 
From the time of his arrival, when the staff hovered between four and six, until 
the school's opening in September of 1893, Cox managed to collect a full 
complement of staff, with the notable exception of a qualified teacher. In the 
absence of one, Cox's wife agreed to serve as a temporary substitute. By 
September the school's pay vouchers listed no fewer than seven full- or part-time 
staff. By November it had increased to fifteen and included a teacher, matron, 
cook, baker, seamstress, laundress, industrial teacher, and farmer, plus an 
assortment of Indian helpers and laborers. , But Cox soon discovered that he was 
dealing with a stingy Indian Office and often unreliable employees. Within the 
school's first six months, for example, Cox went through no fewer than two 
farmers and industrial teachers, and two classroom teachers.15 Indeed, Cox 
found it so difficult to obtain staff willing to stay that his first qualified teacher 
apparently left between her appointment and the actual opening of the school. 
This would prove to be a recurring problem for all of Rainy Mountain's history. 
In addition to forming his staff, Cox also oversaw, the completion of the 
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school's main building, the stocking of necessary supplies, clothes, and other items, 
as well as the plowing of the school's farm land. He made provisions to fence part 
of the school's four sections of land and put fifty acres under cultivation. In late 
March 1893 the school received a large shipment of seeds and plants with which 
Cox intended to begin a modest farm operation. Judging from the invoices, he 
placed especially high hopes on pumpkins, tomatoes, cabbages, and beets. Cox 
also ordered large quantities of shade tress and decorative plants with which to 
enhance the school's campus.16 His successor, Cora Dunn, was an indefatigable 
tree planter as well but their combined effort to create .a tree lined campus failed. 
Today the school's grounds show no evidence whatever that trees were planted. 
Cox purchased the school's staple goods and supplies, items that were 
intended to signify the break from Kiowa life that awaited the school's students. 
An inventory from the summer of 1893 contained an astonishing collection of 
goods from disk harrows to shoe blacking. Included were hand bells, brooms, 
butter knives, mirrors, thimbles, mirrors, gingham dresses, shoes, wash tubs, and 
other assorted goods and tools that would be used to force the transition from 
Kiowa culture to Angloamerican culture. With every necessity of life provided, 
the students would be dependent on the school for virtually all their needs, which 
would in tum help to sever completely any connection to the Kiowa world from 
whence they came. Cox also left an inventory of office supplies. It included the 
usual foolscap stationery, inkstands, and envelopes. It also included, alas, "one 
spool - red tape."17 If only Cox had known how close to the truth it really was. 
As the summer of 1893 came to a close the school finally appeared to be 
ready for opening. On August 14, Agent Hugh Brown informed Commissioner of 
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Indian Affairs D. W. Browning that the school would begin taking students on or 
about September 1. Browning authorized an opening date of September 1, but 
stipulated that Cox accept no more than forty pupils. This was due to the 
previously noted absence of a teacher. Browning promised to send one as soon as 
a qualified applicant could be found. Until then he authorized Cox to employ 
"some competent person as a temporary teacher."18 Rainy Mountain School 
opened officially on September 5, 1893 with a total of five scholars, as they were 
called, in residence. Two weeks later the number had grown to thirteen; by 
March 1 it had edged up to thirty-two. The Kiowas at last had their school, and a 
great experiment had begun. 
Cox stayed at the school only for its first full year of operation. During the 
summer of 1894 he left Rainy Mountain and was replaced by Cora Dunn, who 
with her husband Alfred as industrial teacher and farmer, stayed on for the next 
sixteen years. It was she who saw the school through its formative years. More 
than this, Cora Dunn was largely responsible for making the school successful. 
Her determination often made the difference between success and failure. As it 
was, her best efforts often succeeded only in keeping the place afloat and 
somehow operating. During her tenure Rainy Mountain developed a sense of 
identity. And it endured a fumbling Indian Office that often had no 
understanding of the rigors which plagued schools like Rainy Mountain. 
Understanding the administrative history of Rainy Mountain School means 
recognizing the withering realities which beset.it from the very beginning. The 
reservation inhabitants whom it served had a reputation for obstinance and 
violence. Agents had little control over their wards; the government's civilizing 
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program was often little more than a joke. Schools were too few to be effective; 
there was the distinct possibility that Rainy Mountain would amount to little more 
than a holding pen for Kiowa children. · Cora Dunn's first years at the place 
confirmed that life there would likely be difficult and perhaps even unpleasant. 
So unfavorable a portrait of the school is not altogether accurate, however, 
for the place was more complicated than that. True, it suffered mightily from 
neglect and official carelessness. Administrators were often forced to operate a 
school that was a pale and shoddy imitation of what the government wanted. 
Cramped and unhealthy living conditions frustrated the school's effectiveness. 
High staff turnover kept the curriculum unsettled, hastily planned, and poorly 
administered; Limited budgets meant minimal upkeep of the physical plant and 
property. Yet the school opened nearly every year to a full, if not overflowing, 
contingent of students .. Many Kiowas came to embrace the place, cherishing it 
despite its deficiencies for the good that they believed it did their children. Thus, 
the school lived in the midst of a paradox; never adequately staffed or supported, 
chronically troubled, yet filled to capacity for each of its twenty-seven years. 
Reservation boarding schools were intended to provide an environment in 
which Indian children could learn how to lead productive lives as independent 
citizens. In theory an institution of total control, the boarding schools were the 
most critical link in the government's assimilation program. Because it was "just as 
necessary to teach Indian children how to live as how to read and write," said 
Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz in 1880, reservation boarding schools were 
regarded as the laboratories of change.19 The Indian Office regarded these 
schools as gateways to the freedom gained through hard work, discipline, and 
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learning. 
At Rainy Mountain rhetoric never reflected reality. Two factors account 
for this. The first was that administratively the school rarely had sufficient 
support from the government to accomplish its mission. Whether it was unsafe 
buildings or lack of books,.Rainy Mountain went through every year needing (and 
usually not getting) a variety of major things. The second explanation for the 
school's failure to fulfill its expectations: the ability of Kiowa children to resist the 
government's forced assimilation program. Their resilience, combined with the 
school's marginal effectiveness, meant that Rainy Mountain could not hope to 
affect the changes desired by policymakers. 
When she arrived at Rainy Mountain in the summer of 1894, Cora Dunn 
took charge of a boarding school that.eventually enrolled more than 150 children 
every year. Once enrolled, those children began a program that would lead to a 
sixth grade education, one that combined academic instruction with vocational 
training in domestic and industrial arts. The school was supposed to emancipate 
Kiowa children from the uncertainties of reservation life and from a cultural 
identity that was, policymakers believed, already out of step in an industrializing 
modern America. 
The most urgent problem confronting the school in its first years concerned 
the physical plant and the condition of the campus. This proved to be a 
continuing dilemma. The largest and oldest building on the campus was the two-
story stone dormitory that originally housed the girls, some of the boys, and many 
of the staff. A similarly sized second dormitory went up in 1899, along with a 
superintendent's cottage in the same year. A laundry, barn, commissary building, 
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mess hall, band stand, and various service buildings went up over the next fifteen 
years. A large classroom building was added in 1915. The campus was a neatly 
arranged quadrangle set. at the base of Rainy Mountain's east side. In addition to 
the central campus, the school held 2,560 acres of adjoining land reserved for the 
exclusive use of the school. Much of that land was used as pasture, put under 
cultivation, and even on rare occasions might be leased. As reservation boarding 
schools went, the place was not particularly unique. The size of the school, the 
scope of its activities, and the nature of its operation all reflected generally the 
state of affairs at reservation boarding schools across the country. 
The government's almost ubiquitous neglect of the care and protection of the 
Rainy Mountain campus, however, meant that.from the earliest days of its 
existence the school suffered serious problems. These in tum produced 
deleterious effects on students and programs alike. Poor buildings, unhealthy 
living conditions, outmoded or insufficient equipment and teaching materials 
combined to create a difficult environment. . A close look at conditions on the 
campus shows a troubling lack of interest or concern by the Indian Office or the 
Kiowa-Comanche agents. Of course, not all reservation boarding schools were as 
poorly kept up as Rainy Mountain; some were better, some were equally bad. On 
balance Rainy Mountain was a typical institution, problems and all. At any rate, it 
is difficult to find schools of the same size and general characteristics which were 
much better off than Rainy Mountain. In most ways - size, location, student 
body, problems - the place was not unique. And the fact that Cora Dunn 
sometimes feared for the very roof over her head can be taken as a symbol, 
literally and figuratively, of what life was like in the reservation schools. 
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As far as the physical condition of the campus was concerned, the 
government showed a curious ambivalence. Surviving records from the school are 
rife with complaints and reports detailing the disregard of the Indian Office for 
any but the most urgent needs. Even then, school officials often had to press for 
help. Having invested at least $37,825 in the campus in its first six years, it seems 
reasonable that the government would have shown considerable interest in 
protecting and improving its investment.20 This was not to be the case. In fact, 
having spent the money, the Indian Office usually appeared reluctant to 
appropriate more funds, even when conditions at the school were dangerously 
unsafe. 
Several examples illustrate the case. At the end of his first and only year 
as superintendent, W. H. Cox issued an annual report on the school. He came to 
the conclusion that Rainy Mountain was "in need of an additional building for 
schoolrooms and quarters for either the boys or the girls; that the school also 
requires a range, and that some porches should be constructed on the present 
building." In response, the Indian Office doubted the need for some of Cox's 
improvements and asked Agent Maury Nichols to look into the matter.21 
Cox's requests were both necessary and justifiable. In its first year the 
school had already outgrown its single main building, built to hold perhaps fifty 
pupils. Attendance increased from an average of thirty-one in May of 1894 to 
more than seventy by December of 1894. By the fall of 1895 it stood at seventy; 
by early 1897 it stood at nearly ninety, far more than the school could adequately 
hold.22 The main building was already filled to capacity by the 1895-1896 
academic year. Crowded conditions were the norm for students and staff alike. 
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The lack of employee housing made the situation even worse, for staff members 
were forced to live in the dorms, reducing the space available for students. 
Because it served as dormitory, assembly hall, classroom, staff living quarters, and 
chapel, the main building quickly began to suffer from over use. The school 
clearly needed another building. Kiowas were enthusiastically filling the place to 
overflowing every term. Something had to be done. 
Cox left without persuading officials of the school's needs. When Cora 
Dunn assumed control she too brought the issue to the attention of her superiors. 
In November 1894 she informed the commissioner's office that the school was in 
need of a variety of general repairs and improvements. "The plastering of the 
[main] building was originally of very indifferent quality," she wrote, "and is now 
badly broken." She requested funds to repair the plaster, and she also asked for 
authority to build three water closets in the main building. In a separate note she 
also inquired about getting $550 for a barn and toolshed. Noting that the school's 
livestock and implements were unsheltered, she reminded the commissioner that 
this was the third time in her brief tenure that she had written of the matter. 
Dunn seems to have believed that the Indian Office was not taking her seriously, 
so she was, she said, writing at the advice of "Special Agent Able, who appreciates 
our pressing need. "23 
The Indian Office responded by suggesting that instead of building a large 
dormitory-style edifice, a number of smaller cottages would probably suffice. This 
also had the important advantage of being considerably less expensive than a large 
building. Unwilling to endure the cost of probably more than $10,000 (the 
original main building had cost $12,000), the office advised Kiowa-Comanche 
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Agent Hugh Baldwin that the plan was economical and practical. Cora Dunn 
agreed, but she had some reservations. Her letter to Baldwin in December 1894 
noted that the plan "commends itself to ·me as the best and most functional 
method of fostering a love of homelife among these homeless children. Such an 
arrangement would turn out more permanent work than all the non-reservation 
schools with their vast machinery." With the cottages she could also solve other 
problems. The dining area in the main building could be converted into a chapel, 
and the kitchen (the pupils would cook in their cottages) into a classroom. She 
worried, however, that the need for additional employees would be a burden. The 
school would need a matron for each cottage "to insure the prosecution of the 
work and sufficient protection for the girls." At the same time, she continued, the 
expense of additional matrons might be offset by eliminating the positions of cook, 
baker, and laundress.24 
Nothing ever came of the plan, and three years later Dunn was writing 
again to complain about conditions at the school. "The standing need of this 
school, as has been stated in all previous reports, is another large building of the 
same size and general construction of the one now occupied." So desperate was 
its need, she continued, that it would have to serve not only as a dormitory but 
must also contain a kitchen and dining room, for those facilities were pressed well 
beyond capacity. In addition she also requested a cottage for the superintendent, 
a carpenter's shop, and a milking shed. Without these and other improvements 
the school simply could not be expected to provide the children with adequate 
instruction. 25 
As if these were not enough, Dunn also brought the. agent's attention to the 
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need of extensive repairs across the campus. Flues in the main building were 
"nearly ready to fall," she reported. Indeed, after further inspection she hastened 
to add that the flues were "in worse condition than we supposed, and it is 
extremely fortunate that it was discovered in time to save the building from 
destruction by fire. 1126 Shortly thereafter the agent received a note from Alfred · 
Dunn asking permission to build flues in the dining room and playroom. "The 
children are having chills," he wrote, "and ought to have fires early in the 
morning." There being no funds for such purposes, the request was denied.27 
It seemed to be one thing after another, especially during the first years. 
Plumbing, plaster, walkways, fire hoses, wells, and new buildings all found their 
way into Cora Dunn's correspondence on a regular basis. As her tenure 
lengthened, moreover, she discovered that she could usually expect little sympathy, 
and less help, from the Indian Office when it came to keeping her school in good 
condition. In 1897, for example, she raised the issue of getting a decent water 
system for the campus; six years later she was still asking for the same thing. In 
the meantime, the school muddled through by relying on the .. decrepit original 
system from 1893.28 
In February of 1904 the condition of the school's major buildings (including 
a new dormitory, which she got in 1899), had deteriorated so badly that Dunn 
needed more than six thousand pounds of plaster for repairs. Blaming the 
condition of the buildings on the haphazard and inferior craftsmanship of the 
original contractors, she noted that some ceilings were in such poor shape that 
they were "positively dangerous."29 Driven to exasperation in the spring of 1905 
by the bureaucratic wrangling that crippled even the simplest requests, Dunn 
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tersely· informed the agent that she needed, and had ordered, boiler grates and a 
range for her cottage. "In, order to obviate the extensive correspondence and 
tedious waiting involved in ordering·through the Indian Office," she continued, "I 
had ... a hardware merchant in Gotebo order them. "30 
· She had learned from experience that such maneuvers were unappreciated 
by the Indian Office, but she also knew that the alternative was to suffer the 
interminable paper shuffling that too often left her without anything more than an 
official rejection notice. In the fall of 1897, for example, in answer to her 
repeated requests for $220.00 worth of fire equipment, the Indian Office declined 
to authorize the funds because the prices she quoted "seem to be about 100% 
above market price." In the end she was allowed a total of $78.05 for the 
purchase of one hydrant and 250 feet of hose.31 In the meantime, however, the 
office refused to upgrade the water system, thus the fire equipment was only 
marginally useful. -, : 
Despite the necessity of extensive improvements championed by Cora 
Dunn, significant changes did not occur until the turn of the century. · For more 
than six years Rainy Mountain languished. It filled to overflowing every term, but 
the Indian Office refused to expend additional funds to meet the demands of 
increasing enrollments. The school got a tool shed and barn, both built sometime 
in 1895. No additional quarters or classrooms were approved, and it was not until 
late 1899, a full five years after Cox first raised the issue and long after the school 
had outgrown its facilities, that an additional dormitory was added. In the 
meantime a stable went up in 1895, a playroom and lavatory in 1896, a slaughter 
house sometime between 1894 and 1900. Certainly the school had need for these 
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facilities, yet the Indian Office did not address the most urgent problem of all, 
that of:better living quarters and expanded classroom space. By the time the 
second building went up, moreover, enlarged enrollments threatened to · 
overwhelm the school again. By 1899 it had already begun to creep toward 100. 
In 1905 it stood at nearly 130 and the school was badly overcrowded. Cora Dunn 
wrote the agent that "the need of an additional building for school purposes has 
so frequently been represented that it is unnecessary to further enlarge upon 
it."32 Relief did not come until 1915, when a third building - primarily a 
classroom building - went up. It marked the last major construction at the 
campus. By then enrollment averaged more than 160 students. 
In 1906 Cora Dunn informed Agent John Blackmon that although the 
dorms were adequate, "the need of an additional building for school purposes has 
so frequently been represented that it is unnecessary to further enlarge upon it." 
To dispel recent reports that conditions were in fact unhealthy, Dunn hastened to 
tell Blackmon that "the only time the pupils really lacked for sufficient air is when 
all are assembled in the schoolroom used as a chapel." This is not surprising given 
the fact that at the time of her letter attendance was 129 .. 
Besides the continuing concern over the physical state of the school's 
building, Cora Dunn inherited an especially critical problem - the lack of a 
reliable water system. The original report establjshing the location of the school 
stated that "an excellent spring that will amply supply water for all purposes" was 
only one-halfmile from the school.33 This was an exaggeration if not an outright 
fabrication. The lack of a reliable water source and the unwillingness of the 
Indian Office to provide anything but the most meager appropriations for a 
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serviceable water and sewer system meant that Rainy Mountain was forced to exist 
under conditions that were unhealthy. This was increasingly so in the years after 
1900, when the school's ability to take care of students was compromised year 
after year. Indeed, after 1913, when more than 160 students crowded into the 
school, health and hygiene suffered as a direct result of poor bathing and laundry 
facilities. The lack of flush toilets forced the school to endure drop-pit latrines 
until well in the 1910s. The greatest danger came from trachoma, a malady 
associated with dirty water that led in some cases to blindness. It began to run 
out of control as early as 1910. 
The problems caused by the water situation were well known. Dunn and 
her successor~ James H. McGregor, who arrived in the fall of 1910, repeatedly 
brought the issue the attention of the Indian Office. In fact, it runs like a thread 
through all of the official correspondence for the entire history of the school. In 
December 1893, nearly two years before the school was in operation, John 
Richardson - who had earlier assured the office that water supply would not be a 
problem - advised the commissioner "that the manner of the water supply be 
looked after at once, so that there will be plenty of water when the school is 
opened."34 When the school actually opened, the water question had not been 
resolved. The school's supply was brought in daily from a spring located close to 
three miles south of the campus. W. H. Cox complained that it took one 
employee nearly half the day to haul the necessary amount.35 In August 1894, 
Cox wrote to Agent Maury Nichols for permission to hire a man to dig a well at 
the campus. Because Rainy Mountain creek ran not far from the school, Cox 
offered that a well dug some fifteen to twenty feet deep "would likely furnish a 
supply of water."36 Nichols apparently did not share Cox's concern and did not 
approve the request. 
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Cora Dunn took the matter up in the summer of 1895 when she wrote to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Daniel Browning to submit an estimate for a well. 
She wrote that a small one had recently been dug for. the convenience of Indians 
who gathered at the school for the issue of rations and annuities and that an 
enlarged one at the same place "would furnish an inexhaustible supply of pure 
water ... at a moderate cost." There was some urgency about the issue, she 
continued, as the small well was the school's only reliable source of water short of 
continuing to haul it from the spring three miles distant.37 
Browning's reply is revealing. To the request for funds to build a water 
system ( estimated by Baldwin at $1,799.24) Browning replied that Baldwin needed 
first to establish which of the reservation's schools could be enlarged to 
accommodate a larger than anticipated pool of eligible children. Until such 
recommendations had been received in the office, Browning told Baldwin that he 
refused to consider the question of water at Rainy Mountain School.38 Obviously 
there was not enough money to satisfy every school's needs, but because it was 
unlikely that Rainy Mountain would be enlarged it was equally unlikely that its 
water problems would receive much attention. By tying improvements to matters 
that had nothing to do with the actual problem, the Indian Office virtually assured 
that pressing needs would often go unattended. The merits of its case, clear and 
convincing though they were, did nothing to help the school. In the end, Cora 
Dunn's subsequent request of $40 for a wagon-mounted water barrel was met with 
a curt response that authorized her to spend "no more than $30.00 for one wagon 
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water tank. "39 
By early 1896, the Indian Office apparently had a change of heart and 
authorized $1,381.94 for a well, water tower, pump, and pipe. Hopes ran high on 
the campus and Cora Dunn anticipated the end of a troubling dilemma. In a 
letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, she had announced· that "the health 
and comfort of the school demand new water closets and sanitary construction. "40 
That summer a local contractor was hired to plumb most of the school's main 
buildings. Another dug a well. A third was hired to erect a windmill, motor, 
pump, and pipe. The total cost was $637.71. · How the remaining $744.23 was 
spent, or if it was spent, is not known.41 
No sooner was the water problem solved, however, than a series of new 
disasters appeared. In December 1896, most of the pipes laid that summer burst. 
In a letter to Herman Veidt, who had done the installation, Alfred Dunn implied 
that shoddy workmanship was to blame. (Perhaps a low budget contract explains 
why less than one-half of the appropriated funds were actually used.) "There are 
several things that will be a continual source of trouble," warned Dunn, "and they 
had better be fixed now."42 Veidt apparently complied, but how much he did is 
not known. 
Shortly after this episode, a train of events occurred that defy explanation. 
On March 21, Alfred Dunn notified Baldwin that a spring storm the previous 
evening had wrecked the school's windmill. The apparatus was "torn all to pieces," 
noted Dunn, and it left the school with less than a week's supply of water.43 By 
early April, Dunn had overseen the digging of a new well but was anxious to know 
when the school could expect a new windmill. Without it there was not sufficient 
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water (short of hauling it, an onerous task that Dunn wished to avoid at all costs) 
to supply the school's water closets. Fearing that he would be forced to tear down 
the water closets because of a health hazard, Dunn appealed for help.44 By late 
April, he informed Baldwin that matters were becoming serious; "if we do not get 
relief soon" he wrote, "we will be compelled to let some of the children go home. 
We are running our water wagon all the time and our cisterns have given out, so 
that we are dependent on the water wagon to furnish drinking, cooking, and 
laundry water, besides water for the closets."45 The matter had gone beyond 
inconvenience, now it threatened to affect the operation of the school. 
One week after Dunn's plea, the Indian Office authorized $225 to replace 
the destroyed mill.46 It had taken nearly six weeks for it to do so; it would be 
almost another month before the second mill went up. And then disaster struck 
again. In early June, as the mill was being raised into place, a rope parted and 
the mill crashed to the ground. "It is in nearly as bad shape as the other mill," 
reported Alfred Dunn. But the agent could take some solace from the knowledge 
that the broken rope belonged to the man hired to erect the mill, "so no blame 
can possibly rest on us." No doubt the agent found comfort in that fact. After 
repairing and raising the mill again after several days, Dunn reluctantly wrote that 
it was so bent that it did not function. Worse, it was in danger of falling down in 
even a moderate wind. In early June, the Indian Office authorized funds to 
replace the second mill. But it did not spend very much money. Despite Dunn's 
warning that without a good mill the school would "of course be out of water the 
rest of the year," the office allocated only $28.94.47 
Events then verged on the ridiculous. Apparently a third mill went up in 
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late June but not for very long. On June 25, Alfred Dunn wrote to Baldwin that 
"the 'expected' has happened to the windmill." The mill was destroyed; Dunn's 
letters do not reveal exactly what happened.48 The Indian Office, probably 
flinching every time it heard from the school, agreed to spend $179.04 for a fourth 
windmill that went up, and miraculously stayed up, in mid-August 1897.49 
Alas, the problems were not solved. In early September, Alfred Dunn 
wrote to Baldwin. "I am sorry to say it," he began, "but the mill will not put the 
water in the [storage] tank. ... I am satisfied the tower will have to be raised in 
order to give wind steady and strong enough to do the work." Until that was 
accomplished he would haul water for forty hogs as well as for the kitchen and 
laundry.50 By 'October Dunn reported that the school had water in limited 
quantity only and that the water closets had been moved. He was increasingly 
afraid of the fire hazard related to the lack of water across·the campus. Shortly 
thereafter Baldwin won approval for a steam engine to pump water from. the well 
or nearby creek to the main buildings. But as the winter deepened, so did the 
trouble with the water supply. In early January 1898, Dunn told the agency that 
the school was "out of water and have been for three weeks."51 
At this point a new solution came to hand. Sometime between late 1897 
and late 1900 a reservoir was constructed at or near the top of Rainy Mountain. 
Parker McKenzie, a student at the school from 1904 to 1914, believes that the 
reservoir was built sometime around 1897. Official estimates from Cora Dunn 
concerning the cost of the plan, however, do not appear in the records until late 
1900. It could be that the project spanned several years, thus explaining the 
discrepancy in dates. At any rate, in October 1900 Cora Dunn requested $535.25 
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for the "proposed reservoir at the top ofRainy Mountain." In March 1901, she 
included as part of a general estimate for campus repairs a request for cement "to 
be used in repairing the water reservoir and rendering it insect and vermin proof. 
Its present condition," she said, "is a standing menace to the school and must be 
remedied."52 By using the steam engine to pump water up from the well or 
creek, the system could then rely on gravity to send water at sufficient pressure to 
the campus below. 
It was a good idea that promised to solve a disgraceful situation. The only 
problem was that it did not work very well. In early February 1900 the school's 
fourth windmill was blown "completely to pieces." Later that year Cora Dunn 
informed Agent James Randlett that the "automatic flushing apparatus of the 
water closet in the girls' building refused to work." The only water the school was 
getting was water that it did not particularly need; the main buildings were leaking 
like sieves, she noted, and their ceilings were being ruined. By the spring of 1902 
she asked for a new well as the old one could no longer supply the school. And 
in the summer of 1903 she lectured Randlett emphatically on the "immediate 
necessity of repairs ... to the plumbing and water system at this school." The 
grates at the steam boiler in the laundry had given way, the girls' dorm needed a 
complete plumbing overhaul, and the water closets would not flush anywhere on 
campus. "All the plumbing at the school was originally of the most inferior quality 
and workmanship," she wrote, "and no repairs have ever been made except such as 
could be effected by school employees. The health of the employees [to say 
nothing of the children] ... is greatly endangered." She demanded $44.50 to set 
things right immediately. Two months later Randlett finally authorized the 
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money.53 
Had the effects of the windmill episodes not been so important for the 
health of the school they would seem humorous. But the lack of attention given 
to the seriousness of the situation, and the resulting problems that arose, made 
the water issue critical. The danger from fire and the inconvenience of hauling 
water aside, the health of the children who attended the school was badly 
compromised. And employees suffered as well, although they were rarely affected 
like the children. Inoculated against disease, able to take advantage of the 
school's facilities, employees might have been uncomfortable but rarely were they 
threatened. Alfred Dunn~ for· example, could easily find ways to keep himself and 
his wife supplied with fresh water and other goods. Who would question the need 
of the principal to maintain a certain level of cleanliness and hygiene? 
Students, on the other hand, endured primitive conditions. Drop-pit 
latrines located at a distance from dorms, water so limited in.quantity as to allow 
bathing only once every other week - and even then in tubs shared by two to 
three children - no regular physician, and susceptibility to a variety of illnesses 
and diseases meant that life at the boarding school could be very hazardous. In 
the case of Rainy Mountain there were never any severe outbreaks of smallpox or 
other scourges. For the most part, trachoma was the most troublesome affliction, 
and it was related directly to the presence of dirty water and unsanitary 
conditions. It was an especially prevalent condition from 1910 on. 
Reluctant to spend enough money to remedy the situation, the Indian 
Office instead allowed the school to suffer through prolonged unhealthy periods. 
Doing so meant that the ability of pupils to learn and grow was compromised in 
fundamental ways. For a school that would not provide clean drinking water 
could not possibly create an atmosphere in which learning was nurtured and 
supported. 
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In addition to the school's physical woes, it suffered constantly from poor 
support. For much of her tenure, Cora Dunn battled the agency or the Indian 
Office with regard to some shortage of important supplies or about one pressing 
need or another. The school's official correspondence for much of its first decade 
reveals a deeply felt sense of isolation. Located far from the agency office in 
Anadarko, the place was generally inconvenient for travelers who sought it out for 
visits or inspections. Out of sight, and just as often out of mind, Rainy Mountain 
seemed very inuch like a remote outpost. 
This remoteness was most clearly revealed through the attitude of the 
Indian Office regarding Cora Dunn's endless requests for more help, better staff, 
improved instructional materials, and ,other myriad needs. In its formative years 
the school faced enormous shortages of just about every necessity. The Indian 
Office tended either to shrug this off or to provide what Dunn and her successors 
considered a bare minimum of supplies. Several examples illustrate this point. 
It was the custom of the Indian Office to require that all students wear 
"citizen clothing," or more simply put, non-Indian clothing. Cora Dunn would 
have gladly enforced the rules if she had been able to provide her students with 
ample supplies of such clothing. On most occasions she was able to see that the 
children dressed in accordance with the regulations. But she often was forced to 
make do with salvaged goods and cast-offs from other schools, or to rely on the 
charity and goodwill of missionaries. Her invoices for supplies of clothing reveal 
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regular.shortages of staple items, especially shoes. 
In August of 1903, for example, she implored Randlett to find her enough 
shoes so that she could open school on schedule. "There are no shoes on hand 
for the opening," she wrote, "and as yet none received. If you would call the 
attention of the Indian Office to this also, it would help me out of an 
embarrassing situation." In September she again asked Randlett for help on the 
same matter. "Where are my shoes?" she queried the agent. "We have none at all 
for the children .... The Indians are greatly dissatisfied over it." The same day 
that she was writing Randlett the agency received 427 pairs of day shoes and 
Sunday shoes for boys, youths, and misses.54 
In the.fall of 1905 Cora Dunn was pressing for shoes once again, as well as 
for clothing for her older students, especially the boys.55 Three months later she 
informed the agent that although she had shoes on hand, the were "so coarse and 
stiff as to occasion the children great discomfort in wearing them. Lighter shoes, I 
think, would wear quite as well and effect ... the relief that would be afforded 
the unhappy wearers of those now in use."56 By the end of the spring term for 
1906 the school was so low on essentials that she was moved to attempt an early 
closing. "We are now out of bacon, lard, rolled oats, potatoes, hominy, and rice," 
she wrote. Her supplies of beef, soap, and sugar were good for about three 
weeks, and she offered to slaughter part of the of the school's dairy herd. That 
would not be a very practical solution, however, because of the lack of ice and 
proper storage for the dressed beef.57 
In early October 1906 she once again approached the agency for help. "I 
am sorry to mention the subject of shoes again," she wrote, "but a number of our 
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children are barefooted and are really suffering these cold mornings." She noted 
that their parents either would not or could not buy their children shoes. (Some 
stubbornly saw it as an obligation to be borne by the government. Others simply 
did not have the money.) "Many of the children have colds and I am trembling in 
fear of some of the barefooted ones having pneumonia." Worse, she was having 
to deal with angry parents. "The Indians are greatly incensed over the matter and 
I cannot blame them." Turning their ire to her use, Dunn reminded the agent 
that the Kiowas did not know "how perfectly helpless I am as far as providing for 
their children is concerned." At the end of the month she submitted bills for the 
emergency purchase of shoes for children whom she carefully noted "were 
barefooted. "58 
Clothes were only one problem. In November 1895 Cora Dunn advised the 
agency that a sewing machine intended for Rainy Mountain had been sent instead 
to the Fort Sill School. It rankled her enough so that she dropped her normally 
respectful demeanor. "Whatever the need for a machine may be there, it can't be 
as great as at our school, for we have only two machines, one of which is 
practically worthless, while [I] understand that Fort Sill has five already." Three 
weeks later she raised the matter again. Not wanting to seem importunate, she 
wrote, she was nevertheless driven to remind the agent that her personal sewing 
machine had been pressed into service the preceding year. "I think each of the 
other schools have as many as five, and I don't quite understand why we are not 
allowed those that have come for us." She never got her sewing machine back 
from Fort Sill and was forced to divide her two usable machines between forty-
nine female students.59 
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An especially important part of the school's program was its kindergarten, 
where incoming pupils received their first taste of formal schooling. Cora Dunn 
considered it a critical component in the civilizing process. Like many of the 
school's other programs, however, it suffered from a lack of supplies and support. 
Indeed, it was all Cora Dunn could do to keep a kindergarten teacher, or any 
other teacher for that matter, in the school long enough to maintain any direction 
over the children. Between 1897 and 1902, for example, no fewer than three 
women served as kindergarten teacher. Worse, some of them were of the poorest 
caliber. In 1907 Dunn complained to Agent Blackmon that her current 
kindergartner "has done very much less work than any kindergartner I have ever 
had and has done that little very poorly." In 1894 Dunn requested various 
materials for the kindergarten and pleaded for consideration by the agent on the 
grounds that "the material asked for is mainly colored and really costs very 
little."60 In 1899 she was once again in the same circumstance. "Miss Mattoon 
[the kindergarten teacher] complains that she has not the proper material to 
successfully prosecute her work," wrote Dunn. "If the present estimate could be 
filled this year it would aid her greatly. We have received no kindergarten 
supplies for two years."61 And in 1905 she simply asked for authority to purchase 
her own materials. "No supplies of this character have been furnished this school 
for three years," she wrote, "and there are none on hand now." Thankfully, her 
request was approved.62 
This situation in the kindergarten was illustrative of the rest of the school. 
Administratively, it reflected the overall problems of poor supply, high employee 
turnover, and lukewarm support from the Indian Office. Indeed, personnel 
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turnover was chronic at the school for its entire history. It was especially high 
during its first ten years. For example, between 1895 and 1902 the school had no 
fewer than fifteen teachers. Only one of that group stayed two years, the rest 
drifted in and out at an average of every six months. Only once during that span, 
from September to December 1899, did the school have as many as four teachers. 
By December the number had dropped to three; one year later the school had 
only one teacher for the entire spring term when the enrollment was 110. It 
averaged two per year for the years 1895 to 1902. Other positions had similar 
rates. Between 1895 and 1902 the school employed at least six matrons, three 
seamstresses, four cooks, and five laundresses. Rainy Mountain's predicament was 
not unique; by 1927 personnel turnover in the Indian school system reached 48 
percent. Parker McKenzie said that during his time at the school, "there were not 
less than six changes in the position of boys' disciplinarian .... Three seamstresses 
served in my time, and ... two different laundresses."63 
Although Cora Dunn rated most of her employees as satisfactory, she had 
to settle quite often for second-rate workers who had little interest in building the 
school into an effective institution. In 1901 she noted dryly that a recently hired 
laborer at the school was working out nicely. "I find he is a trained machinist, a 
competent musician, and, as he did not during the night develop aspirations to the 
position of superintendent, I think he will do."64 On another occasion, however, 
she worried that a prospective employee· did not quite appreciate the school's 
predicament. On her application for kindergartner, Alice B. Moncure of Virginia 
made inquiries about the size of Anadarko, the number of white inhabitants in the 
area, the availability of a physician and "a minister of the gospel," and whether or 
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not the climate was "dry and healthy." Cora Dunn wrote to Agent John Blackmon 
that "the lady is laboring under some illusions that ought to be dispelled at once 
before she comes nearly two thousand miles." What most worried Dunn was that 
"I have one employee now who wants the earth and I doubt my ability to divide it 
satisfactorily between the two." On the other hand, she needed a kindergartner 
and was willing to do what was necessary to get one. She enclosed a copy of her 
yet unmailed reply to Moncure with a note to Blackmon saying that if it was an 
"unduly discouraging" letter_ that he ought to return it and "I will gloss things over 
a little more."65 
During its early years, the school was rarely fully operable and suffered 
from a chronic list of problems. Its treatment by the Indian Office marked it as 
an isolated, often neglected school. Its physical plant was poorly built and 
maintained, and the campus was forced to make do without many essentials. 
Hobbled from the beginning, the place worked against great odds in its attempt to 
school Kiowa children. But it survived,_ often due only to the perseverance of 
Cora Dunn and sometimes because of good luck and timely aid. She more than 
any other person or administrator stamped the school with a sense of mission and 
dogged determination. A more easily satisfied principal would likely have seen 
the place fall to pieces. Cora Dunn was undeterred in her work, even when the 
school struggled with repeated shortages and disasters. And she even kept a sense 
of humor about her situation, though it was tinged with understandable bitterness; 
in a letter to Randlett in 1903 decrying the latest in a series of setbacks, she wryly 
observed that Rainy .Mountain's somewhat diminished facilities "could not fail to 
gratify the practical statesmen who framed the Indian appropriation bill." Five 
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years later she reminded one of Randlett's successors that "there are so many 
things needed for the school" that she was running out of ideas.66 But she never 
ran out of energy or devotion, and this meant the difference for hundreds of 
Kiowa children between abject misery and heartfelt concern. 
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CHAPTER V 
"WE HAD A LOT OF FUN, BUT, OF COURSE, 
THAT WASN'T THE SCHOOL PART" 
Most accounts of Indian education focus on various aspects of institutional 
or policy history. For the most part, the record reflects a concern with 
understanding how schools operated according to the government's policy and 
procedural guidelines. The experiences of Indian students often get little 
attention. Although some works show more concern with understanding the 
boarding school experience from the perspective of students, relatively little is 
known about what it was like to attend a government school.1 This is not to say 
that material is lacking about life at the boarding schools; but more often than not 
the available accounts are not from Indians as much as they are about Indians. 
The difference is crucial, for it entails the critical component of perspective. 
Young Kiowas who attended Rainy Mountain were not so malleable that they did 
as they were told without a moment's hesitation or thought; most were keenly 
aware of what was happening to them. And they often left the school with deep 
feelings about what they had seen and done as students. Few of their opinions, 
however, have ever found their way into scholarly assessments. 
Understanding what Rainy Mountain was like through the eyes of its 
students presents a rich portrait of life in a reservation boarding school. It offers 
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a revealing look at how they learned, what they learned, and how their lives were 
affected. In the case of Rainy Mountain and the Kiowas, knowing what happened 
to the children who attended the schools opens the way not only to a fuller 
understanding of the realities of boarding school life, but also to important 
insights about contemporary Kiowa life. The boarding schools did not transform 
the children who attended them as completely as the government intended. This 
was so for many reasons. Two of the most important were that schools usually 
lacked the power to do it, as the example of Rainy Mountain's early history 
attests. Secondly, Indian children and their parents showed great resilience in 
their efforts to protect the cultural lifeways that made up their identity. Kiowas 
did show a willingness, however, to adapt themselves and their children to new 
situations in which they lived. This often meant combining certain pre-reservation 
values and institutions with ones that were non-Indian. Such an approach was not 
novel by the 1890s; it had been going on among the Kiowas since first contact 
with Euroamericans. Of course, this was exactly what the boarding schools were 
intended to discourage, for total change was the goal. But the process turned out 
to be more complex than policymakers ever imagined. Rainy Mountain was 
supposed to prepare Kiowa children for meaningful lives as educated, self-
sufficient citizens. Ironically, it often succeeded in doing that, but not at the cost 
of what made those children Kiowa. The Rainy Mountain experience made it 
possible for students like Parker McKenzie to get their start in life; it did not 
mean the end of their Kiowa identity. 
What the government wanted to accomplish is abundantly clear. How well 
it was done and what characterized it are less well known. Moreover, because 
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official records do not reveal much of.the student perspective except to comment 
on certain excesses and problems, they tend to present a one-sided version of life 
at Rainy Mountain. Cora Dunn, for example, was the very portrait of Victorian 
gentility. Although she could lodge bitter complaints and make withering 
evaluations about staff and students alike, her correspondence was avowedly 
"official" in content and interpretation. Relying· solely on her records or on those 
of the agency and Indian Office would give at best a jaundiced view. Striving to 
see good in almost every situation, reluctant to concede that for much of her 
tenure she was perhaps locked in a losing battle, Cora Dunn left a decidedly 
colored interpretation. Her successor, James McGregor, was less inclined to word 
his missives so politely, but his letters are not much more useful for getting at the 
students' perspective. 
In and around Carnegie, Anadarko, Mountain View, Gotebo, and other 
Kiowa communities in southwest Oklahoma, there are many former students, as 
well as their children, who recall life at Rainy Mountain or one of the agency's 
other boarding schools during the early twentieth century. Except for the Doris 
Duke Oral History Collection undertaken in the late 1960s and a handful of 
scholarly studies, few of these people have ever been asked to comment at length 
on their experiences. Much of what follows rests on interviews with elderly 
Kiowas and Comanches who attended Rainy Mountain or another boarding school 
on the reservation. 
As with all sources, some caveats are in order. Because much of what 
follows rests on memories that reach back as far as the first decade of this 
century, the question of reliability is legitimately raised. As oral sources these 
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accounts deserve to be treated as useful and unique narratives, yet held to fair and 
rigorous standards of historical interpretation. Acknowledging their limitations, 
however, does not obviate their importance. In most cases, multiple sources are 
used to illustrate points, especially where discrepancies exist. Knowing that the 
recollections of most of those interviewed are based on memories dimmed by time 
or softened by the passing of many years reminds readers of the difficulties 
involved. Still, because these former students grew up with, and still respect, the 
continuing authority of oral traditions, the accounts offered here have a certain 
potency. Rainy Mountain School never managed to destroy Kiowa culture; this is 
especially true with regard to language and its role in the transmission of values 
and ideas. It is a profound irony that two of the most keenly targeted elements of 
Kiowa life - language and the oral tradition- have survived to be used as a 
basis for understanding what Rainy Mountain was actually like. 
As the fall term of the school's first year approached in 1893, 
Commissioner Morgan ordered Kiowa-Comanche Agent George Day "to meet 
with parents of children and make a thorough canvass among the children of 
school age and suitable health who are tributary to the Rainy Mountain School." 
The purpose of the meeting was for Day to get "a thorough understanding with 
the parents and effect such arrangements that you may get the children into the 
school without delay as soon as you are ready to receive them."2 Getting Indian 
children into the schools and keeping them there had a high priority. Anxious to 
bring as many children as possible under the civilizing influence of the school 
house, the Indian Office directed agents to spare no effort in getting the schools 
filled. This meant locating and enrolling as many children between the ages of 
144 
about five and fifteen as possible. Some children started school as early as the 
age of three or four; typically they waited until about the age of five or six. Rainy 
Mountain records show that by the age of seventeen or eighteen most students left 
the school. 
On some reservations this was less of a problem than on others. At the 
Kiowa-Comanche Reservation tribes were generally willing to enroll their children. 
The problem facing that reservation was not reluctant parents but too few schools 
to accommodate the school-age population. Once Rainy Mountain opened it 
rarely had trouble filling its quota. Except for episodic illness, bad weather, or 
some unanticipated development, the school usually filled quickly and almost 
always operated at, or over, capacity. And when Kiowa parents showed an 
inclination to resist, the agent had important powers that were normally sufficient 
to compel parents to relinquish their children. Because a reservation census was 
taken annually, the number and location of families was a matter of record. The 
agency kept track of where families with school-age children lived and monitored 
their movements through ration and annuity issues. Moreover, with the coercive 
force of the army at his disposal, and with the authority to restrict rations, 
annuities, and supplies, the agent had clear advantages in the campaign to enroll 
Indian children. 
Kiowa families in the Rainy Mountain district, however, rarely showed 
significant resistance in putting their children into school. Although there were 
some who were slow to comply every September when the school opened for the 
year, for the most part a full contingent was on hand within several weeks. The 
reasons for putting children in school varied. Some families believed that their 
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children would only have a secure future if they had the benefit of education and 
training. Others believed the school might provide better care than they could -
there was food, clothing, and shelter for every pupil. Myrtle Ware attended Rainy 
Mountain between 1898 and 1907 and returned as an assistant matron after her 
school days were over. She entered because she remembered that her family was 
having a difficult time providing food and other necessities. At the time of her 
enrollment she was living with an aunt and uncle in a tipi near Anadarko, about 
thirty miles from the school. Her relatives told her "that I can't be taken care of 
down this way ... she [her aunt] took me up there to Rainy Mountain. She asked 
my dad, 'I wanta put her up to school there, where I'll go and see her,' and I went 
up that way."· Annie Bigman, born in 1900, entered sometime around 1904 or 
1905 for the same reasons. "Daddy started me to school when I was about four 
years old,'' she stated. The comment that "that's an awful little girl to be going to 
school," brought the reply "yeah, he was sick then. He don't want to take care of 
a little one so he pushed me to school."3 
For some the decision was associated with peculiar factors. Guy Quoetone, 
born in 1885, first attended school at J. J. Methvin's Methodist Institute south of 
Anadarko. The decision to enroll him there was linked to his father's membership 
in the Methodist Church. Quoetone stated that he would have gone to one of the 
agency schools in Anadarko "if my father hadn't already have joined the Methodist 
church, and the campaign was on in every camp, and when we started to school he 
wanted me to go to that school [Methvin] and dedicated me and sent me to that 
school." Rainy Mountain records show that Quoetone entered in the fall of 1902 
and stayed for about one year. When asked the reason he changed schools, 
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Quoetone replied, "well, nothing, only we lived closer to Rainy Mountain." He 
also recalled that he told his father "maybe they might give me better grades, but 
they didn't. "4 
Sarah Long Hom, born in 1902, entered Rainy Mountain sometime around 
1910. "Oh, I don't know," she said, "I must be about eight years old I guess, or 
something like that. Or either I must be awful young when I went to school." 
She enrolled in order to be close to one of her cousins with whom she had been 
raised. 
We mostly was raised together, and I always want to be with her. Well, I 
didn't know she was going into school. ... I went down there to see that 
girl. They say she's going to school, so I went to visit her and she begged 
for me to stay. So I thought to myself, I'll stay for a few days and then I'll 
go back. Then when the time came, well I was already in school. So I just 
stayed there and never did go back home .... that's how l got to school. I 
went to school myself. By going visiting, she asked me to stay, so I just 
stayed with her.5 
Fred Bigman, born 1900, began his education at the Cache Creek Mission 
west of Apache, Oklahoma. "Boy," recounted Bigman, "they is like real 
missionaries [at Cache Creek]. Sort of like Baptists." In fact they were 
Presbyterian. From there he went to public schools near Fort Cobb and then to 
Saint Patrick's Catholic Mission west of Anadarko. In September 1915, he 
entered Rainy Mountain because his "folks took me down [to] Rainy Mountain. 
Wanted me to switch schools. They just took me here and there." The peripatetic 
Bigman, who attended at least four schools by the time he was fifteen (most of his 
cohorts were lucky to attend two during their entire lives) noted that he was not 
particularly happy about being at Rainy Mountain. "I didn't like that school right 
there close" to home. He stayed only for a half a year and then returned to public 
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schools.6 For him, as for many of his fellow students, the idea of going to school 
was neither to be feared nor resisted. But few of them saw as many classrooms in 
the space of five or six years as he did. 
James Haumpy entered Rainy Mountain in the fall of 1913 at about the 
age of thirteen. His mother and father sent him to school, he said, to be with 
"those other boys they was schooling out there." Haumpy apparently found little 
solace in that fact; "I was a little boy. I don't know how to talk English. They put 
me in school. Well, I ain't used to it. And I cried and cried, I wanna go home." 
So, like other young Kiowas, Haumpy went because his parents wanted him to, 
and because other Kiowa children were there as well. Haumpy also remembered 
that when he eventually got over his initial displeasure, he found that school was 
not entirely unpleasant. "I'd take my horses down there" to Rainy Mountain, he 
said. "I seen pretty girls at that school.'17 
Lewis Toyebo got to Rainy Mountain only because a family friend 
prevented missionaries from carrying him away. At the age of five or six, Toyebo 
and a boyhood friend were on their way to a mission school when a relative 
"chased us down and made us get off' their horses. Pondering the incident, 
Toyebo mused "we might have been preachers." About a year later, "Daddy and 
Mother told me they were to take me to Rainy Mountain School." This was in 
1898. He spent the next decade at the school and eventually became an assistant 
disciplinarian there. In a surprising move, Toyebo's father Edward asked to attend 
the school with his son. In 1902 Cora Dunn obtained permission for the father to 
stay on the school grounds and to attend classes. 
While his progress has been slow, as might be expected at his age, during 
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his three years ... at school he has learned to read and write and can 
speak English with sufficient ease to make a very acceptable interpreter for 
the missionary. Deprived of educational advantages in his boyhood, 
Toyebo, late in life determined to educate himself. For several years he 
struggled along with no other help than his little boy during vacations.8 
Parker McKenzie said that by the time he entered the school in 1904 "most 
of the Kiowas already were impressed of the benefits of education and took 
advantage of schooling." As far as McKenzie's family was concerned, "the Indian 
was already out of us by the time we went to school ... missionaries had already 
been doing this. . . . After joining the church we began to change." (It is worth 
noting that McKenzie was a half-blood; the overwhelming majority of his 
classmates were full-bloods, many of whom had not yet been exposed to white 
culture to the same degree as he.) McKenzie also commented that because Rainy 
Mountain was well known to the Kiowas by the time of his enrollment "no one 
had to inform them about the schools, they were on hand and saw them." His 
parents, convinced of the advantages that schooling gave their children, made sure 
that McKenzie and his siblings attended. His father enrolled Parker and his 
brother Daniel in 1904 "to get us used to boarding school life."9 
Important support for the school also came from well-placed authorities 
inside the tribe. When schools began to open on the reservation in the 1880s 
various headmen and chiefs often took the lead in encouraging Kiowas to enroll 
their children. Some of them probably understood the importance of education as 
explained to them by the government. Others used it to gain favor with agents. 
In August 1905, for example, Big Tree, a highly influential Kiowa chief and 
former opponent of reservation life (he eventually became a Baptist) dictated a 
letter to Agent James Randlett concerning Rainy Mountain. Randlett had 
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solicited the chiefs help in getting the school filled. Big Tree replied "I will tell 
the people to put these children in school. ... We are going to the Ghost Dance 
Friday and I will let the people know about the school and tell them to put these 
children in school." In closing, the chief reminded Randlett that annuities were 
due shortly and wanted to know "when the payment will be."10 It was a friendly 
reminder that support had a price. 
Although the school usually had few problems recruiting students, on 
occasion it was forced to take measures in rounding up the children. Not every 
Kiowa was anxious to surrender a child. Resistance took several forms. Parents 
sometimes used the leverage of annuities and other payments. Until payments 
were made, they kept their children out of school. In September of 1900, for 
example, allotment negotiations on the reservation had produced bitter feelings. 
Angry over what they believed was a fraudulent process, parents held their 
children at home. Cora Dunn reported that at the end of the opening week she 
had only two dozen students on the campus; in past years opening week had 
brought in an average of seventy-five children. "The Kiowas are in an ugly frame 
of mind over the terms of the allotment treaty," she reported, "and are determined 
to be as annoying as possible." This included using their children as a bargaining 
point. "If the children do not come in by the first of the coming week," she 
concluded, "some coercive measures will have to be used to fill the school." The 
situation was remedied when several groups of parents managed to collect a 
number of children and brought them to the school.11 
More often than not, however, parents discovered that they could not 
challenge the system very long, especially when it meant that important rations or 
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money hung in the balance. Most of them brought their children in after a fairly 
brief period. In March of 1905 Cora Dunn advised Agent Randlett that one such 
case had been resolved after a father agreed to enroll his daughter, thus his 
grazing money should not be held up. Moreover, she added, the case ought not 
be pressed too vigorously "as he promises he will voluntarily place the child in 
school next year." Another parent was reported as having "placed in school his 
daughter ... on account of whom his per capita payment was with held." This 
was typical of the approach taken. Cora Dunn believed it was absolutely 
necessary to take a firm stand. "I know from experience," she wrote, "that nothing 
is to be gained by temporizing with a K.iowa."12 
In extreme cases parents (and occasionally children) were actually jailed. 
Less drastic solutions were usually found. If withholding payments failed, agents 
refused rations. This was a very serious decision. The Indian Office specifically 
identified it as a legitimate use of force and approved its use in a wide variety of 
circumstances. In 1898 Commissioner William A. Jones informed Kiowa-
Comanche Agent William Walker that unless parents put their children into 
school he would cut off their rations and annuities, "and if that does not suffice I 
will send their children [to school] anyway. Make it peremptory, and let them 
understand that I do not care and will not have any obstacles in the way of these 
children going." In the same year Jones reported that he fully supported "more 
vigorous measures" to increase enrollments. Citing an 1896 circular to all agents, 
Jones instructed that all children who deliberately avoided school were to be 
arrested and subjected to "suitable punishment." Parents and guardians who 
likewise resisted were to be punished as well. "The wisdom of this course," he 
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imperiously obseived, "is fully evidenced in the largely increased enrollment and 
average attendance for these schools. "13 
Once they were in school, Kiowa youngsters entered a world that was 
intended to be completely different from the one into which they had been born. 
For a minimum of forty weeks a year they lived according to a regimen that 
exposed them to the tenets of a Christian life based on independence, diligence, 
and discipline. It was to be a wholly transforming experience both culturally and 
intellectually. In theory no detail was too small to be spared, no lesson too 
limited to be ignored. . 
The change began immediately upon arrival. Physical appearance was an 
important manifestation of a civilized life. Although some children already wore 
so-called citizen's clothing, or mixed it with traditional Kiowa dress, all of the 
children went through a process that marked the beginning of the attempt to take 
the Indian out of them. For a few the· transition was not so difficult. Parker 
McKenzie was born in a tipi on the reseivation but grew up in a home where he 
learned much about white culture. "I am sure I was not surprised that knives, 
forks, and spoons were on the cloth covered tables," he recalled. A visiting 
missionary once described the home of McKenzie's maternal grandparents as "neat 
and clean, two beds well made, chairs, a table, a polished cook stove, a cupboard 
well arranged, pictures on the wall."14 For McKenzie, Rainy Mountain was not a 
radical departure. 
Most others, however, came to ·the place with considerably less experience. 
For them the school was largely foreign, composed of people and things that were 
unfamiliar. Guy Quoetone recalled that the first tiine his parents left him at a 
reservation boarding school he was "still in my Kiowa costume." Staff members 
ushered him into a room where two men and a woman waited for him. 
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They shut the door and about that time I get excited and they got a chair. 
This man set me there and they commence to hold me. While I was 
talking at her ... this barber ... he come from behind and cut one side of 
my braid off .... About that time I turned tiger! I commenced to fight 
and scratch and bite and jump up in the air! They had a time, all of them, 
holding me down. Cut the other side. Two men had me down there and 
that white lady tried to hold my head and then that barber cutting all the 
time. It was almost an hour before he finished cutting my hair. And you 
ought to see how I looked. I sure hate a haircut! 
Following his encounter with the barber, Quoetone was issued government 
clothing and shoes and went to the boys' dormitory.15 
All students were issued uniforms. Styles varied from year to year, but the 
school always provided some standard dress for both sexes. When Annie Bigman 
entered Rainy Mountain in 1904 or 1905 the girls all wore grey uniforms that 
resembled sleeveless jumpers. A white blouse, black shoes, and stockings 
completed the ensemble. Boys wore "little brown suits. Boys' knee pants. Brown 
caps. "16 When Sarah Long Horn arrived several years later there was a military 
look to school clothing. Girls wore ribbons in their hair that identified them as 
members of company B or C in military style.17 After cutting Lewis Toyebo's 
braids, staff members bathed and then fitted him with new clothes and shoes. 
"Everything that was needed was furnished by the school" he said. "The Indians 
didn't have to buy nothing." Toyebo remembered a martial look to the clothes he 
wore. "Our school uniforms were grey with red stripes and our play clothing were 
plain jeans. We were a sight on earth."18 
In addition to new clothes, many students also received new names. Those 
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without a Christian, english name were assigned one. When asked if his son had a 
name, Lewis Toyebo's father said that he did not. "Okay, we'll call him Lewis" was 
the reply. James Haumpy received his name in similar fashion. Working from 
lists, staff members apparently assigned names on an arbitrary basis. There was 
not much variety; school rolls show an inordinate number of girls named Sarah, 
Mary, Elizabeth, and Bessie. Popular boys' names included Robert, Henry, 
Albert, James, and Frank. Surnames were either translated, if possible, or 
rendered phonetically. Each student also had a permanent number. Toyebo was 
number forty-one from the day he entered in 1898 until he left in 1909. Myrtle 
Ware was number nineteen, "which I kept for so many years until I was dismissed 
from the school." Parker McKenzie said that "like prison convicts we were mostly 
identified by our assigned numbers rather than by name, except in classrooms 
where we were 'respected' by our given English names."19 
Living quarters were assigned by age and sex. Here, as in all aspects of 
school life, students were strictly separated. Matrons hovered over their wards 
and were unstinting in their punishment of those who tried to cross the line. 
"Keeping the sexes apart was routinely strict," said Parker McKenzie. "We were 
under strict discipline, we were never free." Students nonetheless flirted with each 
other across an imaginary line that McKenzie said most feared to cross. Boys and 
girls not only maintained separate living quarters, but ate at separate tables, 
occupied different portions of the same classrooms, and were kept apart at chapel 
services. Only at the school's carefully chaperoned social functions were they 
allowed to mix. And even then it was not quite an open field. Students "all 
marched to and from [these events] in military order - and separately, too." 
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Despite what McKenzie called "some unavoidable togetherness," for the most part 
staff members tried to keep boys and girls as far apart as possible.20 
Sarah Long Horn said that the boys often tried to find ways around the 
separation of the sexes. There was an occasional daring foray into the girls' dorm, 
but the odds of success were long, and punishment was swift and sure. There 
were more auspicious moments. When students made the trek to Boake's trading 
post about a mile from the campus, for example, there was usually opportunity to 
test the rules. But the girls were closely watched by staff members, recalled Sarah 
Long Horn, who diligently protected them; "They watch us real close," she said. 
"There's got to be one teacher up in front and there's got to be somebody else in 
the back that will watch the boys and the girls."21 Fred Bigman grumpily recalled 
"we never did get to talk to any girls." Sometimes students managed to foil the 
best efforts of the staff. McKenzie wooed his future wife Nettie by passing her 
notes in phonetically written Kiowa, a practice that prevented teachers from 
confiscating the notes and reading them out loud. Eventually McKenzie perfected 
a written Kiowa language.22 
The premium placed on order was high. Discipline was thorough and 
sometimes harsh. Like other boarding schools, Rainy Mountain was run according 
to strict regimens and schedules copied from military forms. McKenzie wrote "I 
distinctly remember ... how odd it was to line up like I imagined soldiers lined 
up." Students queued up for every occasion, he said, and marched to meals, 
classes, and chapel services. Boys drilled every day before breakfast, except for 
Sundays. "It was not unusual for the little ones' skins to appear blue from the 
cold. It was very sad to see 6, 7, and 8 year-olds being compelled to learn the 
rudiments of soldiery as early as 6:00 am." The school organized students into 
companies and designated older pupils as cadet sergeants. A former student at 
Riverside said that boarding school 
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was really a military regime .... Every year an official from Fort Sill would 
come down and review our companies and our drilling maneuvers. We 
marched everywhere, to the dining hall, to classes; everything we did was in 
military fashion. We were taught to make our beds in military fashion, you 
know, with square corners and sheets and blankets tucked in a special way . 
. . . On Sundays we had an inspection ... just like the military.23 
Those who stepped outside the bounds received quick lessons. "Everything 
you do, you get punished," recalled a former Riverside student. "You'd get tired 
and get punished." Disciplinary responses ran the gamut from stern lectures to 
draconian whippings. By far the most common sin was speaking Kiowa. School 
officials regarded stamping it out as one of the first steps toward the 
transformation of the children. Speaking Kiowa, even by the youngest children, 
was not tolerated and brought swift punishment. Not surprisingly, this had a 
· chilling effect on many youngsters who, rather than venture a question to a Kiowa 
classmate, simply remained silent and used no language at all. Getting caught 
meant enduring a variety of punishments including having one's teeth brushed with 
soap, extra drill duty, carrying stepladders on the shoulders for several hours, or 
restriction from the school's social events. The child of a former Rainy Mountain 
student said that her mother was forced to hold quinine tablets in her mouth for 
using the Kiowa language.24 Sometimes punishment humiliated rather then hurt 
physically. Sarah Long Horn said that boys caught speaking Kiowa were punished 
by being made to wear sandwich boards reading "I like girls." At other schools 
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boys were forced to wear dresses. Rainy Mountain girls stood face-first in room 
corners until they spoke English. 25 
Myrtle Ware said that getting caught speaking Kiowa brought demerits 
used to restrict opportunities for trips and outings. "There's one of the matrons, 
you know, she goes around and listens ... when one of them gets six marks, they 
don't let them go to the store." Harry Tofpi, Sr., a Kiowa who attended Riverside 
School in Anadarko in the 1930s, said that when he was caught speaking Kiowa 
his hands were bound tightly behind his back until the circulation had been 
completely cut off and he had learned his lesson. He also said that teachers 
considered his left-handedness incorrect; when he attempted to write with his left 
hand his teachers tied it behind his back and.forced him to write with his right 
hand.26 
For all of the attention given to eradicating the Kiowa language, however, 
the campaign rarely succeeded. All of the children carried on conversations in 
Kiowa "when the matron ain't listening," said Myrtle Ware. Despite the 
punishments they had to endure, McKenzie said that Kiowa "nevertheless 
remained the dominant language away from the campus, particularly with the 
younger boys." Kiowa remained the language used in the majority of Indian 
homes where children went for holiday visits or the three month summer vacation 
spoke it daily. This failure was a costly one in view of the school's mission. 
Psychologically and culturally the survival of the Kiowa language meant that an 
important barrier to assimilation remained in place. The full meaning of this 
became clear in the decades that followed. The generations of young people who 
went through the school proved to be a galvanizing force in the continuation of 
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Kiowa culture in the middle and late twentieth century. They played the central 
role in transmitting crucial knowledge and traditions.27 
The most serious offense short of violence or sexual misconduct was 
running away. According to the official records, Rainy Mountain suffered only 
about two dozen runaways. It is likely that this is not entirely accurate; school 
officials were not anxious to admit that runaways occurred. Moreover, if children 
returned within a reasonable amount of time (usually several days), an appropriate 
punishment was given but the offense was not recorded as a runaway. On the 
other hand, runaways could not be tolerated; those who turned out to be 
incorrigible often discovered to their sorrow that the punishment was severe. 
For those who doubted the harshness of a reservation boarding school, 
runaways provided a reminder. In some cases offenders were forced to wear a 
ball and chain, boys had to dress in girls' clothing, or suffer whippings with rubber 
hoses. Common punishments included paddlings or standing on tip-toe with arms 
outstretched. Some schools locked children in darkened closets. Most former 
boarding school students recalled that boys were treated more harshly than girls. 
In extreme cases students were actually arrested and subjected to the vile 
conditions of the Fort Sill stockade. Cora Dunn arrested recalcitrant students on 
several occasions. In May of 1895 she wrote to Agent Hugh Baldwin about "a 
case of most willful disobedience from this school" involving a young Kiowa boy 
who had asked to leave. When Dunn refused he left anyway. "I think the 
punishment he really needs is about thirty days in the guard house at the Agency," 
she wrote. "In the Cheyenne and Arapaho schools that seemed to have the most 
salient effect possible in such cases." She left the final decision to the agent, but 
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closed by observing that the young man in question came from a family "that 
needs a good lesson."28 
In February 1900 she sent two students to the agency under armed guard 
and ordered thein "punished by imprisonment in the guard house for at least one 
month." The two boys had "given trouble in every way," she wrote, and normal 
disciplinary measures had proved "wholly unavailing." Frustrated by her inability 
to prevent them from making more trouble (which included fighting and running 
away), she sent them to the agency and told the agent "I feel they both deserve 
more severe punishment than I am prepared to inflict on them, hence I send them 
to you." There were no mitigating circumstances, she assured the agent, and any 
defense offered by them "will be a product of their imaginations."29 
Cases like this were extreme; most disciplinary problems were less serious 
and normally handled at the school. Once runaways were located, the school's 
matron or disciplinarian was dispatched to return them; Annie Bigman said that 
the school's male employees would administer the punishment, which usually 
meant a whipping. These were genuinely feared because they occasionally ran out 
of control. In 1891 the superintendent of the Fort Sill School in Anadarko was 
fired after one of his teachers whipped two boys so savagely that they ran away 
and froze to death. "The men ... do it," recalled Bigman. "When they whip 'em 
some would half kill them." Fred Bigman said that "some boys get away, but they 
get 'em back. When they get 'em. back they punish them .... They whipped 
them."30 
Still, boys and girls alike tried to leave. Some were lonely, others were 
scared, and a few simply did not intend to stay in school. A Wichita girl who 
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attended Riverside in the late 1910's said that: 
I don't exactly know why, but I was all the time running away. There were 
two older girls who at the end of the week would say, "let's go home." And 
since I was the little kid, I'd always say, "Okay " .... Whenever we'd run 
home, my folks would just bring us back the next day. I don't ever 
remember getting punished for that.31
James Haumpy, who gained a reputation at Rainy Mountain for running 
away, was probably typical. He ran away because the older boys were always 
trying to pick a fight with him. "I don't fight," he said. "You know how it is." But 
he also discovered that the girls did not particularly like him either, and that was 
too much for him to take. "Young and got to go to school," he said, "and some 
girls they don't like you. That's why I wanna' go home."32 
Order and discipline, then, lay at the core of the boarding school 
experience. Virtually all aspects of students' lives were strictly controlled, in 
theory at least, and this control would be used to foster the change that awaited 
them. Cora Dunn seemed genuinely to love her students, but she also feared that 
at best they were an untamed rabble. Thus she worked diligently to create an 
environment in which they could be carefully and completely remolded. Given 
Rainy Mountain's circumstances she rarely accomplished this to the degree she 
desired. But she labored mightily. Nowhere was her effort more apparent than in 
the school's academic and vocational training. Here were the real laboratories of 
change. In the classrooms, under the watchful eyes of their teachers, Kiowa 
children would be molded into citizens freed from the temptations of a wild life 
on the plains. At least that was the plan. 
Students at Rainy Mountain matriculated through the sixth grade, provided 
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they had the endurance to make it. Most did not. The education given them 
rested mainly on the acquisition of vocational skills - farming and industrial arts 
for the boys, domestic training for the girls. To these were added lessons in the 
rudiments of history, grammar, arithmetic, civics, the English language, and the 
truths of the Christian religion. Their education was intended to be a stepping 
stone from the reservation to life as independent, self-sufficient models of 
Angloamerican society. It promised nothing more than that and was not really 
intended to make them equal members of that society. A small percentage went 
on to one of the large off-reservation boarding school, but most stayed a handful 
of years at Rainy Mountain and then left to make their way in the world. 
The government's boarding school curriculum focused on giving students 
usable skills and training. In 1895 the commissioner observed that the majority of 
the schools were equipped for: 
thorough industrial work, and great stress is laid.on this portion of the 
educational curriculum. While literary branches are by no means neglected 
... the necessity of giving Indian youth an all-round training, which shall 
equip thein for their own living, is kept constantly in view. To teach the 
Indian boy and girl to work intelligently, effectively, and hence 
remuneratively, is the first consideration.33 
The annual report for 1902 of the Superintendent of Indian Schools 
summarized the government's approach to Indian education. Drawing on a series 
of papers delivered at a summer seminar for Indian school teachers, the report 
highlighted the work to be accomplished at schools like Rainy Mountain. In 
"Essentials of Indian Education," the Most Reverend John Ireland argued that 
above all "the Indian needs a practical education. It is well for him to 1rnow that 
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he must live as a white man, and consequently he must learn to work." Because 
"work is the basis of all civilization," continued Ireland, Indians could only profit 
from the strict lessons of industry and discipline instilled in the classroom. 
Teach the boys a trade of some kind, and teach them farming, which is, of 
course, the most important of all. Teach the girls the ordinary industries 
for which they are fitted ... and I believe it will do much more for the 
elevation of the race than teaching boys. Let the spirit of the home be 
what it should be, and the father and son will be all right. Teach the girls 
to take care of their homes and make them attractive. Teach them 
cooking, teach them neatness, teach them responsibility. Teach the girls to 
milk and take care of poultry; and teach them how to serve a nice 
appetizing meal for the family; do this and I tell you you have solved the 
whole question of Indian civilization.34 
In the· same report were excerpts from "What Should Be Taught The 
Indian," by Z. X. Snyder, the president of the State Normal School in Greeley, 
Colorado. Snyder stated that the "soul of the Indian is different from that of the 
Caucasian, and a generation cannot change it." By acknowledging "the nature of 
his impulses," teachers would realize that "industrial education should be the 
central notion in ... training, and should include the useful trades, the native 
handicrafts, farming, and nature study." Training the "intellectual nature" meant 
giving the Indian work skills; training the "social nature" gave Indians "a chance to 
do the things he likes that are helpful to others."35 
Other papers summarized in the report bore titles like "How To Impress 
Upon The Indian The Use And Value Of Money," "Training The Pupils To Be 
Better Indians," "Training For Citizenship," and "The Place Of Athletics In Indian 
Schools," whose author worried that "small lung capacity seems a too general 
defect among the Indians," and suggested that vigorous exercise would likely cure 
it. But there was danger in over emphasizing athletics; the essay soberly noted 
that "Indian boys are too liable to get the wrong idea of the importance of 
applause. "36 
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From the beginning, the Indian school curriculum placed more importance 
on practical training than on academic development. All that was necessary was 
enough general knowledge to instill respect for Angloamerican values. Anything 
more was a waste of time and effort. The result was a curriculum of limited 
expectations and goals that according to Sally McBeth "were not intended to meet 
any specific Indian problems or needs."37 The thrust of Indian education 
throughout Rainy Mountain's years reflected a paternalistic approach based on 
limited possibilities for all but the bare few who could escape the cultural and 
intellectual barriers of being Indian. Geared toward producing obliging, obedient 
graduates, schools like Rainy Mountain did little more than provide a decent level 
of literacy and familiarity with Angloamerican values and institutions. The gulf 
between the ability of Indians as measured against that of whites was obvious, 
thorough, and nearly impenetrable. Cora Dunn loved her work and her children, 
but she also believed that by their nature Kiowas were not fully capable of 
attaining the same intellectual or cultural status as whites. For her, Rainy 
Mountain's mission was to raise the children from savagery. She agreed with 
Commissioner William A. Jones who wrote in 1903 that "the central thought is 
work as a preparation for home life." In Cora Dunn's opinion, Rainy Mountain 
was best suited as a training ground for a decent, respectable lifestyle.38 
Rainy Mountain's curriculum combined vocational skills with what 
Commissioner Jones described as "academical classes." These included English 
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language training, history, geography, arithmetic, and a smattering of civics, the 
Bible, and other suitable topics designed to imitate the American public school 
system. Students normally spent half the day in class, and half the day at one or 
another of the school's vocational classes. For boys this meant harness making, 
farming, carpentry, shoemaking, tailoring, dairying, masonry, blacksmithing, and so 
on. Girls were taught sewing, housework, laundering, dairying, cooking, poultry 
care, "and the multitude of 'little things' which contribute to the successful 
housekeeper and homemaker."39 In theory all of this and more formed the core 
of a successful reservation boarding school. 
A 1914 report from principal John McGregor detailed a typical day at the 
school and revealed how the boarding school curriculum operated according to 
the conditions that prevailed at Rainy Mountain. (Accounts by McKenzie, Toyebo, 
and others who were there in earlier years reveal a nearly identical regimen. The 
only noticeable change after 1910 was the addition of evening classes and 
meetings.) The day began at 6:00 a.m. with drilling and cleaning. Morning roll 
call came at 6:45. Breakfast followed from 7:00 to 7:30 after which students 
returned to their rooms to do routine chores. Classes began at 8:00 and ran until 
11:45. Lunch was at noon. Instruction resumed at 1:00 and continued until 5:00. 
Supper was served at 6:10. Evenings were filled with more classes, vocational 
training, reading circles, recreation and free time, lectures, and various 
programs.40 
In 1913, for example, the school calendar showed numerous evening socials 
(usually designated for small, middle, or large-sized boys and girls) as well as 
lectures on topics ranging from the humane treatment of animals to patriotism. 
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Evening roll call came at 7:15 for small pupils and at 8:00 for the older ones. At 
9:00 it was lights out. Weekends brought a respite from the routine. Saturday 
mornings usually found students engaged in chores or work from 8:00 to 11:00, 
but afternoons were free time. On alternate weekends groups were taken to 
nearby Gotebo or to Boake's trading post not far from the campus. Sundays 
meant Sunday school from 10:00 a.m. to noon, recreation and free time for much 
of the afternoon, and church service from 5:00 to 6:15. Attendance at the church 
was required. A Kiowa girl who attended one of the reservation's other boarding 
schools recalled that "you went to church; there was no not going. "41 
For much of the school's history classes were formed in two divisions -
kindergarten through third grade, and fourth through sixth grade. Between 1894 
and 1910, moreover, the fact that the school often had only two teachers during 
any term meant that only two classrooms were formed. Sometime after 1910 the 
academic program was divided into three parts - kindergarten through second 
grade, third and fourth grades, and fifth and sixth grades. A paucity of full-time 
teachers, however, kept the program hobbled. Students in kindergarten through 
the third grade typically concentrated on rudimentary learning skills, especially 
English language training. They also had simple lessons in hygiene, manners, 
music, and exercise among other things. By the fourth grade students added 
history, classics, agriculture, and civics. It was at this stage as well that vocational 
training began. 
In 1916 a redesigned curriculum designated schools as either pre-vocational 
or vocational. Reservation boarding schools characterized the former, off-
reservation boarding schools the latter. Differences in curriculum were mainly 
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matters of degree; whether at Carlisle or Rainy Mountain students got the same 
kind of training, only the intensity and variety changed. As a pre-vocational 
school Rainy Mountain was expected to offer a wide variety of training classes 
suitable for the age and experience of its students. First, second, and third 
graders concentrated on lessons in music, manners, health, arithmetic, and some 
limited vocational skills described by the Indian Office as "industrial work." 
Instruction in reading, grammar, and spelling rounded out the academic day. 
Beginning with the fourth grade academic skills were scaled back in favor of more 
intense vocational instruction. Academic training in the fourth grade, for example, 
consisted of 145 minutes a day of instruction in reading, history, geography, and 
other topics; vocational work, however, took up 240 minutes of the day. 
According to this regimen schools like Rainy Mountain would successfully train 
students for what the commissioner called the task·of leading "useful lives under 
the conditions which they must meet after leaving school."42 
It all sounded fine in theory. In practice, however, most schools never had 
a chance of putting such plans to work. Limited facilities and too few teachers 
meant that for much of the time Rainy Mountain gave its students parts of this 
program but rarely all of it. A 1911 inspection, for example, revealed a distressing 
lack of critical facilities including a dairy barn, carpenter shop, and industrial 
cottage. 43 Worse, because of the lack of teachers the school usually held classes 
that were enormously over crowded. In December of 1912 attendance stood at 
146, but the school employed only two academic teachers plus an industrial 
teacher. Forty-seven percent of the student body (sixty-seven pupils) were in the 
first grade. Twenty-eight percent (forty-one pupils) were second and third 
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graders. Thus 110 of 146 students attended grades one through three with one 
full-time teacher.44 
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In September of 1913 the situation was largely the same. With 108 
students on campus (soon to top off at 166), eight-five pupils were assigned to the 
first grade with one full-time teacher. During the previous spring semester when 
the same conditions prevailed, the agent, in a masterful show of understatement, 
had characterized the situation as "somewhat difficult."45 Over the next two years 
the .circumstances did not improve. Huge numbers of students filled the lower 
grades where they were not taught so much as they were simply warehoused.46 
This was typical of most years at Rainy Mountain. In many cases other staff 
members were pressed into service, particularly for domestic and vocational 
training. Older students were also used as assistant matrons, disciplinarians, or 
helpers in the effort to keep the school's programs adequately staffed. 
Living and learning in Rainy Mountain's crowded conditions meant that 
progress was very slow. Many students languished in the lower grades and never 
successfully advanced. Parker McKenzie remembered many boys well into their 
teens who had advanced only to the second or third grade despite five or six years 
of instruction. A 1915 inspection report revealed that 10 percent of the school's 
first and second graders had been at Rainy Mountain for as long as seven 
years.47 
In addition to overcrowded classes and the lack of teachers, one of the 
chief causes of such poor rates of advancement was the" language barrier. 
Students were strictly forbidden to speak Kiowa; teachers knew no Kiowa and 
insisted that English be used exclusively. Combined with the over crowding that 
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plagued every classroom each term, this amounted to a significant problem. It 
was an especially grueling transition for the very young pupils, many of whom 
were so frightened that according to McKenzie they "just clammed up." 
McKenzie recalled an experience that helps to illustrate the difficulties involved. 
He arrived at the school with no knowledge of English; his teacher spoke 
absolutely no Kiowa but was resolute in her determination to teach the children 
English. To demonstrate the use of articles she placed a boy's hat on a stool and 
said that it could be "a" hat, or "the" hat. "Some of us were puzzled," said 
McKenzie, "because she was seeing two hats where we only saw one .... How she 
managed to get it across to us still mystifies me." His first language lesson came 
at the hands of a fellow student who translated the signs in the boys' playroom for 
him: "Do not spit on the floor," went the message. "To do so may spread 
disease. 1148 
Fred Bigman said that learning English was one of the hardest things he 
did at the school. "Boy, I had a hard time," he said. "When they start talking 
English I don't know what they are talking about." Once, when called to the 
board for spelling and grammar exercises, he panicked. 
And when I went to school in class ... that teacher told me to come up to 
the blackboard, write something on it. I didn't know what to write. I didn't 
know what she said. So I ask a guy ... what'd she say .... She said for 
you to run out. Boy I jumped up and grabbed my cap and away I went. I 
went plumb back to our boy's building. 
After several years Bigman progressed "to where I got to learn to talk English 
pretty good. Wasn't extra good." Looking back on the experience he commented 
that "I had a hard time. I think about it sometimes myself. Oh, it was painful."49 
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Myrtle Ware said that she spoke no English prior to her enrollment at 
Rainy Mountain in 1898. "We had to learn," she said. "They write it on the 
blackboard when I first started to school." Every pupil went to the board, 
something that frightened many of the young children. "Our names are called, we 
go there and she tell us, write, give us a word, and then we have to write it down. 
Spelling so that she'll know that we know how." Ware adjusted fairly easily and 
even began to enjoy trips to the board as long as she got her favorite word, 
Mississippi. 50 
When they were not at the blackboard, students learned the rudiments of 
grammar, penmanship, and style. Surviving samples in the school's official records 
reflect the influence of the Bible, Benjamin Franklin, and Robert Browning. "I 
am the Resurrection and the Life," wrote twelve-year old Alma Bigtree in March 
of 1895. Isabel Horse found her model from the works of Franklin: "A man of 
words and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds."51 These were more than 
samples from which to perfect penmanship and grammar; they were the rules of 
life that every student was expected to learn and cherish. 
Students occasionally received unexpected language lessons. Billy Evans 
Horse recalled that one of his grandfather's first memories of the English language 
came from an encounter with the school's farmer. Watching the man trying to 
harness animals, Horse's grandfather heard him scowl "stand still" to which he 
added a terribly obscene epithet. Shortly thereafter young Horse was in class. 
When asked to share his beginning knowledge of the English language, he stood 
up and repeated what he had heard from the farmer. By all accounts the teacher 
was not amused.52 The fact that many students took several years 
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to attain even minimal English fluency meant that academic training remained 
remedial at best. The comments of former students say relatively little about 
classroom experience, except for language lessons, and much more about 
vocational training. When asked if she remembered any of the classes she took in 
school, Sarah Long Horn said no. She commented at length, however, on her 
vocational training. She remembered that girls were assigned to the school's 
bakery, laundry, or ironing room. Not surprisingly, kitchen work was standard for 
all girls. Work details changed every two months, she said. "That's where I got all 
my work, my neatness and my sewing, most of my cooking, things like that, 
because we stay there and do all that work."53 
Fred Bigman spent much of his time working in the school's dairy barn or 
on the farm. "They put you to a certain kind of work," he said. In his case that 
usually meant milking cows. "I didn't know how to milk," he said, but he learned. 
Rising every morning at 4:00 a.m. he joined about a dozen other boys to milk the 
school's small herd.54 Parker McKenzie also worked on the dairy detail. He and 
his companions milked as many as. a dozen cows twice a day but "we never saw 
milk, and butter, too, on our tables! Most of it went to ... single employees." 
And as far as Alfred Dunn's manner of teaching was concerned, McKenzie 
characterized it as "mostly bossing."55 
Myrtle Ware's memory of the classroom was that her teacher taught them 
"how to write and sing and read and spell." Beyond that she offered no specific 
information on academic training except to say "I like to go to school in the. 
morning 'cause I feel a little fresh to learn something .... At a certain time you go 
to school, you know, so many hours, and then you're out to work so many hours, 
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too." She spent much of her time working in the laundry, where she was so 
proficient that after several years as a student she was hired as an assistant 
matron. (This was not entirely uncommon; Louis Toyebo worked as an assistant 
disciplinarian, Parker McKenzie was the school's office boy, and Annie Bigman 
served as an assistant matron.) Work assignments changed about once a month 
during her time.56 
William Lone Wolf, who enrolled at Rainy Mountain in 1905, said that 
although there were six grades, "mostly they teach us how to work; it was a nice 
school, I learn some - I learn to work there."57 Students from the reservation's 
other schools made similar comments. "We were taught practical things such as 
sewing and cooking, laundry and how to care for a family," said a former 
Riverside student. "All the things we learned were things we needed to know for 
our immediate living."58 Some students regretted not getting more academic 
training. "It didn't take me long to realize how far behind I was," noted a former 
Fort Sill student. "I had a little math and science ... compared to those who 
attended public school." One Riverside student lamented the lack of academic 
instruction; another Fort Sill student said "I don't think it was good because it was 
really academically inferior to the public school."59 Despite the fact that many 
former boarding school students voiced similar complaints, most also commented 
that they had received important and useful training in school. In that sense 
Rainy Mountain served its pupils better than we might think. At the very least it 
helped them to acquire some of the skills necessary to make a living after their 
school years were over. 
Relations between staff and students tended to be formal and reflected the 
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school's orderly regimen. There were strict rules against crossing the lines of 
authority. "There was very little personal contact between white employees and 
students," said Parker McKenzie. The school "seemed to have that segregation 
business going real strong."60 But this did not mean an adversarial relationship. 
When Lillie McCoy transferred from Rainy Mountain in 1896, for example, she 
lamented leaving "my sweet little Kiowa children," but desired to be closer to 
home.61 A former Riverside student from the 1930s said that "the employees 
have empathy for the students .... The teachers influenced us a lot and we liked 
them a lot."62 Lucy Gage, a Riverside teacher in the early twentieth century, 
observed that "teachers ... were for the most part refined and well-prepared," and 
cared deeply for their work.63 
Former Rainy Mountain students held mixed opinions about their teachers. 
Fred Bigman, who learned under teachers in public schools as well as at the 
reservation schools, saw no real distinction between the two. "I don't see any 
difference," he said. "Teachers always teachers .... I do what they tell me. I 
mind them."64 Guy Quoetone schooled under missionary teachers prior to 
enrolling at Rainy Mountain. He preferred missionaries because "I think that they 
were really more interested that we learn."65 Parker McKenzie remembered "a 
wispy, bossy ... as cook during my early years at Rainy Mountain. Her actual 
name was Miss Slappy, and she bossed by it; it wasn't a name the students pinned 
on her."66 The woman's true name was Elizabeth Schleppy, and her reputation 
seem well deserved according to the opinions of those with whom she worked. 
Some teachers were genuinely liked. Flora A. DeLay, for example, was still alive 
in 1963 when the first reunion of former Rainy Mountain students was held. She 
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was invited, said Parker McKenzie, because she was "a dedicated teacher and well 
liked."67 
Despite the effort to enforce strict order, occasionally a serious breach of 
the rules occurred. One such incident came in the spring of 1909 and involved 
accusations of sexual misconduct between several white female employees, a male 
employee, and some of the school's older Indian boys. The case centered on 
rumors that Arthie Edworthy, an assistant matron, and Arthur Curtis, the 
disciplinarian, had carried on an affair that had left Edworthy pregnant. "He 
thought he had Miss Edworthy in a fix," reported a local man. "They were unable 
to knock it and he wanted money to get away." When the rumors reached Cora 
Dunn she ordered an investigation that produced fifty-one sworn letters, affidavits, 
and statements that ran to more than 120 pages.68 
The investigation produced disturbing evidence of student complicity. 
Witnesses testified that Edworthy and another female employee were often in the 
company of male students at night. All involved admitted that this was true, 
including the two women, but insisted that nothing untoward ever occurred. 
Sydney Holmes, a clerk at nearby Boake's trading post, said that he observed the 
older school boys "go down to the blacksmith shop near the store and wait for 
Misses Edworthy and Connor to come by, when the boys would join them. I seen 
this happen four or five times after nightfall." Corwin Boake, owner of the 
trading post, testified that he found Edworthy's actions "indiscrete .... I based my 
opinion on having seen her at times leaving the store after nightfall to be met by 
Arthur Curtis." He also reported that a number of "the bigger school boys wait 
for her to come out of the store and join her on her way back to the school." 
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The real bombshell came when Cecil Horse, an eighteen year-old former student, 
reported that he and a handful of other students visited the women in their rooms 
regularly. He admitted having sex with Connor but not with Edworthy, whom he 
said never approached him. 69 
In his sworn statement Curtis said that he bragged to Horse about sleeping 
with Edworthy but maintained this was actually a lie. "I was fooling," he said. 
"We were joshing around." (His room mate was Lewis Toyebo, who testified that 
he did not believe Curtis had slept with either of the women.) Edworthy admitted 
to having male visitors but said that they were always gone by the 9:00 curfew. 
She denied all the accusations and told Cora Dunn that she had enough evidence 
to sue the Indian Service for libel. For her part, Cora Dunn arranged a visit to 
the school by the agency physician ostensibly to have her father examined. Once 
there, however, Dunn directed him to Edworthy's quarters to administer a 
pregnancy test. The results were negative. 70 Edworthy took an unpaid leave of 
absence in March 1909, returned late that spring, and resigned in August of 1910. 
Curtis and Connor also left the school.71 
There was more to life at school than the classroom and vocational training 
that dominated student's lives. A wide variety of extra-curricular activities went on 
regularly and offered welcome relief from the school's routines. On the campus 
students could participate in reading circles, evening meetings, and lectures. After 
James McGregor's arrival as principal in 1910 a school newspaper appeared and 
athletic teams became quite popular. Most holidays were celebrated, especially 
Christmas, when a week's vacation allowed children to go home. It was the only 
time all year that they left the campus for an extended time. There was also an 
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annual Christmas dinner, complete with turkey ( or pork in years when the budget 
was tight) and small gifts. Halloween, New Year's Day, and Easter ("which was 
the only time I ever saw eggs", said Parker McKenzie) were also celebrated. 
Indeed, to encourage "the inculcation of patriotism," the Indian Office regularly 
issued guidelines reminding the schools to observe appropriate holidays. In 1891, 
Commissioner Morgan called attention to all of the usual holidays plus 
Washington's Birthday, Arbor Day, and Franchise Day.72 
Playing in Rainy Mountain's school band was by far one of the most 
popular activities for students. Cora Dunn started the band sometime in the late 
1890s and it became an institution unto itself. A bandstand was built in the center 
of the campus in 1906 and Dunn herself directed rehearsals and performances. 
Music played an integral role in the introduction of Angloamerican culture at 
Indian schools across the country. In Cora Dunn's opinion no other aspect of 
Rainy Mountain's curriculum was as effective in that process. In 1895 she 
requested funds for a piano, justifying the purchase in part on the grounds that it 
would greatly improve the school's ability to cultivate the students' sense of 
advancement. "I attend personally to the instruction of the music pupils," she 
wrote, "and find them more enthusiastic and responsive in this than in any other 
branch of study." She was counting on the Indian Office's support "to make the 
musical features of this school a power in the intellectual and moral elevation of 
the pupils." The office agreed and in late November of 1896 the school received a 
piano.73 
Within two years she gathered together enough instruments to form a small 
band. Applicants for positions at the school were quizzed as to· their musical 
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training and Dunn went out of her way to find and hire teachers, disciplinarians, 
and other staff members who were qualified to teach music. In this she was 
supported by the Indian Office, which tried to select applicants for reservation 
school jobs who could teach music. In 1897, for example, Dunn requested 
authority to hire a disciplinarian for the school who could not only drill the boys 
but also teach music.74 On another occasion she wanted an assistant matron who 
could also play the clarinet comet. The actual duties for the job "are those of 
farm laborer including milking," she noted, but as long as she was hiring she 
wanted an employee with musical ability.75 
The band proved a huge success. "The proficiency of the Rainy Mountain 
band is a matter of pride and no school influence has contributed more to the 
advancement of the pupils," she wrote in 1907.76 Indeed, students eagerly 
participated and showed impressive talent. Parker McKenzie said that Dunn 
produced "wonderful school bands from fourteen to twenty-year olds who learned 
to play the masterpieces even before some mastered the fourth grade." On a visit 
to the campus in the summer of 1990 he stood by the remains of the principal's 
cottage, motioned in the direction of the bandstand and commented that he could 
still see Cora Dunn marching purposely toward her waiting students, baton in one 
hand, sheet music in the other.77 
Off-campus trips provided an especially welcomed respite from school 
routines. With the exception of the Christmas holiday students did not leave the 
campus during the year except in cases of illness or emergency. The outing 
system, popularized at schools like Carlisle where advanced students were sent to 
live and work in surrounding homes and businesses, was not used at Rainy 
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Mountain. In response to the commissioner's inquiry in 1910 as to the absence of 
the system at Rainy Mountain, Agent Ernest Stecker replied that the number of 
pupils old enough to participate was not large. Moreover, he wrote that "all of 
those who are of proper age are needed at the schools to successfully conduct the 
school farms, gardens, laundries, etc." Finally, he feared that Kiowa parents would 
not only hamper the program and unduly influence the students, they would likely 
regard the outing system as "enforced labor."78 
For thirty-nine out of forty weeks every school year, then, students did not 
leave the campus for more than an afternoon trip. Band members occasionally 
traveled on overnight trips, but this was rare. Parents were allowed to visit, but 
school rules usually kept such occasions short. Cora Dunn restricted such visits to 
Saturday afternoons, and occasionally forbade them completely. For most 
students, the chance to go to the nearby town of Gotebo, or to Boake's trading 
post a mile or so from the campus, represented a special treat. Parker McKenzie 
said that during his years the school allowed trips to Gotebo on alternate 
Saturdays. Such outings were considered a privilege earned by good behavior. 
Boys without demerits could also use Saturday afternoons for a trip to Boake's 
trading post. Girls went as well, but always with chaperons. Trips to Boake's or 
to town were often used to stock up on food. Because most students regarded 
school food as barely sufficient in both appeal and quantity, day trips were an 
important opportunity to pick up "eats" with the money they received as allowance 
or wages. Crackers, bulk cookies, pork and beans, sardines, candy and other 
luxuries were especially popular.79 
Myrtle Ware also remembered buying what she called "eats" at Boake's, 
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mostly apples or oranges. Saturday afternoons the matrons escorted groups of 
girls to the store. About once a month she went to Gotebo (sometimes more 
often if the band - to which she belonged - was playing), where she sometimes 
got to see her father, who would bring her ribbons and candy.80 
Rainy Mountain also sponsored athletic teams for both sexes. Like the 
band, these teams became a source of school pride and also offered the chance to 
get away from campus. Cora Dunn endorsed sports at the school (though not·as 
enthusiastically as she did the band) and always included athletic equipment in her 
annual request for supplies. Baseball games against neighboring reservation 
schools and local teams began as early as 1902. "The boys are taking great 
interest in playing ball this year," she reported that year, "and have arranged 
match games with the ball clubs of the surrounding towns."81 Lewis Toyebo 
played shortstop for the team and remembered that "about the only other team 
we played was Gotebo, then we just played among ourselves, just to have some 
exercise." Girls participated as well. Sometime around 1910 they began their own 
basketball team. 82 
After James McGregor's arrival as principal in 1910 the athletic programs 
grew rapidly. By 1912 he had helped to arranged athletic meets between the 
reservation's boarding schools that included baseball, high jumping, running, and 
pole vaulting. To this was joined an academic meet with contests in writing, 
reading, spelling, and arithmetic. His enthusiasm got him elected president of a 
newly formed athletic association. (The letter informing him of this development 
noted dryly that the vote had come during a meeting "at which you were unable to 
be present.") In addition to baseball, which seems to have been the most popular 
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sport at the school, students played volleyball, tennis, and ran on the track team. 
On a visit to the campus in the summer of 1990 Parker McKenzie, then ninety-
two, playfully jogged in place and attributed his good health to the fact that he 
had once been a member of the Rainy Mountain track team. Like the band, 
athletics represented an important introduction to American ideals and culture. 
Tennis, volleyball, baseball, and football all figured prominently in the 
transformation of Indian youngsters. Administrators extolled the virtues of 
exercise and lauded the healthy effects of vigorous competition.83 
Finally, a rich and sometimes closely guarded unofficial life kept students 
busy when not in school or otherwise occupied. Although school administrators 
tried to regulate all that students did, the children inevitably found ways to get 
around such attempts. On one level the activities were meant simply to retain 
some level of autonomy. James Silverhorn said that after the school day was over 
"the boys used to all go up on the hill - up on Rainy Mountain and stay up there 
until supper time. Just to take a walk."84 Likewise, the clandestine conversations 
in Kiowa in which most students participated at one time or another preserved an 
important measure of identity untouched by the school. 
Such activities also relieved the monotony of school life. Parker McKenzie 
reported that students engaged in a wide variety of games and self-made 
amusements. In addition to the usual pursuits of baseball, tag, or marbles ( the 
impending showdown of self .,designated world champions caused eager 
anticipation. "We regarded it almost as much as the World's Series now is 
regarded."), there was a student circus located behind Rainy Mountain. Cast-off 
furniture and other junked odds and ends were scavenged and put to use as props. 
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A band provided accompaniment on imaginary instruments made from wooden 
sticks and drums made out of discarded tubs. Aerialists, tumblers, and acrobats 
wearing long-handle underwear for tights performed on mattresses while cowboy 
rope artists and clowns entertained the crowd. A menagerie of rabbits, possums, 
"a rat or two," squirrels, and snakes was a popular attraction. One boy won 
acclaim for his gorilla act - complete with a fur suit crafted from a worn-out 
mohair mattress and wooden teeth - during which he growled and hung from a 
chain. Two others created a buffalo complete with cow's skull and horns. 
Admission was a uniform button, preferably brass.85 
School administrators probably knew of the circus' existence, but there is 
no indication that they ever tried to close it down or restrict it. However, the 
circus produced effects not entirely welcomed. Apparently it was so popular that 
matrons and disciplinarians fumed over the mysterious wholesale loss of uniform 
buttons. School supply invoices for May 1909, and April 1910 (within the period 
during which McKenzie was associated with the circus) showed orders for a total 
of six gross of coat and vest buttons.86 From the perspective of former students 
Rainy Mountain was a collection of contradictions. It existed to prepare them for 
life but could not adequately train them. It meant to strip them of their cultural 
identity but failed to do so. It sought to transform them but in actuality only 
changed them. Some students learned well and left the school with advantages 
they would have otherwise missed. "If it hadn't been for Rainy Mountain School, 
I probably would not be typing this account," wrote Parker McKenzie. "Despite 
the hardships we encountered there, they were well worth the time .... It 
provided us the opportunity for an education, though rudimentary for most of 
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us."87 Yet McKenzie, who spent nearly forty years of his adult life as a Bureau 
of Indian Affairs employee, never gave up his Kiowa identity. He originated and 
perfected a written system for the Kiowa language and assumed prominence as a 
tribal historian. 
Other former students also carried fond memories away from the school, 
despite its often unpleasant circumstances. "But I really did, I really did like that 
school," said Sarah Long Hom. "I'm always thankful that I went to that school 
because that's lots of things that I had ... learned from that place."88 On the 
occasion of his ninetieth birthday Lewis Toyebo told his descendants that he had 
"fond memories [of Rainy Mountain] .... I now see the Kiowa people have made 
rapid progress from the tipi to the halls of higher education .... That was the 
wish and prayer of our ancestors who have gone on."89 
For most of these students the school did not succeed in destroying their 
cultural identity. It forced an accommodation, and it surely worked changes in 
their lives. Undoubtedly some left the schools ashamed of their Indianness and 
determined to keep it buried. Most, however, came through it with their sense of 
identity intact. Rainy Mountain could not take from them the fact of who they 
were. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SHIFTING PRIORITIES: THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
As the early twentieth century developed, the Indian school system 
underwent important changes. New political, scientific, and social attitudes 
contributed to a climate of opinion that brought a troubling perspective to Indian 
education. By the end of the First World War, the future of Rainy Mountain 
School was increasingly in doubt. Although it served an important role in the 
effort to bring education to the remote comers of one of the country's most needy 
Indian reservations, the school's usefulness, and that of boarding schools in 
general, was becoming questionable. Several factors help to explain this. The 
most important was the changing philosophy inside the Indian Office concerning 
assimilation and. education's role in accomplishing it. Frederick Hoxie argues 
convincingly that during the first two decades of the twentieth century the 
government's goals and assumptions about assimilation and Indian participation in 
mainstream society changed dramatically; the optimism of the late nineteenth 
century asserting that progress was a natural human condition gave way to 
profoundly pessimistic opinions. These new interpretations labeled Indians as 
racially backward, culturally deficient, and intellectually feeble.1 After 1910 Rainy 
Mountain would suffer even greater troubles as a result of such thinking. 
Buffeted by changing currents in government policy and the popular mood, Indian 
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education faced severe challenges in the early twentieth century. For Rainy 
Mountain the challenges would ultimately be too much. 
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In 1892, Thomas Jefferson Morgan had written that thert? were "no 
insuperable obstacles in the way of blending Indian children with white children." 
By 1920, however, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells spoke for an Indian 
Office that had retreated from such a position. Reflecting a much more limited 
view of assimilation, Sells commented that education policymakers had "no other 
choice than to regard the Indian as a fixed component of the white man's 
civilization." By "fixed," he meant accepting a permanently subordinate position 
on the periphery of American society and not, as had once been imagined, 
meaningful participation in it.2 In a world where education and assimilation had 
been used interchangeably, schools were readily accepted and often genuinely 
supported. Now, as troubling questions were raised about the ability of Indians to 
assimilate, schools were increasingly seen as having a limited utility. 
Policymakers in the post-Civil War era had relied in part on scientific 
opinion in the formulation of policy. The goals and assumptions of assimilation, 
for example, reflected the generally optimistic view held by most late nineteenth-
century ethnologists and anthropologists that Indians could and should be 
transformed from savages into citizens according to the standards of white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant America. By the turn of the century, however, these largely 
self-taught anthropologists lost their place to professionally trained academicians 
who came to control sociological and anthropological studies ( and thus Indian 
studies) by World War I. This was a critical shift, for it meant replacing the 
forward-looking cultural evolutionists, on whom the government had relied for 
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advice concerning assimilation, with thinkers whose ambivalence and occasional 
hostility toward Indians helped to change policy directions dramatically.3 
A useful example comes in the contrast between the generation that 
produced anthropologists like Lewis Henry Morgan and that which produced his 
successors. Morgan, the most eminent anthropologist of the late nineteenth 
century, believed firmly in the inevitability of social evolution. All cultures, he 
wrote, moved at varying speed from simple to more complex modes of existence. 
The evidence for the linear progression from savagery to barbarianism to 
civilization was abundant and universal; Western civilization had gone through it, 
so too would the Indians. Thus, Indians were not necessarily inferior or deficient 
intellectually;· they lacked certain institutional and environmental advantages. 
"The history of the human race," Morgan declared, "is one in source, one in 
experience, one in progress."4 
For Morgan, the issue was not if the transformation of Indians could occur, 
but how and when. Economic change pointed the way. Property relationships 
were especially critical, for Morgan saw them as the way to change on a series of 
levels. 
It is impossible to overestimate the influence of property in the 
civilization of mankind. It was the power that brought Aryan and 
Semitic nations out of barbarism into civilization .... Governments 
and laws are instituted with primary reference to its creation .... 
With the establishment of the inheritance of property in the children 
of its owner, came the first possibility of the strict monogamian 
family.5 
In Morgan's wake came John Wesley Powell, Alice Fletcher, and others 
who agreed that transformation was both necessary and possible. For much of the 
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late nineteenth century, when policymaking was still influenced by humanitarian 
forces, the government turned to this group for advice on Indian matters. As 
director of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Powell (and his assistants) 
dominated both professional anthropology and policy-making. Working behind 
the scenes, careful to avoid political intrigues, Powell exerted pressure on the 
Indian Office to enact policies he believed were consistent with the social 
evolution theories that lay at the heart of Indian assimilation.6 He offered what 
Frederick Hoxie describes as "a chilling condensation" of the social evolutionist 
blueprint: separate Indians from their homes and their past, divide their land into 
individual parcels, make them citizens, and draw them into American society. 
Powell's suggestions had scientific precision. Who could doubt that they were 
reasonable and practical?7 
Alice Fletcher agreed with Powell in terms of joining the anthropological 
community and policymakers but tended to be more-outspoken. This was 
especially true concerning government sponsored education for Indians.8 For 
Fletcher, education and allotment were absolutely central to the transformation of 
Indian children. "The task of converting the American Indian into the Indian 
American," she wrote in 1890, ''belongs to the Indian student." An early advocate 
of Indian education, she believed that the surest path to change was the 
classroom. Commissioned in 1888 to lead a nationwide survey on Indian schools, 
she closed her final report by saying that "more . . . [ and] better equipped schools 
were a national need."9 Without them, the governmen,t's plans would likely fail to 
produce lasting results. 
When the government turned to this generation of scientists it heard a 
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nearly unanimous voice. Social evolution was an indisputable fact which could be 
accelerated by the careful and precise application of certain environmental forces, 
chiefly education and allotment. There were disputes, to be sure, about the rate 
of progress possible among the various tribes; and looking at the era with the 
benefit of historical hindsight it is easy to see flaws. Morgan's use of the Iroquois, 
for example, as a sort of base from which to derive meaningful models for other 
tribes did not prove valid. And of course the optimism of Morgan, Powell, and 
others was characterized by a healthy dose of ethnocentrism; still, the Indian 
problem was not considered insurmountable. The important point is that when 
approached for an opinion, the scientific community responded with an optimistic 
answer. And hearing what they accepted to be an authoritative assessment, 
policymakers based measures on it designed to achieve transformation. 
Policies based on such thinking would froduce Indians poised to join 
mainstream society. At its heart policy demanded that Indians become culturally 
indistinguishable from their anglo neighbors in all important ways. Schools wen~ 
generally considered the centerpiece of this process. As long as popular opinion, 
scientific observation, and policy assumptions formed a certain core of beliefs, 
schools remained important components of the policy-making process. Shifts in 
that core, however, endangered the substance of the Indian schools, for the loss of 
any part imperiled the system. ~d that is precisely what happened in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At schools like Rainy Mountain, where 
the struggle simply to maintain some sense of direction, the consequences would 
be very important. 
Rainy Mountain matured in the midst of a changing climate of scientific· 
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opinion. A new cadre of social scientists came on the scene and surveyed the 
issues, arriving at radically different conclusions from an earlier generation. Often 
casting aside the idea that progress was a natural condition, these new experts 
perceived a much greater distance between the races than had been previously 
assumed. Thus the inevitability and even the appropriateness of assimilation came 
open to challenge.10 The optimism of Powell, for example, was met with and 
replaced by the skepticism of professionals who described Indians as alien, 
backward, barbarian, "zoomimic", or sub-human. Rejecting the confidence of the 
late nineteenth century, new thinkers focused on various characteristics of Indians 
to justify their classification as culturally deficient people locked in a world from 
which few could escape. 
The preoccupation with race, for example, marked a dangerous precedent 
in the interpretation of culture. By seizing on race as a determinant, leading 
voices like Madison Grant and Daniel Brinton opened the way to a reformulation 
of culture and its foundations that resisted the notion of change. By implication 
this meant assimilation was an unrealistic hope. Moreover, by promulgating a 
view of cultural worth that placed a premium on skin color, racial determinists 
automatically assigned Indians, among others, to an inferior position in society.11 
It is, of course, too simplistic to say that this alone accounted for the shifts 
in policy that occurred in the early twentieth century. This is especially so with 
regard to the emerging disciplines of anthropology and sociology. Critics of the 
racial determinists, for example, argue that there was more going on than that. 
The point is conceded, but with important caveats. 
It is true that some anthropologists looked more optimistically at culture. 
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Most prominent was Franz Boas, who interpreted the Indian question in a ve:ry 
different light from most of his contemporaries. Unconvinced by the racial 
determinism of the era, Boas helped to introduce cultural relativism to the field of 
Indian studies. In general he saw much about native culture that suggested a rich 
complexity and innate value. At the same time, however, he regarded Indians as a 
vanishing race. In 1906 he said that "day by day the Indians and their cultures are 
,--· 
disappearing more and more .... Fifty years hence nothing will remain." He was 
wrong, of course, but anthropology still includes an emphasis described by Jacob 
Gruber as "ethnographic salvage." Boas might have disagreed with the racial 
determinists, but he did not offer a particularly positive alternative. Despite his 
prominence, Boas never truly dominated professional anthropology in such a way 
as to exert meaningful influence with regard to policy-making. The Bureau of 
American Ethnology was hostile to the Boasian clique, and he suffered at the 
hands of anti-Semites who distrusted him and his students. Divisions among 
prominent anthropologists thus helped to worsen the ambivalence that confronted 
policymakers.12 
Joined to this new interpretation of the Indian question was a panoply of 
popular ideas and cultural icons contributing to the impression that assimilation 
was wrong-headed. Popular opinion in the form -of literature and photography, 
for example, began to reflect an increasingly romanticized, nostalgic view of 
Indians. Pulp Westerns, dime novels, and arcade movie reels all highlighted 
Indians as the vanishing race. Museums and Wild West shows promised 
scintillating re-creations of Indian life and the Old West. When Hollywood joined 
the fray the metamorphosis was complete. 
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Photographers like Edward Curtis who rushed to capture the last fleeting 
moments of a disappearing race had an especially powerful impact. Careful to 
retouch any evidence of the modem world that tainted his meticulously planned 
scenes, Curtis intended to convince his audience and his patrons that a once 
glorious way of life was soon to be gone. Considering the enduring power of his 
work, Curtis very nearly succeeded. In his world there was no Indian problem; 
they only existed because he conjured them up. Moreover, Curtis had to conjure 
them up because they were, he believed, on their way to extinction. The kind of 
concern reflected in his works, and that of other image makers, had nothing to do 
with civilizing Indians and everything to do with immortalizing them.13 
Some ·of the clearest expressions of the conquered Indian doomed to 
extinction came from artists and sculptors. Like Curtis, so-called cowboy artists 
Charles Russell and Frederic Remington captured and popularized a mythical 
image of Indians that quickly became part of _the cultural baggage of early 
twentieth-century America. Again, this is important because the perception of 
Indians as a romantic breed that flourished. only in the old, conquered West, 
deflected reality. Why worry about their assimilation (and their schooling) if they 
were gone? James Earl Frazer's sculpture "The End of the Trail," which debuted 
at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco in 1915, was a 
particularly potent expression of this sentiment. Designed on an epic scale (two 
and one-half times life size), the piece depicted a slumped Indian astride a listless 
pony, lance pointing downward. Its impact was electric and it proved to be one of 
the exposition's most popular attractions. Speaking about the message conveyed 
by the· piece, Fraser commented that it was the "idea of a weaker race being 
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steadily pushed to the wall that I wanted to convey." Few other pieces of art so 
completely captivated the public's imagination. "The End of the Trail" became an 
enduring symbol of the romantic West and an icon to the vanishing Indian.14 
Finally, political decision-making reflected a noticeable shift to the West at 
the turn of the century. There, attitudes were widely anti-Indian. Compassion for 
Indians was nearly nonexistent. Beginning with Theodore Roosevelt's 
administration in 1901, a Western perspective increasingly influenced both White 
House and the Congress. Indeed, Roosevelt represented personally the 
intellectual and political forces that soon came to dominate policy-making. He 
and his "cowboy cabinet" of self-styled experts like novelist Owen Wister, 
journalists Francis Leupp and Hamlin Garland, and artist Frederic Remington 
accepted the changing attitude of the day toward Indian assimilation. Under 
Roosevelt, and subsequently under Taft and Wilson, the Indian question lost its 
place as a national concern. Like many Americans, Roosevelt was convinced that 
Indians and other lesser races probably were incapable of assimilation. Although 
the majority of Indians "must change," he noted, they could only do so gradually. 
"It will take several generations to make the change complete."15 
The impact of a western shift was revealed most tellingly in congressional 
politics. Between 1889 and 1912, forexample, ten new states - all from the West 
- entered the union. The most immediate consequence of this for Indian affairs 
was that key committee posts went increasingly to senators and representatives 
from the West. The nine senators who chaired the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs between 1893 and 1920, for example, were all Westerners who accepted 
the new order of things without exception. Calling for practicality over Eastern 
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philanthropy, they redirected policy goals by scaling back expenditures and 
rejecting the previous generation's comparatively rosy assessment of the issues. 
Thus began the eclipse of the reformers who had molded policy since the days of 
the Peace Policy. Control of the Indian question came to rest almost completely 
in the hands of western politicians whose views on Indians tended to be 
unencumbered by concerns about moral reform. Also, the men who occupied the 
commissioner's office at the Bureau of Indian Affairs between 1900 and 1928 
continued as in the past to be political appointees with no experience among 
Indians. But for Francis Leupp, who actually had some first-hand knowledge of 
Indians (he considered them racially backward), commissioners were selected for 
their political loyalty and business sense, and not for their understanding of the 
issues.16 
The reappraisal of assimilation's goals and policies prompted policymakers 
to lower their expectations for Indians. If assimilation was a questionable 
assumption - and surely it was by the 1910s ·- then it was equally clear that the 
means of achieving it were also open to debate. The promise of membership in 
the mainstream now gave way to a more ambiguous place. In a hierarchically 
arranged society, assimilation no longer meant complete membership for Indians. 
According to Frederick Hoxie it now meant "locating each group in a discrete 
place within the social structure." For Indians that place was the border of 
American society.17 
Obviously, the changing goals and assumptions of assimilation meant that 
the. means attached to it came under scrutiny. For the Indian Office this forced a 
close critique of allotment, citizenship, and education - the centerpieces of the 
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old approach. Severe blows were leveled against these institutions, but nowhere 
was the attack more keenly felt than in the Indian school system. It had been a 
sacrosanct part of the nineteenth century Indian Office, held up as the agent of 
transformation in even the most difficult circumstances. By the 1920s the system 
had been scaled down, redefined, and handed over to experts who believed 
wholeheartedly in a new policy. Rainy Mountain School, a small outpost in the 
old system, would not weather the changes very well.18 
The rhetoric of education had historically trumpeted a sort of "all things 
are possible" approach. The reality of political interference and other limitations 
aside, Indian education had enjoyed at the very least a reputation as a problem-
solving institrition of remarkable importance. As the twentieth century began, 
however, the certitude of pro-education reformers began to fail, signaling a new 
era philosophically and administratively for Indian schools. Of enormous 
importance in this regard was the erosion of philanthropic and reform support 
from the Christian Reformers who had dominated Indian policy, especially 
education, since the days of Grant. The new political fortunes that attended the 
rise of the modern West help in part to explain this trend, but there was more to 
it. Indeed, in the first decade of the twentieth century, their preeminence in 
Indian affairs, according to Paul Prucha, was "severely shaken, if not indeed 
shattered. "19 
To their dismay, many Peace Policy era reformers found they no longer 
controlled policymaking, nor were they particularly effective in influencing the 
selection of those who did. Once they had had a strong role in appointments 
inside the Indian service, especially in sensitive areas like schools; now they 
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contended with more politically powerful adversaries who used the Indian Office 
for different ends. Thomas Jefferson Morgan, W. N. Hailmann, Carl Schurz and 
others represented a kind of reform spirit that flowered briefly in the late 
nineteenth century; by the twentieth century, however, they were gone. More 
often than not, reformers had to confront Western senators and representatives 
who had powerful influence in patronage and policy decisions. Even President 
Roosevelt admitted ruefully that when it came to the Indian Office, "I simply 
cannot get a man confirmed unless the senators from that state approve him."20 
It was bad enough when agents had been the targets of intense political 
patronage battles; now the process reached all the way to the highest levels of the 
Indian Office~ (Of course this had always been the case. But it was surely a 
different situation to have men like Frederic Remington influencing policy rather 
than someone like Albert K. Smiley, Lewis Henry Morgan, or even Richard Pratt.) 
Groups like the Indian Rights Association and the Lake Mohonk Conference now 
saw their prestige and influence slip away. As the twentieth century unfolded, it 
became increasingly clear that the old, deliberate, humane programs were losing 
precious ground to new, less thorough ones being pushed by policymakers who 
were the vanguard of a new generation of leaders. Once gone from the scene, 
personalities like Morgan and Powell, among others, would not be replaced by 
like-minded individuals. This, of course, led to profound reevaluations of policy 
goals and assumptions. 
In their stead came a generation of administrators who· carried the banner 
of progressive reform and scientific management of the Indian service. Often 
lacking the philosophical and personal passion for careful reform that had 
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characterized an earlier generation, the new policymakers tended as a rule to be 
less patient, more concerned with achieving goals, and generally suspicious of 
passion when it came· to Indian rights. For them, the ultimate goal was the 
dismantling of the Indian Office, a fact that in and of itself would be evidence of a 
permanently solved Indian problem. Rather than continuing to struggle with the 
difficult problems posed by assimilation, new policymakers thought in terms of 
finding solutions quickly and efficiently. It was an old goal; achieving it, however, 
necessitated speeding up the process even more and redefining exactly what the 
goals of an assimilation agenda were. 
In the minds of most policymakers not much changed as far as overall goals 
were concerned. A changed Indian, self-sufficient and freed from wardship, 
remained the ideal. But deciding how that existence was to be achieved, as well 
as what defined it, posed problems. Still, the ultimate end remained clear. As a 
reminder that the result was non-negotiable, the Board of Indian Commissioners 
thundered in its 1901 annual report that the object of the Indian Office was to 
"make all Indians self-supporting, self-respecting, and useful citizens of the United 
States. The Indian Bureau," it continued, "should always aim at its own speedy 
discontinuance!" Success was to be measured not by self perpetuation but by "self-
destruction!"21 But what was a self-supporting, self-respecting, and useful 
citizen? In the new era how could progress be realistically defined and practically 
defined? 
As always, individualization remained the key to the destruction of Indian 
culture. But whereas an earlier generation of reformers had believed deeply in 
the ability of Indians to move into mainstream society, more contemporary 
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thinkers hedged their bets. By altering programs like education and allotment, 
Americanization could be hastened and goals met all the more quickly. 
Accelerate the pace of allotment, make it easier to obtain clear title, limit the 
years students could stay in school, lower curricular expectations, make Indians 
subject to citizenship and state and federal laws more quickly - these and other 
things were mentioned as examples of how the Indian question could be solved 
expediently, judiciously, and above all economically. Some otherwise respectable 
voices even advocated throwing Indians to the wolves; Cato Sells, for example, was 
only too happy to accelerate the competency process that allowed Indians to claim 
title to their individual allotments. Doing so exposed them to all kinds of 
temptations and situations with which they were not prepared to deal. Sells 
argued they must either sink or swim. For·his part Sells was willing to let large 
numbers sink. 
Policymakers reminded critics that it did Indians a greater disservice to 
keep them in a state of near-thralldom than to release them to find their own way. 
In 1907, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Francis Leupp observed that the Indian 
Office was engaged in a multitude of works for which it really had no legitimate 
responsibility - irrigation, forestry, and reclamation, for example - and which 
only reinforced the dependence of Indians on the government dole. "All my 
work," he wrote, "is guided by my general aim of preparing the whole Indian 
establishment for going out of business at no very distant date."22 Doing business 
as usual only slowed the inevitable consequences of finally forcing Indians to stand 
on their own feet. For the social Darwinists who ran the Indian Office, resisting 
the need to get on with the business at hand was unnatural and unwise. 
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Beginning with Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Jones, who took 
office in May 1897, and continuing down through Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Charles Burke, who served through Coolidge's administration, the five men who 
held the office of commissioner accepted an increasingly narrow definition of 
assimilation and married it to a similarly narrow view of what Indian schools 
ought to achieve. Thomas Jefferson Morgan's plans for a four-tiered school 
system resembling the public school system in thoroughness and 
comprehensiveness had failed to emerge during the 1890s. At best, the system 
became and remained a patchwork.23 By 1900 new ideas about the Indian 
schools were quickly gaining support, prompting what Prucha admits were goals 
"explicitly more modest."24 
Commissioner Jones heralded those more modest hopes himself when he 
wrote in his annual report for 1900 that: 
The Indian school system aims to provide a training which 1will 
prepare the Indian boy or girl for the everyday life of the average 
American citizen. It does not contemplate, as some have supposed . 
. . an elaborate preparation for a collegiate course through an 
extended high-school curriculum .... It is not considered the 
province of the Government to provide either its wards or citizens 
with what is known as 'higher education. '25 
Like many experts, Jones believed that practical knowledge and training should lay 
at the heart of the Indian schools. Rudimentary learning in math, science, history, 
geography, hygiene, and music was clearly necessary but should not be undertaken 
as major components of the curriculum. The greatest _amount of time should go 
to more practical areas - agricultural training, domestic skills, cooking, dairying, 
tailoring, upholstering, baking, and so on. Vocational training of course had 
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formed the core of the Indian school curriculum since the days of Carlisle. In 
some ways, then, what happened in the early twentieth century was an 
intensification of an already well established process. Yet it was also a different 
process, for it was based on and justified a view of Indians that was decidedly 
more limited than ever before. Having convinced themselves that Indians were 
perpetually backward, policymakers could safely construct policies that ensured 
their backwardness. Lake Mohonk conferees would have blanched at such 
thinking. 
Superintendent of Indian Education Estelle Reel observed in 1901 that the 
Indians' future lay in vocational training and not in more formal studies. 
Referring to lessons for plowing, for instance, she wrote that "upon this work 
more than any other depends the advancement of the Indian." As Hoxie has 
suggested, those who agreed with her moved aggressively to strip the Indian 
schools of what little real learning existed to begin with and sought instead to 
replace it with more practical, vocational instruction. Emphasizing domestic skills 
for girls, for example, Reel reported that every girl should learn to bake bread and 
"must be taught how to cut bread into dainty, thin slices and place [them] on 
plates in a neat, attractive manner." Of history and civics, she was moved to 
observe that students should know only enough "to be good, patriotic citizens." 
According to Hoxie, here was evidence of a curriculum of depressingly low 
expectations. 26 
In addition to embracing a limited curriculum for the Indian schools, Jones 
also began a campaign to reduce the number of schools and to pare the 
government's commitment to boarding schools off the reservations. Jones believed 
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that off-reservation schools were poor investments. Reviewing the statistics of 
schools like Carlisle reinforced his opinion. "Analysis of the data obtained by this 
office," Jones wrote in 1901, "indicates that the methods of education which have 
been pursued for the past generation have not produced the results 
anticipated."27 
Closing them down would save enormous sums of money and reinforce 
Reel's vision of practical training. Rather than enduring the escalating costs of 
finding, transporting, feeding, clothing, and returning students thousands of miles 
to and from the reservations, why not place them in boarding schools on the 
reservation? In Jones' opinion, such an arrangement fit more reasonably within 
the goals of Indian education. In addition, reservation boarding schools could be 
similarly replaced in time with far less expensive day schools. Jones' vision called 
for a simplified and reorganized school system.28 
When he left office at the end of 1904, however, Jones had not succeeded 
in closing any of the government's more than two dozen off-reservation schools. 
On the other hand, he had begun a shift in where the majority of students were 
schooled; not surprisingly, reservation boarding schools showed the highest growth 
rates. It would only be a matter of time before more significant changes became 
apparent.29 
Francis Leupp succeeded Jones.· A Progressive journalist, a one-time 
member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and an agent of the Indian Rights 
Association, Leupp continued in the same tradition as Jones, advocating even 
bolder changes.30 Indeed, according to Hoxie, with the appointment of Leupp, 
"the Indian office embarked on a comprehensive reorganization of its educational 
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programs."31 Those changes mirrored Leupp's opinion that Indians were 
intellectually feeble, culturally moribund, and best suited to menial jobs. Speaking 
to the National Education Association in 1907, the commissioner observed that 
"the Indian is an adult child .... [with] the physical attributes of the adult with 
the mentality of about our fourteen-year-old boy."32 
Agreeing with those who believed Indians hobbled by their race, Leupp 
advocated lowered standards and decreased involvement on the part of the federal 
government in areas such as education. There were, after all, limits to what might 
realistically be accomplished. "The Indian," he wrote, would "always remain an 
Indian." It was a mistake to "push him too rapidly into a new social order." For 
those who hoped that the commissioner might eventually accept a more 
enlightened opinion of the Indian, Leupp observed in his first annual report that 
such optimism was usually unwarranted. "Nothing is gained," he said, ''by trying to 
undo nature's work and do it over."33 The optimism of Thomas J. Morgan went 
into total eclipse. 
Like Jones, Leupp focused his attack on boarding schools. Calling for "a 
marked change in the Indian educational establishment, always in the direction of 
greater simplicity and a more logical fitness to the end for which it was designed," 
the commissioner endorsed enlarging the day school system and opposed any 
increase in boarding schools.34 His reasons were clear. In the first place, such a 
move would save money. Like Jones, Leupp considered the cost of educating 
students at off-reservation schools to be exorbitant. "We spend on these now 
nearly $2,000,000 a year, which is taken bodily out of the United States Treasury 
and is, in my judgement ... a mere robbery of the taxladen Peter to pay the non-
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taxladen Paul and train him in false, undemocratic, and demoralizing ideas. The 
same money ... would have accomplished a hundredfold more good, 
unaccompanied by any of the harmful effects upon the character of the race." On 
average, he continued, the government spent between $167 and $250 per student. 
In day schools, by contrast, the sum was between $36 and $67 per student. 
Accepting an average of $50, Leupp argued that day schools could accomplish the 
same work as boarding schools at one-fourth or one-fifth the cost.35 
Leupp voiced other concerns about the Indian schools. Chiefly he worried 
about how to justify them. Two issues bothered him. First was the fear that 
schools were not engaged in practical work. Calling them "simply educational 
almshouses" and a "well-meant folly," the commissioner argued in 1907 that the 
schools were unrealistic: 
The pupil grows up amid surroundings which he will never see 
duplicated in his own house. Steam heating, electric lighting, 
mechanical devices for doing everything - these cultivate in him a 
contempt for the homely things which must make up his 
environment as a poor settler in a frontier country. His ideas of the 
relations of things are distorted; for his mind is not developed 
enough to sift ... between the comforts which are within his reach 
and the luxuries which are beyond his legitimate aspirations. 
The schools indulged Indian children so badly that in the ·end they fell prey to "an 
ignoble willingness to accept unearned privileges." Agreeing with Estelle Reel, 
Leupp sided with those who advocated limited curricula. He accepted a gloomy 
view of Indians and believed that attempting to elevate them beyond their natural 
place was wrong. To attempt it meant teaching "false, undemocratic, and 
demoralizing ideas."36 
208 
Second, the commissioner agreed with others who maintained that separate 
schools for Indians were becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Social scientists 
and education experts had already begun to question the ability of the so-called 
backward races to assimilate; it was not long before the institution most 
responsible for causing that transformation came under assault itself. Some of the 
critics were very influential. Herbert Welsh, for example, supported Carlisle and 
Hampton, but wrote in 1902 that the Indian race was "distinctly feebler, more 
juvenile than ours." The principal of Hampton said in 1900 that "Indians [are] 
people of the child races .... I believe we should teach them to labor in order 
that they may be brought to manhood." In 1892 the journal of the American 
Academy of Social and Political Sciences added that "There is a wide gulf between 
the civilization of the Indian and that of the white race ... the two races may not 
be placed in the same category."37 Reminding his listeners that the government 
was not then engaged in providing separate educational facilities for other 
minorities, House Indian Affairs Committee Chairman John Stevens thundered 
that in the South, "4,000,000 Negroes (who were as much wards of the government 
as the Indians are now) [were] turned loose ... without one red cent being 
appropriated by Congress .... Likewise, why should not the red man be cared for 
in the States where they live?" Leupp echoed this by asking "Where else does the 
United States Government maintain special race lines in education?" This 
reflected what Hoxie says was a determination to build "permanent, segregated, 
inferior schools in the Indians' own communities," a decision that "would be more 
fitting than a continuation of the evangelical policies of the 1880s."38 
In his attempts to close off-reservation boarding schools and to limit 
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educational opportunities on the reservation, he revealed not only an ambivalent 
attitude toward Indian education, but also a similarly uncertain position on where 
non-white peoples belonged in American society .. Any man who could argue that 
Booker T. Washington had been successful because "the black man [was] to him a 
black man, and not merely a white man colored black," could hardly be counted 
on to endorse a school system that operated on the premise that education would 
change Indians completely into models of white America.39 
In mid-June 1909, Leupp left the commissioner's office, giving it to his 
hand-picked successor, Robert G. Valentine. For the next four years, the trends 
set in motion by Jones and Leupp continued apace. Described by Prucha as "a 
solid Progressive, committed to economy and efficiency," Valentine enthusiastically 
embraced Leupp's plans and pushed for further reductions in education. Writing 
in his first annual report in 1910, Valentine observed that, with the exception of 
the Apaches and Navajos who lacked even the most basic schools, "there will 
probably be no further need of new boarding schools." Moreover, he continued, 
those still in operation could finally be put out of service as public schools 
enrolled more and more Indian children. Calling the public schools "a definite 
means of prompting the assimilation of the Indians into American life," the 
commissioner called them the "final step" in both getting Indian youth into schools 
and the government out of the education business. Indeed, the record suggests 
significant success in the matter. In 1912, for instance, the commissioner's report 
showed 17,011 Indians in public schools; by 1914 the n,umber had risen to 
25,180.40 Under Valentine the movement begun by Jones and continued by 
Leupp finally reached full speed. Schools like Rainy Mountain - remote, small, 
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serving fairly small numbers of children - were the most likely targets of this 
development. As budgets leveled off and philosophical changes emerged during 
the Progressive era, reservation boarding schools became increasingly imperiled. 
Like his predecessors, Valentine also held a fairly pessimistic view of 
Indians and believed that their education ought to reflect a more realistic 
approach. He revealed his opinion in 1910 when he wrote that students at non-
reservation schools would receive the "kind of training that will best fit [them] for 
the conditions prevailing at home."41 Far from liberating Indians from the 
reservation and preparing them for entry into the mainstream, schools now 
prepared them for a return to the community from which they had come. It was 
not at all what Pratt and Morgan and an earlier generation of reformers had 
intended. 
In 1912, for example, Valentine observed that special attention was being 
given to instruction of young girls. "The home condition of the Indians is one of 
the most unsatisfactory features of the Indian problem. To affect this directly, the 
character and efficiency of the training given Indian girls must be improved." 
Barely a generation prior to this, W. N. Hailmann, former superintendent of 
Indian Education, had implored Indian parents to give him their children so that 
he could give them an education and this "the great emancipation." Now 
Valentine, Reel, and others wanted to keep Indian students on the reservation. 
"Every Indian, like every white man, is best fitted for some one thing," he wrote in 
1912. "We are trying to find that thing."42 He had already settled on what that 
thing was; in 1911 Valentine himself wrote that "the whole policy of the 
Government concerning the Indian race may be described as an attempt to make 
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it function industrially in the civilization with which it is now surrounded." To this 
end, more emphasis was placed every year on "proper industrial education." Like 
Leupp, who appreciated "certain racial traits of the Indian, such as his lack of 
initiative [and] his hereditary lack of competition," Valentine recognized clear 
limitations. Improvement of a sort consistent with the acknowledged racial and 
cultural peculiarities of Indians had replaced the total transformation Pratt and 
Morgan had demanded. 43 
The last of the Progressive-era commissioners of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells, 
took over in June of 1913 and served throughout Woodrow Wilson's 
administration. Typically with. no prior experience or special knowledge of 
Indians, Sells, a Texas banker, did not move very far away from the policies of the 
previous administrations.44 Sells announced in 1913 that although he intended to 
protect Indian rights to the extent that natives might "ultimately take their rightful 
place as self-supporting citizens of the Republic," his "fixed purpose [was] to bring 
about the speedy individualizing of the Indians." This he did by working to 
remove guardianship, to lower the barriers to competency certification, and to 
limit more sharply than ever the role of the Indian schools. "The aim of the 
Indian schools," he noted in 1915, "is not the perfect farmer or the perfect 
housewife, but the development of character and sufficient industrial efficiency ... 
through instruction in the agricultural, mechanical, and domestic arts."45 Again, 
the Indian Office viewed the work of the Indian schools through the lens of what 
was proper and possible for a race of limited means and abilities. 
In 1916 Sells adopted a new course of study for Indian schools that divided 
the schools into three levels: primary, pre-vocational, and vocational. Primary 
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instruction began in the day schools where grades one through three met. Pre-
vocational training began at the reservation boarding school and continued 
through the sixth grade. For the relatively few who then went on to off-
reservation boarding schools, a more fully developed vocational program was 
available. "The course had been planned," wrote Sells, "with the vocational aim 
very clearly and positively dominant."46 
In 1918, Sells clarified the new course of study. In his annual report, he 
made the connection between education and race clear. "We must also take into 
account the development of those abilities with which he is peculiarly endowed 
and which have come to him as a racial heritage," Sells commented, including 
"religion, art,· deftness of hand, and his sensitive, esthetic temperament." Those 
who understood the reality of the circumstances would no doubt appreciate the 
fact that the work of the Indian schools was "essentially practical rather than 
ideaiistic. "47 
Sells drew attention to what ·he called certain "nonessentials" of the Indian 
schools. These included the study of geography, arithmetic, history, and 
physiology. "It is a savings of time and expense to leave them out," he wrote, and 
"thus make room for more practical and useful subjects." For example, in 
arithmetic such subjects as powers and roots, ratios, averages, approximations, 
divisibility, foreign money, metric system, partial payments, duodecimals, and 
stocks and bonds were eliminated from the course of study in Indian schools. By 
then, the Indian Office was openly rejecting the call to include subjects which 
were standard in public schools. Sells was moving toward a specialized curriculum 
that suited the needs of Indians and of the society that defined them as second-
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class citizens. In unapologetic language, he noted that "the development of the 
all-around efficient citizen is the dominating feature." By eliminating "needless 
studies" and using "a natural system of instruction," Indians would conceivably be 
prepared for their "rightful place as self-supporting citizens of the Republic."48 
Three years later, in 1921, Sells' successor, Charles Burke, echoed that sentiment. 
Running the schools efficiently and in an orderly fashion was critical. For only 
then would Indian students get through "the dangerous transition period between 
the close of school and the time when they should fill worthy places in our social 
order."49 The metamorphosis of the Indian.schools seemed complete.· 
Taken collectively, the commissioners who served between Jones and Burke 
reflected a reordering of priorities that sounded the death knell of schools like 
Rainy Mountain. Jones' wish to close the off-reservation boarding schools in favor 
of reservation day schools was eventually replaced by a similar move to close 
reservation boarding schools as quickly as possible. Students would be shifted 
either to day schools or, whenever possible, to public schools. Citing the 
importance of efficiency and economy, Progressive-era policymakers approached 
education dispassionately. Failing to appreciate the role that Rainy Mountain 
School and schools like it played in Indian communities, the Indian Office pushed 
with increasing vigor to close such plants and either transfer students to public 
schools (policy that looked and sounded persuasive on paper but which in reality 
was largely a failure) or to let them shift for themselves. Indeed, Commissioner 
Jones noted in 1901 that students who had attended government school for six or 
seven years ought to be dismissed and sent out to make their way. After all, these 
students had "had fair opportunity to develop his or her characteristics. "50 In the 
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face of such thinking, the survival of the Indian school system seemed open to 
question. It did not, in fact, disappear, but it withered badly. 
Against this changing interpretation of the Indian school system, Rainy 
Mountain School had little chance of survival. It comes as no surprise that the 
school's closing came in the midst of the events discussed above. Whether 
challenged on the basis of fiscal necessity, educational priority, or policy direction, 
the school could not survive. Even in the relatively hopeful years of the late 
nineteenth century Rainy Mountain had never been a very well run place. Now 
that policymakers had adopted a more limited view of assimilation, education 
came in for closer scrutiny. This meant that either the school would fall in line 
with the new wisdom of narrowly focused minimal standards of education for its 
students, or it would be closed. Either way the future looked unappealing. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DECLINING FORTUNES 
As the changes of the Progressive era became more fully felt, their effect 
on education began to filter out through the entire Indian school system. Targets 
like Carlisle, which required large sums to operate, were obviously affected by the 
narrowing educational approach of the Progressive era. Moreover, Pratt had 
made his share of political and ideological enemies. On more than one count, he 
and his supporters could therefore expect to see their work challenged. Before 
the 1930s had passed, most of the large off-reservation boarding schools were shut 
down. Those that survived became little more than vocational training centers 
that reflected local politics rather than concerns for Indians. But by shifting its 
attention from the large off-reservation institution to reservation schools, the 
Indian Office began a process that resulted in reducing other types of schools as 
well. Caught in the bureau's drive to produce a more efficient, streamlined 
operation, schools like Rainy Mountain proved easy to close. Because it was 
relatively small and chronically troubled the school could be safely targeted for 
closing. With public school facilities within short distance of most of its students, 
and with three other boarding schools serving the same Indian community, the 
Indian Office could martial a strong case for ending Rainy Mountain's service. 
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For those who had followed the school's history, the events that brought on 
its closing were not wholly unanticipated. Indeed, considering the struggle 
required from the very beginning simply to maintain some semblance of order, it 
is a surprise that the plant was not closed earlier. By the second decade of the 
twentieth century, events began to occur that proved fatal to the school's 
existence. For its last ten years, the institution continued to educate Kiowa 
children; it did so, however, against an ever-increasing tide of troubles. 
Serious problems began to appear after 1905 when a series of official 
reports and inspections revealed troubling circumstances in virtually every aspect 
of the school's life. As she had done for much of her tenure as the school's 
principal, Cota Dunn shouldered the burden as well as she could and tried to lead 
the school out of its troubles. By 1909, however, a series of poor evaluations 
ended her career as well as her husband's. Her forced resignation late in the year 
marked a turning pointin the school's administration. Rainy Mountain would 
never have another administrator like her; in her absence much of what had made 
the place a success seemed to be lost. Replaced by a series of well-intentioned 
but ill-supported successors, the school literally began to fall to pieces. Within a 
year the first serious attempt to close the school was made. From then until its 
closing in September 1920, a series of crises kept the school's future in doubt. 
Rainy Mountain struggled in its last decade of service against ever-mounting 
pressures. 
The warning signs had never been far from .the. surface. Isolation, lack of 
funds, high employee turnover, and extraordinarily difficult circumstances 
characterized the school's predicament for almost its entire history. Dunn and her 
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staff attempted to make the best of the situation, but by the first years of the 
twentieth century, the tide turned against them. Indications of what was coming 
appeared in 1909, when two major inspections occurred. The first, in April, 
reported that under the circumstances the school seemed to be functioning as well 
as could be expected. Special Agent C. L. Ellis wrote during his brief stay that 
"the several departments ... seemed to be run in an efficient and orderly 
manner." With the exception of badly overcrowded sleeping arrangements, 
blamed on the chronic lack of space, all seemed reasonably well. Ellis took 
special care to note that despite its difficult circumstances, the school had no 
trouble getting full enrollment. Indeed, unless accommodations were improved, 
he feared it would be "necessary to reduce attendance .... There is no difficulty in 
keeping up the present attendance from the surrounding scholastic population."1 
Except for the usual problems typical of most reservation boarding schools, Ellis 
found little out of order. It was a charitable report, but not an entirely accurate 
one. 
Only months later a second inspection contained a decidedly different 
assessment of the school's health and of Cora Dunn's fitness to continue as 
principal. In early July 1909, Commissioner Robert Valentine wrote to Kiowa-
Comanche Agent Ernest Stecker to inform him that a recent inspection of the 
Rainy Mountain plant by a Special Agent McConihe revealed evidence of serious 
shortcomings, including uncomplimentary and troubling opinions of Dunn's 
performance. The report proved to be the undoing of her career as principal at 
Rainy Mountain.2 Although McConihe found some aspects of the school's 
operation tolerably run, on balance most of what he saw struck him as below 
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standard and even dangerously deficient. What little good he found was restricted 
almost entirely to the girls' dormitory, which he judged cramped but otherwise 
neat. Llke Ellis, McConihe described sleeping arrangements that were 
uncomfortably crowded and in violation of standards. Oassrooms were likewise 
cramped and suffered from poor facilities and enormously large classes. It was 
bad enough, he noted, that the school's blackboards were "miserable affairs ... 
and a menace to the eyesight of the pupils." That problem, however, paled in 
comparison to the fact that a single teacher was responsible f9r 110 pupils spread 
through three grades, all meeting at the same time and in the same room. Even 
by Rainy Mountain standards, this was judged "too great a task for one teacher."3 
Turning his attention to the boys' dormitory and other areas of the school, 
McConihe reported a litany of problems. He found further evidence that "this 
school is badly overcrowded and that children are being compelled to bear with 
discomforts entirely unnecessary," including doubling up in single beds. Worse, 
sanitation was being virtually ignored. Although the health of the students was 
good at present, McConihe warned that "it would not take much to start an 
epidemic here under the present conditions." In a school where "lung trouble" 
and trachoma were often out of control, this was unacceptable.4 
The general appearance of the boys building was bad. "Dirt and disorder 
abounded .... The linen rooms were in much confusion .... Closets [were] 
strongly impregnated with impurities." Floors were "very dirty," and McConihe 
was so overwhelmed by the wash room that he considered it a menace to health: 
"I pronounce [it] as filthy. Towels have been up for five days [a well-known 
source of trachoma] and most were as muddy as though the boys· had wiped their 
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shoes with them, others were too soiled to be used on the face." Employees set a 
poor example, too. McConihe judged most of their living quarters as "keeping 
with the rest of the building showing an utter lack of cleanliness and tidiness."5 
As he surveyed the rest of the campus, McConihe found and reported 
conditions that suggested a poorly run and inefficiently administered school. (Of 
course, he was reporting on the cumulative effects of nearly two decades of 
neglect and shortcuts on the part of the Indian Office. His report made no 
mention of the school's somewhat difficult history.) He judged the study room 
"the most unattractive ... I have ever seen," and wrote that dust and dirt were to 
be seen "on all sides." The outdoor privvies, long a problem and an 
embarrassment to Cora Dunn, were "in a frightful condition." McConihe ordered 
they be hauled off, burned and new ones constructed in their place. The store 
house for the school's oil and other flammable supplies failed to meet standards; 
Dunn was directed to submit an estimate for a new building in which to store such 
materials. Due to limited classroom space, the commissary building, including the 
dining hall, had been pressed into service. As a result, it was overcrowded and 
poorly organized. Supplies were stored improperly where "mice and other vermin 
have a good opportunity to attack" them. McConihe concluded that a great deal 
of waste and deterioration probably occurred. Commissioner Valentine added a 
new storage facility to the growing list.of corrective measures for the school.6 
The school's agricultural and industrial areas also came under McConihe's 
withering scrutiny and like so much of the rest of the campus, they were found to 
be wanting. The horse barn was "in a filthy condition and the extreme disorder 
clearly indicated to me that the person in charge of this work was not fitted to 
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instruct boys in industrial work and the example set for them tended to be 
wasteful and careless." Addressing Alfred Dunn's failure as the industrial teacher, 
McConihe was: 
thoroughly convinced that Mr. Dunn is not giving as much attention to the 
affairs of the school as he should and that he has other interests in the 
neighborhood that are taking up some of his time. I was told that he is 
interested in hog raising and has a small place near the school where he 
has some hogs. He told me that one time he took some of the school hogs 
to his place because there was not sufficient feed for them at the school.7 
Dunn's admission about the hogs only reinforced McConihe's low opinion of him 
and his program. Commissioner Valentine added his own remarks concerning 
Dunn's actions. "Such gross neglect as is evidenced," he wrote, "deserves severe 
censure." Agent Stecker.was instructed to bring this to Dunn's attention and to 
ensure that the situation was remedied immediately. 
Other things caught McConihe's eye as well. Meals he judged to be amply 
prepared and varied. Milk and butter, however, were "two things unknown to the 
children." Of course, Cora Dunn had complained of this before. McConihe 
reported that the school had only three milk cows, two of which were very nearly 
dry. Further, he discovered that what little milk there was went to the cook, who 
used it for feeding sick pupils. The balance (by which McConihe implied the 
majority) went to the Dunns for their personal use. Justifying the practice on the 
grounds that he and other employees were paying for the feed, Alfred Dunn said 
that Agent Stecker knew and approved of what was going on.· Incensed, 
McConihe angrily reported that although there was not enough milk for pupils to 
use in their morning coffee, "the employees have taken what few cows there were 
for their own use."8 Nothing, it seemed, ran according to government standards. 
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When he turned his attention to the school's staff and administration, 
McConihe reported that in those areas, too, there were serious problems. Having 
already noted the overcrowded conditions in the classrooms, and by implication 
the teaching problems associated with them, McConihe wrote that the employees 
rarely met to discuss matters of curriculum. "I asked the employees when they 
had their meetings to discuss the affairs of the school and to make suggestions for 
its betterment. None had been held I was told." Worse, when he inquired after 
Cora Dunn's attention to administrative details, employees apparently informed 
McConihe that general inspections by her "were rarely made." Moreover, when 
asked if she came around very often to oversee or inspect class work, one teacher 
replied that the principal had visited her class only once. The impression overall 
was that the school lacked any substantive direction, was hobbled by inattention to 
important details, and generally seemed deficient in many ways. Indeed, wrote 
McConihe, "there was on every hand the appearance of a lack of system and no 
head."9 
In his concluding remarks, McConihe spoke directly to what he believed 
was the source of the school's ills: 
I am constrained to believe· that the interests of the Service would be better 
served by causing a change in both the positions of the Principal Teacher 
and the Industrial Teacher. I do not believe that the head of this 
institution should be filled by a woman and have as one of her subordinates 
her husband .... I am thoroughly convinced that Mr. Dunn is not giving as 
much attention to the affairs of the school as he should and that he has 
other interests in the neighborhood that are taking up some of his time .... 
I do not believe that Mrs. Dunn has given such attention to her work and 
her duties as her position demands. From the conditions existing in the 
boys' dormitory and building it is very evident that she has been very lax. 
This plant needs new blood at its head, a man to build it up and put it on a 
basis where it will go ahead and show something from its resources. It is 
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essentially a man's job, and a man, too, that has had some experience .... 
The other employees are doing the best they know how but they need more 
supervision and encouragement than I think they are at present receiving. 
I respectfully recommend the transfer of both Mrs. and Mr. Dunn to other 
positions elsewhere.10 . 
McConihe's report had an immediate effect. Although no knowledgeable 
person at the Kiowa Agency could have been surprised by many of the report's 
conclusions, its tone was markedly different from previous inspections. The 
Indian Office seemed to be losing patience with the place, and Commissioner 
Valentine's letters to Agent Stecker about the matter lectured the agent in no 
uncertain terms. In early September, Stecker replied to Valentine's July letter.11 
In a point-by-point response, he informed the commissioner of changes being 
instituted at the school. Among other things, Stecker promised that "proper care 
and attention" would be paid to neatness and health. Privvies would be destroyed 
and a requisition submitted for construction of new ones. Likewise, an estimate 
was forwarded for consideration with regard to a new oil house. The barn was 
receiving close attention. The "milk question" was thoroughly understood. Fire 
drills would be regularly practiced. McConihe had reported that fire drills were 
virtually unknown. When he attempted to turn the water on at one fire plug, he 
could not do so. "It appeared to be rusted," he wrote.12 
Now that the school's poor condition had been frankly admitted by all 
concerned, Stecker asked for a new school building and employee living quarters. 
He pleaded his-case by telling Sells that "they are required to complete this plant." 
He referred to the more well-kept Fort Sill and Riverside schools and requested 
that a building similar to the ones there be erected as soon as possible at Rainy 
Mountain.13 
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He also reported that "the Principal's attention was promptly called to the 
shortcomings of this school and a copy of this letter was furnished Mrs. Dunn with 
such instructions as were deemed necessary under the circumstances." Probably 
hoping to show the commissioner that changes had already begun, Stecker 
reported that Alfred Dunn had resigned. Cora Dunn would remain for the 
coming year.14 
In fact, Cora Dunn stayed only through the first of the year before retiring 
from the service. On December 18, 1909, she tendered her resignation to the 
Indian Office and requested that it take effect February 28, 1910. James H. 
McGregor arrived at the school on March 1, 1910, to assume duties as principal 
and Cora Dunn joined her husband in retirement.15 It had been a remarkable 
era. For nearly fifteen years she had guided the school through a calamitous, 
troubled existence. Her letters and official reports reveal a woman devoted to the 
children and determined to put them on the road to what she believed was a 
better life. For much ofher tenure, however, the galling realities of the place 
taxed her and, in the end, overwhelmed her. Caught between the demands for 
efficiency and order that came from the Indian Office, and the very difficult 
circumstances that characterized Rainy Mountain School, Cora Dunn made the 
place as liveable as she could. As she departed in the winter of 1910, Dunn left a 
school that had begun as, and remained, a beleaguered haven. Nonetheless, it had 
been a better place for her presence. 
With Cora Dunn's departure, the Indian Office _hoped for a fresh start at 
the school. Unfortunately, this was not to be the case. In fact, the school's 
troubles only increased. Principals who followed Dunn each inherited a situation 
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that did not improve much over the next decade. Despite some important 
changes, and attempts to strengthen the school's overall operation, Rainy 
Mountain remained in poor circumstances. Combined with the momentum of the 
era to scale back Indian education and to economize where ever possible, officials 
seriously considered the idea of ending the school's service. Official reports and 
evaluations over the next ten years revealed a strained relationship between the 
school, the agency, and the Indian bureau that ultimately Rainy Mountain. 
In fact, the school's future was so shaky that an immediate attempt to close 
it came in the wake of the McConihe report. Sometime during the early spring of 
1910, someone inside the educational division of the Indian Office suggested that 
the government close Rainy Mountain .. The source of the suggestion is not 
entirely clear, but there is evidence that Stecker himself initiated the discussion. 
On May 4, 1910, Supervisor of Schools H.B. Peairs-wrote to Valentine to 
acknowledge a recent letter from the commissioner's office relative to the closing 
of Rainy Mountain. "I am of the opinion that it would be well to act favorably 
upon the recommendations," wrote Peairs, "provided of course that the Rainy 
Mountain School can.be disposed of in a satisfactory manner."16 On May 16 
Valentine responded that the office had the matter under consideration but could 
not move on it until Congress enacted legislation. In fact, J. H. Dortch, chief of 
the educational division, had already issued a memorandum to the appropriate 
House and Senate committees for such action. "The office wishes to see Rainy 
Mountain Boarding School closed," he wrote, and intended to "apply the proceeds 
to the enlargement and improvement of the Fort Sill School. ... A proposed draft 
of a bill for the sale of the plant is submitted for your consideration."17 By the 
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end of May the proposal was before committees in both houses of Congress. In 
the House, the draft of the bill justified the closing by noting that the Fort Sill 
School was suitably located to take in the Kiowa students and that "in the interest 
of economy and good administration the future maintenance of the Ft. Sill School 
in lieu of the two schools as at present conducted is deemed advisable." 
Moreover, should the Indian Office decide to keep Rainy Mountain in operation, 
"various expenditures will be required for repairs and for the construction of 
several new buildings." For an Indian Office in an economizing mood, the 
availability of the Fort Sill School and the admitted need for costly repairs were 
persuasive elements in the move to close Rainy Mountain.18 
In the Senate similar action occurred. On May 25 a bill to authorize the 
sale of the school was introduced and referred to the Committee on Indian 
Affairs. It authorized the Secretary of the Interior to appraise and sell "the lands, 
buildings, and appurtenances.known as Rainy Mountain Boarding School" and·to 
use the proceeds for the construction of new buildings and for repairs and 
improvements at the Fort Sill School.19 
News of the action in Washington did not reach Stecker at the Kiowa-
Comanche until late August. In a letter to the commissioner dated August 24, he 
informed Valentine that Special Agent Edgar A. Allen had told him only that day 
of the developments. "As this was the first information I have received since I 
recommended the disposition of said school to Mr. Allen, I respectfully request .. 
. a copy of the bill ... in order to keep in touch with all matters pertaining to 
schools under my supervision."20 It took Dortch nearly a month to respond to 
Stecker's request. On September 23 he sent Stecker a copy of the Senate bill and 
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reported that it was still before the Committee on Indian Affairs.21 
And then the matter was dropped; the bills died in committee. No effort 
being made to revive them, Rainy Mountain survived to start the 1910 school year. 
By any measurement, it had been a curious spring and summer. The Indian 
Office appeared intent on pushing the matter through but did not bother to 
contact the Kiowa agency personnel until late that summer. And only after 
Stecker requested it did the Office send him a copy of the Senate bill. Moreover, 
by the time Dortch's letter and the .copy of the bill reached Stecker, opening day 
had nearly arrived. The surviving correspondence does not indicate that any plans 
were discussed to effect the transfer of Rainy Mountain students to Fort Sill or 
Riverside. Nor is there any evidence that officials at those schools were consulted 
about the matter. 
For an Indian Office so openly concerned about efficiency and economy, 
this was poor planning indeed. The letters from· Stecker to Washington, and vice-
versa, showed no sense of urgency, no compulsion to solve the matter quickly. 
One comes away from a reading of the documents convinced that those involved 
in the discussions, especially in positions of high authority, were not very 
concerned about what was happening. Although the correspondence never 
explicitly says so, there is a clear sense that whatever happened to Rainy 
Mountain during that spring and summer, it was not worth much worry. Rainy 
Mountain was already beginning to slip into the twilight. 
Having averted the attempted closing of the school, McGregor and Stecker 
still faced the considerable task of putting Rainy Mountain in order. McConihe's 
report of June 1909 and its litany of violations and substandard conditions 
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required McGregor to make significant changes and improvements. As always, 
however, he had to do so with limited funds and with the knowledge that things 
probably would not get much better. Nonetheless, McGregor took over a school 
that sorely needed strengthening. He ran a much more organized school than his 
predecessor, and there was a fair amount of administrative housecleaning, 
especially personnel changes. If he lacked the almost parental love that Cora 
Dunn had shown for the place, he countered with a rigorous improvement 
program that attacked weaknesses in the school's various departments and 
programs. 
As to McConihe's numerous complaints about cleanliness, hygiene, and 
safety, McGregor responded by initiating a full review of the school's operation. 
He coupled this with a personal request for extensive repairs and additions to the 
school that he detailed in a letter to Stecker in April 1910 for the fiscal year 
1911.22 It is a revealing list for it suggests that the physical condition of the 
school was quite poor. Knowing that Cora Dunn had fought every year for 
appropriations to remedy similar problems is a reminder that the physical state of 
Rainy Mountain had not been a priority with the agency or Washington at any 
point in its first two decades of life. Now McGregor faced the same continuing 
battle. He listed repairs to existing buildings as a top need. "The buildings are in 
need of much repair," he wrote to Stecker. "Both dormitories are defaced very 
badly. Sixty-eight window panes in one dormitory and fifty-six in the other were 
broken when I came." All of the walkways needed repair, and the sewer, water, 
and lighting systems required extensive improvements. The boys' dormitory, for 
example, was still without a modern lighting system of any kind.23 
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Most pressing was the need for a new building and an improved water 
system, problems as old as the school itself. The two main dormitories had served 
since the tum of the century as combination dorm, classroom, employee quarters, 
lecture hall, and meeting room. Both buildings were chronically overcrowded and 
suffered because of it. With living conditions such as they were, and with poorly 
functioning or non-existent necessities like modem toilets and lights as the norm, 
conditions had become strained. To Agent McConihe's estimate of needs for the 
school, McGregor added $10,000 for a new classroom building. In addition to the 
new building, McGregor asked for employee quarters, something the school had 
never had. The custom at Rainy Mountain was for staff to live in the dorms or to 
take up residence in the various buildings across campus. Hoping to provide a 
more comfortable and professional environment, McGregor requested private 
quarters for his staff. Doing so would not only alleviate a pressing concern but 
would also free more room in the dorms for students. "This would bring the 
capacity of the school up to 150 pupils," he noted, which was its approved size.24 
McGregor got his walks repaired and the window panes replaced, but he 
did not get a new building. Nor did the Indian Office allocate funds to repair or 
renovate the other main buildings to his satisfaction. Like Dunn, he was learning 
to live with limited assistance. McGregor found it difficult even to keep the plant 
simply in working order. In October 1910, for example, he informed Stecker that 
despite repeated requests for repairs to the water system, the situation was once 
again becoming desperate. A drought only made matters worse, and McGregor 
was forced to write that "the water supply at this school is almost exhausted." He 
was making preparations to haul water from a spring three miles distant. The 
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school was thus without fire protection - to say nothing of the inconvenience for 
washing, cooking, and bathing - and "the water pressure amounts to nothing. "25 
In the fall of 1910, another official inspection (most schools received two or 
three such visits a year) revealed that the school was still failing to meet health 
and hygiene standards. 26 Of course, with such a poorly functioning water system, 
this came as no surprise. Referring to a report filed the previous April, the Indian 
Office inquired as to whether or not sufficient bedding had been procured to 
alleviate the crowded sleeping conditions in the dormitories. The office could not 
promise to assist the agency in paying for such goods but commented that a report 
was necessary "in order that it may be determined whether or not it will be 
possible or advisable to make the expenditure at the present time." Fire 
extinguishers had been authorized, finally, but the office wanted to know if they 
had in fact arrived. In reply, McGregor wrote that the school needed "60 beds, 60 
mattresses and 180 blankets. The estimated cost of this is $1,000.00. The beds 
and mattresses now in use are old and badly worn ... [and] ... unsanitary." 27 
He promised to maintain higher standards of cleanliness and noted that new towel 
racks had been installed, complete with numbers corresponding to those put in 
students' clothing. Finally, fire extinguishers had actually arrived. He could not 
get a new building, employee quarters, more staff, or repairs to the water system. 
But he could get towel racks with personalized numbers above them. It was a 
troubling comment on the lack of support rendered by the government. 
Matters did not improve as McGregor's term unfolded. In his estimate of 
needs for fiscal 1912, he once again reported that numerous repairs and major 
renovations were still urgent.28 Under repairs he listed five major building (both 
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of the dorms, dining room and kitchen, barn, and laundry) and asked for $1,100 
for work that he characterized as "absolutely necessary." Again he asked for a 
new school building (but lowered the sum from $10,000 of a year earlier to 
$7,000) and employees' quarters, saying that "present building permits care of 
about only one-half of scholastic population .... School has no employee quarters. 
Necessary for employees take rooms in school building." Continuing, McGregor 
noted that repairs to the water and sewer systems were "urgently needed," and 
that the "school urgently needs installation of a new [lighting] system." As if those 
were not enough, he concluded that the telephone line "was urgently in need of 
repair." All told he listed "urgent needs" at $16,360. "Absolute necessities" were 
less - only $1;960.64. Thus, for repairs and urgently needed additions, the school 
required not less than $18,820.64. Of course, McGregor knew that he would most 
likely get little if any of what he requested. The previous year, for example, he 
had made requests of $875; the Indian Office appropriated only $200. 
By now McGregor's correspondence to Stecker and the Indian Office had 
taken on an air of increasing frustration and irritation. Criticized by inspectors for 
failing to meet standards, he discovered that appropriations never covered the 
school's barest needs. What he considered basic necessities -· new water systems, 
lighting, and improved facilities - were reduced or ignored by his superiors. 
Forced to cobble together his own solutions, reliant on limited funds, faced with 
an openly indifferent or, at best, an unsympathetic Indian Office, McGregor 
continued as best he could to make the place work. 
In March 1913, however, he and Stecker once again found themselves 
answering to Washington for the school's recurring problems. The commissioner's 
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office refused to approve McGregor's repeated requests for repair funds and had 
the temerity to inform him that "the water system at the school must be improved . 
. . . Toilets cannot be used, the children are not properly bathed, and the laundry 
is hampered by this lack of water." But a plan submitted by the bureau's 
supervisor of engineering contained details for a major renovation of the water 
and sewer system. McGregor endorsed it. Unfortunately, the estimated cost was 
$1,800. The entire repair budget for the school being only $600, the office 
requested that McGregor postpone his estimate for general repairs "until it is 
known what action the Indian Office will take in the matter of supplying funds for 
the water system." If the funds available proved insufficient, a final remedy 
presented itself. Fifty of the school's ninety-four dairy cattle might be sold at 
$30.00 per head, producing $1,500. Combined with the anticipated $600 from the 
office, this would cover the cost of a new water system. "The cattle are valuable . 
. . and should not be disposed of," noted the Office, "but water is a greater need 
and must be supplied."29 The plan never gained authorization; three years later, 
his successor was still asking for a new water system. 
A second letter from the Indian Office to Stecker in March 1913 
mentioned the issues again. "A new school building is one of the very urgent 
needs of the school," wrote the commissioner's office .. "The present arrangement 
is entirely unsatisfactory .... A school building containing three classrooms each . 
. . an assembly room with a capacity for seating· 200 people, two small rooms to be 
used for employees quarters and two toilet rooms [are] what should be 
considered." The employee mess building was "in very bad condition," the laundry 
building needed repairs, and an electric lighting system was recommended. 
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Despite the undoubted necessity for the light system, the clerk writing to Stecker 
admitted that he was "quite confident the Indian Office will not allow" it. 
Attention was brought to an acetylene system at the Kaw School that was not in 
use; Stecker was directed to make inquiries about obtaining it.30 
The matter of a reliable water supply was an especially serious one; its 
absence meant that in addition to the inconvenience of hauling water and 
enduring primitive latrines, the school also lived with diseases caused by unsanitary 
conditions. It is with regard to this circumstance that the indifference of the 
Indian Office is most clearly revealed. By far the most dreadful of the 
consequences of Rainy Mountain's water and sewer problems was the high 
instance of trachoma, a malady of the eye, which if untreated leads to irrevocable 
blindness. It was known colloquially as "sore eye disease." Caused usually by 
unsanitary conditions, especially dirty water, the disease caused acute pain in the . 
eyes when subjected to light. In severe cases, the lids fused shut as a result of 
secretions in the eye. Those who came down with it were usually confined to 
darkened rooms. 
Coincidence would have it that as McGregor began his term at Rainy 
Mountain, the school suffered a prolonged period of trachoma that was directly 
and indisputably linked to the poor level of hygiene among students. For any who 
doubted the cost of neglecting basic necessities such as modernized water and 
sewer systems, the situation at Rainy Mountain was a sobering reminder. 
At the time of his appointment McGregor inherited a school whose 
facilities were in shockingly poor repair and whose students suffered from 
trachoma at unheard of rates. In April 1912, for example, the temporary 
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physician assigned to the school reported that seventy-nine of 147 students 
suffered from the disease; 10 percent of them were so badly afflicted that they 
required operations.31 The following December, McGregor advised Stecker that 
sanitary drinking fountains had been installed and that new vaults were under 
construction for the outdoor toilets. Lime and carbolic acid in liberal amounts 
would help to keep the pits from breeding disease. But the continuing battle to 
secure clean water for bathing and washing remained. "It is hoped," wrote 
McGregor, "that the Office will take IMMEDIATE action and provide funds for 
constructing an auxiliary water supply .... until more water can be procured ... 
three small boys must be bathed in the same bath water and then only every other 
week. I am aware that this is a bad thing to do." Of course, the situation could 
be helped by the appointment of a regular physician. "It would enable us to fight 
the trachoma scourge systematically," noted McGregor. This was especially true in 
light of the fact that the school was more than thirty miles from the agency 
physician at Anadarko.32 
No significant improvement or repairs to the water system were provided 
over the course of the next few years. The medical situation declined accordingly. 
In mid-April 1913, McGregor wrote angrily to Stecker and lectured the agent 
concerning the government's negligence. Having requested a trachoma specialist 
months earlier, McGregor reminded Stecker that the request had been held in 
abeyance; thus McGregor curtly requested Stecker to inform Washington of the 
prevalence of trachoma at the school. He also took the chance to lecture the 
agent himself concerning conditions at the school. Of the two specialists sent to 
Rainy Mountain in the preceding two years, "one of them stayed six days and 
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rushed away .... Another stayed, by urging, three days." McGregor was especially 
peeved at the agent's apparent disregard for the school's circumstances. "It seems 
to me that the fact that Rainy Mountain is isolated . . . does not lessen the 
obligations of the Indian Office. I have taken the trouble to note that the 
specialists and other visiting officials from the Indian Office spend much longer 
periods at other schools." McGregor went on to remind Stecker that he had 
submitted plans months before for a new water system but had been told, as 
usual, that funds were not available. "The statement that no more funds are 
available does not satisfy me when I read of an Agency here and there being 
furnished an automobile." Anxious to find a remedy, McGregor requested 
authority to begin work himself on a new water system, and he implored Stecker 
to appoint a physician to the school.33 
When Washington curtly informed Stecker and McGregor several days later 
that funds for .new water system were not available, McGregor flew into a rage.34 
It was difficult to understand how such a decision could be made, wrote 
McGregor, especially in light of all of the information in the hands of the office. 
"I must, in duty to a deplorable condition and suffering children," he wrote, 
"request the Office . . . to reconsider. . . . Surely the Indian Office will not allow 
[these] conditions to longer exist." Rainy Mountain had the highest trachoma 
rates in the Indian schools, its students were bathed irregularly, clothes were not 
properly washed and rinsed, and the school had no fire protection. "Is it not 
time," pleaded McGregor, "that relief be furnished Rainy Mountain School?"35 
Apparently McGregor's wrath had some effect. In December 1913 
authorization was made to provide the services of a regular physician at the 
243 
school. However the doctor would not receive the standard salary of $1200 per 
year but only $500 per year.36 In the meantime the school held special meetings 
devoted to eradicating disease. In early December 1913, for example, 
"Tuberculosis Day" featured a discussion titled "Our Efforts, Handicap, and 
Results along Hygienic and Sanitary Lines at Rainy Mountain School." After 
opening comments by McGregor, students from the fourth, fifth, and sixth grades 
read compositions about health. A series of five-minute talks by staff members 
followed on topics ranging from work and exercise to "Danger of Dust and How 
to Avoid It." The agency physician came next with a thirty-minute talk on the 
prevention of tuberculosis. A rousing finale was delivered by William B. Freer, 
who addressed "The Dangerous Fly."37 
How much good this did is not clear. It surely did not solve the problems 
and disease continued. In the same month that "Tuberculosis Day" was held, a 
visiting inspector recommended that a specialist be sent to the school as soon as 
possible to begin "a campaign against trachoma. Reportedly 98% pupils 
affected."38 McGregor reported in late January 19i4 that Dr. B. A Warren had 
achieved good results in treating cases of trachoma at the school. Many cases 
were so advanced, however, that the assistance of another doctor or trained 
specialist (or both) was advised. "I wish to add that this school has the highest per 
cent of trachoma of any Indian school in the United States," wrote McGregor. 
Given the evidence, how could the Indian Office fail to provide another 
specialist?39 The response was usually that of funds prevented it from doing so. 
There is no evidence in the surviving records that another physician or trained 
specialist was ever appointed. · 
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Over the next several years the situation did not improve. Medical reports 
from 1916 and 1917 indicate rates of trachoma that can only be described as 
epidemic. From a student body of 168 in March 1916, an astonishing 163 were 
listed as infected with trachoma. In 1917 it was just as bad when 154 children 
were afflicted. In order for infected children to maintain some level of activity the 
school purchased thirty pairs of dark glasses. In the absence of a physician, and 
without a modernized water and sewer system, it was the best that could be 
done.40 The expenditure of less than $2000 on such a system would likely have 
solved the problem. In McGregor's opinion it was little enough to ask. In an 
Indian Office obsessively concerned with efficiency and economy, however, Rainy 
Mountain did not receive much attention. McGregor could not even get a new 
school building, how could he ever expect something as mundane as a new water 
system? 
In addition to poor physical facilities, McGregor also faced a staff that was 
often only marginally talented. He discovered that turnover was rampant and that 
those hired as replacements were more likely than not the rejects or malcontents 
from other schools. In December 1912 a review of the employee corps produced 
an exceedingly poor evaluation, but one that was not untypical. Although four 
employees were ranked as excellent, eleven others were "not up to the standard of 
efficiency to accomplish the work that is required at an Indian school." 
Reminding McGregor of the obvious, the report noted that "with so many 
employees of mediocre attainments the principal cannot accomplish the best 
work." The inspection did not specifically name those judged to be problems, but 
it did list their positions. Included were laundress, physician, seamstress, industrial 
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teacher, disciplinarian, matron, and academic teacher.41 In other words, several 
of the school's most important staff members were incompetent or at least ill-
suited. Within a month, four of the eleven had resigned, but McGregor admitted 
to the Indian Office that "in one or two instances the present employee is no 
improvement over the one who previously held the position, but in general there 
has been a marked improvement in the personnel of the school force." In a 
separate letter, the principal tried to defend his staff, noting that if some of them 
were not the best caliber (he described the seamstress, who resigned, as "a moral 
degenerate") the rest were doing the best they could under the circumstances.42 
At the end of the 1913 term, matters had not improved significantly. A 
year-end inspection concluded that advanced and intermediate students seemed to 
have good teaching and capable instructors, but the youngest pupils suffered badly 
by comparison. Although the teacher, Florence Hickman, was judged to be 
"conscientiously inclined and willing," her class "was almost in a continual state of 
confusion." Students were listless and disrespectful and showed little progress in 
language training and other critical areas. Overall, matters appeared barely 
satisfactory, but only because McGregor and a handful of employees "support the 
school and hold it up to the standard it now maintains. For the most part, the 
work of the greater part of the other employees is neutralized by their very 
apparent lack of initiative." The school could not possibly "do efficient work with 
so many weaklings among employees." Noting that it was only fair to mention the 
difficulties under which the school operated, the report closed by stating that a 
new school building, more instructional materials, and replacements for the 
kindergartner, girls' matron, disciplinarian, and boys' matron would improve the 
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situation.43 
All of this took a heavy tool on McGregor. As the opening of the 1913-14 
term approached, he poured out his frustrations in two letters to Stecker. In the 
first, written at the end of July, McGregor lamented that the fall term "brings to 
mind very vividly the fact that nothing has been done, so far as I know, to provide 
a suitable school building for this school." Acknowledging that hundreds of other 
requests from other schools and agencies would soon flood the Indian Office, he 
felt compelled to write that "I doubt if there is another school that can· present as 
strong a claim for the need as Rainy Mountain. Without exceptions, the 
Inspecting Officials readily concede this point. The facts are this School has not 
received its just dues and its importance has not been appreciated." Again he 
pressed for a new building and reminded the agent that a separate school building 
had never been furnished despite the fact that the school served a population 
desperately in need of education. "I believe they deserve better treatment," wrote 
McGregor.44 
In the second letter, sent just after the school opened in September, 
McGregor was more adamant in his criticisms and deeply troubled by what he 
perceived as willful neglect on the part of the Indian Office. His comments 
capture the reality of the school's predicament: 
School is in session again and for the fourth time I am compelled to 
use unsuitable and unsanitary rooms for the children. I have tried in vain 
to get a few of the very essential improvements needed at this school and 
after four years I am discouraged. 
Last year we had ... an excellent school. The attendance was good 
- more than 150 pupils - and the interest manifested by the pupils better 
than in previous years. Yet the Indian Office refused to give us any of the 
new buildings or equipment requested. Here is the condition. An 
unfinished plant with an attendance greater than Riverside and almost 
equal to Fort Sill and the two latter schools well equipped, yet Rainy 
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Mountain received $1175 for all improvements for the year and the other 
two schools received more than $7000 between them .... [Rainy Mountain] 
children are forced to use the old fashioned lamps at night, the Comanche 
child has an excellent electric light, the Kiowa boy is forced to go 100 yards 
through the cold to get to a toilet, the Riverside boy steps across the porch 
to a toilet. The Rainy Mountain Employees are forced to room in the 
building with the pupils while the Employees at the other two schools 
[have] comfortable rooms .... The Indian Office must have some good 
reason for this neglect. I can see but one legitimate reason and that is the 
early abandonment of the school. I have been in the Indian Office and 
believe that it would not allow such an injustice to be dealt to Rainy 
Mountain if it were the intention to continue the school. 
It will be remembered that I have in an application for transfer ... . 
I like the work very much and am interested in the Indian problem ... but 
I cannot long remain at Rainy Mountain among the many handicaps that 
surround me. Further, I have been here almost four years and if I have 
not earned a promotion in that time I am free to say that I should get 
out.45 
In December 1913 the school's annual inspection described it as "well 
managed" despite the "lack of proper housing and equipment and some rather 
inefficient employees." McGregor was credited with "in most respects excellent 
work, and is a strong influence for good among the somewhat difficult Kiowa 
Indians." The school's attendance "is regular and the discipline good. I found 
here the most enthusiastic body of Indian boys and girls that I have seen in any 
reservation school," noted the inspector. He attributed much of this to 
McGregor's presence. Acknowledging the school's poor condition, the report 
called attention to its importance in this region. The Kiowa country was sparsely 
populated and lacked adequate public schools. "This fact, together with the 
crowded condition of the boarding school ... call for consideration of the 
question whether the school should not be enlarged at.least to the extent of 
providing another class room and an additional teacher."46 McGregor could take 
some comfort from the fact that the school's problems were not entirely unknown 
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to his superiors; at the same time, however, he got little support from them. 
By the middle of the 1913-14 term, McGregor's resolve was beginning to 
break down. Since his arrival at the school, nothing substantive had been done to 
improve its condition, and as each year passed expressed opinions that revealed a 
deepening sense of despondence. In March 1914 he wearily approached Stecker 
again on matters at the school; this time the letter was almost completely 
personal. "I have passed the fourth year at Rainy Mountain without a change in 
salary," he wrote, "and without the.help from the Indian Office that the school 
deserved. I am tired of it." Moreover, the situation had become a strain on his 
wife, who had agreed to serve as a teacher since coming to the school. He asked 
for an increase in pay or a transfer. It would be with regret that he left Rainy 
Mountain, he noted, ''but I know that it is an injustice to my family to remain 
much longer." Unless a change was made, McGregor announced that he would 
"make other arrangements .... It is my intention to leave Rainy Mountain during 
the next school year." He had not fixed a date but wanted to give Stecker ample 
time to locate a replacement.47 Clearly, McGregor had all of the place and its 
problems that he could stand. He was gone by the end of 1914. 
McGregor was not alone in his concern for the school's condition. In 
February 1914 Delos K. Lonewolf wrote to Commissioner Cato Sells on behalf of 
the Kiowa Business Committee, a collection of prominent Kiowa leaders, to 
express the committee's fears about the condition of the school and about the 
apparent neglect of the Indian Office. In reply, Assistant Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs E. B. Meritt told them "that the Office has been quite fully informed as to 
conditions there and the need of extensive repairs .... I wish to be as liberal" as 
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possible. "You will understand, of course," he continued, "that there are many 
other Indian Schools in need of the same assistance. . . . At this time there is 
almost no money available for constructive purposes or repairs, but I assure you 
that the Rainy Mountain School will not be overlooked next year."48 
For once the office was true to its word. Shortly after Lonewolf and 
McGregor had voiced their latest worries, the bureau authorized funds for the 
construction of a new school building. More than that, the money allocated 
actually represented sufficient funds to get a sturdy, worthwhile building; instead 
of the $7,000 McGregor had requested earlier, the Office authorized $10,000.49 
Finally, good fortune had come to Rainy Mountain. The building, completed in 
early 1916, had classrooms and a large assembly hall with a seating capacity of 
210. In March 1916 the Office approved expenditures for an acetylene lighting 
system on campus.so 
Some relief from the water problem also appeared in 1915. Parker 
McKenzie remembered that water closets were added to the boys' dorm as part of 
an annex built sometime in 1915. A new pipeline running from the side of Rainy 
Mountain to the school was laid in the same period and was connected to a pump 
house and reservoir that dated from 1913. It was not the kind of system 
McGregor had wanted, but it did alleviate some of the worst problems.s1 
Ironically, all of this came at about the same time that McGregor left 
Rainy Mountain. Unwilling to endure another year under such conditions and 
anxious to provide a better environment for his wife and family, he left the school 
in late 1914 to accept a position at the Rosebud agency in South Dakota. Soon 
after, he transferred to the Pine Ridge agency and school.s2 
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Between Cora Dunn's forced resignation in 1910 and McGregor's transfer 
in late 1914 Rainy Mountain made no significant progress. The problems that had 
troubled it during its first two decades continued; some, especially health, became 
worse. Unfortunately, McGregor could not convince the Indian Office that 
improving Rainy Mountain's facilities should have high priority. McGregor can be 
credited with making some improvements and for attempting to bring a renewed 
spirit to the place, but the severity of the situation was more than he could 
handle. By the time he left the school it was entering its last years of service. 
The two men who followed him as principal had neither the will nor the support 
necessary to save the place. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
"THE KIOWAS NEED THEIR SCHOOL, THEY 
CANNOT VERY WELL GET ALONG 
WITHOUT IT' 
McGregor left Rainy Mountain as the school as it entered its last years of 
service. Possibly he anticipated this, for he constantly reminded Agent Ernest 
Stecker that a transfer would be greatly appreciated. Stecker, too, left as the 
Kiowa-Comanche agent, replaced in April 1915 by C. V. Stinchecum, whom 
Parker McKenzie described as "Boy, he was all business!"1 By then the future of 
the school was imperiled. During MsGregor's tenure it did little more than 
muddle through one crisis after another, surviving in the midst of the usual 
dilemmas; this was not his fault, but like Cora Dunn, he discovered that he simply 
could not combat the school's continuing problems. When he left the school in 
the winter of 1915 it had only a hand,ful of years left. 
McGregor's successor was John Crickenberger, who. arrived in January 1915 
after he and his wife transferred from Tohatchi, New Mexico.2 Crickenberger 
stayed only about one year before giving way to R. W. Bischoff, who ran the 
school until it closed in the fall of 1920. During Crickenberger's short term, he 
did little more than keep the school going. The brevity of his tenure and his 
unfamiliarity with the school seem to have prevented him from attempting 
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anything more than acting as caretaker.3 
It did not take long, however, for Crickenberger to run afoul of the Indian 
Office. In March Agent Stecker learned from the Indian Office that the school 
had once again received a poor evaluation. "Many of the children are not making 
good progress in their studies," went the report. "This leads to the conclusion 
either that the instruction has not been efficient . . . or that teachers have not 
been alert ... or else that some of your pupils are mentally backward." To 
support its findings, the Office referred Stecker to Rainy Mountain's quarterly 
attendance report, which showed a number of pupils who had been at the school 
for as long as seven years but who languished in the first and second grades. 
Nearly twenty such cases appeared on the report, almost 10 percent of the student 
body.4 Stecker instructed Crickenberger to review the school's records carefully 
to ascertain the cause of the school's poor performance and was warned that "class 
room instruction will have very careful attention in future visits to all schools." 
On an optimistic note Crickenberger's supervising principal, J. W. Smith, 
expressed assurance "that Rainy Mountain will show up very favorably in this 
year's work in all departments."5 
Crickenberger replied that his teachers "are all good ... certain pupils have 
made good progress ... there are no children here who [are] ... feeble minded." 
The cause for the school's lack of progress lay not with its staff or students but 
with its poor facilities. Evening study sessions were impossible, for example, 
''because we do not have the lights." He pleaded for the agency to "give us up to 
date classrooms, good lights for evening work, another teacher, and give the 
Principal time to supervise closely the work." Only then would the children make 
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good progress. In answer to the Indian Office's specific query concerning students 
who had lingered in the first and second grades after years of effort, 
Crickenberger suggested that many reasons could explain the situation - irregular 
attendance or sickness for example. Yet, he was unwilling to give up on such 
students or to dismiss them. "These, like the poor, are ever with us," he said.6 
An official inspection in September 1915 produced only luke-warm praise. 
Noting that industrial education was given "some attention," the inspection went 
on to say that due to the "lack of facilities and of sufficient number of employees, 
little in the way of systematic instruction can be given. There is great need . . . of 
better facilities ... in order that the children of this school maybe given 
opportunities· to which they are entitled." It all sounded very familiar. But all was 
not lost; the inspector did note with pleasure that "great care" had been taken to 
prevent students from marking books and destroying property.7 
Five months later, -another inspection revealed some improvements. 
Crickenberger had implemented a new course of study emphasizing industrial 
training, including evening study three nights a week. The Indian Office received 
the news with pleasure and went so far as to recommend hiring a domestic science 
teacher. With the exception of trachoma, which still plagued the school "to a 
considerable extent," Rainy Mountain seemed to be in satisfactory condition. 
Commissioner Sells reminded all concerned that he wanted "to get this school on 
a basis of successful industrial operation as rapidly as possible:"8 
Crickenberger left .the school at the end of the 1915-1916 term. His 
replacement, R. W. Bischoff, stayed until the place closed in September 1920. 
During his administration the usual barrage of complaints continued to flow out of 
260 
the Indian Office. In December 1916 Bischoff got his first taste of an official 
inspection when Edgar Allen made a stop of several days at the school. The 
course of study was finally being followed according to Allen, but only "as [it] is in 
most schools ... followed in part." There was no music instruction; pupils were 
judged to be quite large and old; industrial instruction was satisfactory in a few 
classes, fair in some, and scarcely existent in the rest. The health of the students 
seemed to be good.9 Overall, it was not an especially laudatory report, but it did 
find some bright spots. It is worth noting that in his reply to the report 
Stinchecum asked the commissioner to remember that in addition to the school's 
well-known problems, there had been "no less than twelve changes in teacher's 
positions ... since July 1, 1915." He also commented that as Rainy Mountain was 
patronized almost entirely by Kiowas who "did not take readily to the school" 
(which was decidedly untrue), the agency faced a continual struggle just to get and 
keep children long enough to make some meaningful change in them.10 
By this time, however, the school's usefulness was coming to an end. As 
negative or barely acceptable evaluations piled up year after year, and as 
conditions continued to remain marginally acceptable, it was only a matter of time 
before the office decided to close it and transfer its students. Although records 
from Bischoff s term do not reveal much in the way of day-to-day life at the 
school, neither do they suggest that any significant improvement occurred. That 
being the case, the move to close the school began in earnest in late 1919. 
During the fall of 1919 the Indian Office announced plans to close twenty-
five reservation boarding schools in Oklahoma, including Rainy Mountain.U This 
was consistent with the government's stated intention to scale back such schools 
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and of place Indian children in public schools. Isolated and troubled, it had been 
a source of worry and frustration since nearly the day it had opened. With three 
other boarding schools in the vicinity (Fort Sill, Riverside, and Anadarko) and 
with public schools within easy distance of most of Rainy Mountain's school-age 
population, closing the plant would not work undue hardship on anyone. At least 
that was how Washington saw things. 
The decision to close the school became apparent by August or September 
of 1919. Informed by the Indian Office that his agency's budget for school and 
agency buildings was being decreased by $4,000 for the coming year, Stinchecum 
wired the Office for an explanation. He noted that such a decrease would leave 
him only $2,000 to operate four schools, field stations, and a hospital. "Absolutely 
impracticable to keep property in condition with such meager allowance. Request 
reconsideration."12 In reply Commissioner Sells wrote that because Stinchecum's 
annual report for the agency indicated "that practically all children on the Kiowa 
Reservation live within three miles ·of a public school," and because of declining 
enrollments in the agency's boarding schools, one of those schools would have to 
close. Due to its poor condition, Rainy Mountain was at the top of the list.13 
Thus, Stinchecum would not have to allot funds toward the school, which helped 
to explain the decision to reduce the agency's funds. Stinchecum wrote back to 
Sells to say that although the views of the office about closing Rainy Mountain 
"correspond exactly with my own," he still needed the $4,000 for repairs at the 
agency's other schools and buildings. Without it "we cannot make a dollar's worth 
of repairs during the rest of the year."14 Sells was apparently unmoved by the 
request. 
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In February 1920 the office authorized a full review of the agency's schools. 
Reporting in early March, Dr. R. S. Russell revealed conditions at Rainy 
Mountain that were appallingly poor. With the exception of the principal's 
cottage and the boys' dormitory, the rest of the school was "in a generally 
disreputable condition .... The plant, taken as a whole is a disgrace to our 
service." The girls' dormitory, "once the pride of the school, is in such a state of 
repair that it is a crime to house nice girls in it." Most of the other buildings were 
judged to be beyond repair or actually "falling to pieces." At a minimum the place 
required $25,000 in repairs. The work force was small, demoralized, and 
inefficient - the result, partially, of the miserable conditions under which it lived. 
The students· showed little evidence of schooling. The girls were observed wearing 
shawls and blankets, and the boys were "a more progressive looking lot." Russell 
was distressed that he heard "no Indian pupil use a word of English, a fact this is, 
in my judgement, one of the strongest arguments for the discontinuance of this 
school."15 
With other boarding schools nearby, and with public schools available to all 
of Rainy Mountain's students, Russell built a compelling case against the place. 
Riverside and Fort Sill were in excellent condition, produced well-trained students, 
; 
and were reputable schools. Moreover, the trend toward putting Indian children 
in public schools was well established. Between 1916 and 1921, for example, the 
number of Indian children enrolled in public schools in the area had grown from 
152 to 749; the enrollment in boarding schools had declined from 628 to 431. 
Russell estimated that for 1921 there were at least 467 eligible school-age pupils 
in the area, not enough to fill the agency's four boarding schools unless one was 
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closed. The best interest of the Kiowas, he continued, lay with the enrollment of 
their children in public schools at the earliest opportunity. Resisting the move 
would only harm the children. Rainy Mountain should close, reasoned Russell, "if 
for no other reason than to force the Kiowa children who attend it into contact 
with the White children in public schools." To those Kiowas who objected, 
Russell forcefully reminded them that it was they, in fact, who had first begun the 
present turn of events by enrolling their children in public schools, "cutting 
thereby the total number of available children to a number insufficient ... to 
allow an enrollment at the four [boarding] schools" run by the agency. According 
to bureau officials, Rainy Mountain was the least suitable of the schools to save. 
The Indian Office had fixed upon it as the one to close, "an opinion with which," 
noted Russell, "I have no hesitancy in saying, I am in full accord."16 
The decision to close the school set off a storm of protest. The sources of 
the protest were interestingly varied, ranging from outraged whites who objected 
vociferously to schooling their children with half-civilized Indians, to the Kiowas 
for whom the school seemed a debt owed them and an indispensable component 
of their tribe's progress toward membership in American society. Word had 
barely gotten out before the tribe began an intensive campaign to keep the school 
open. Writing to Congressman Scott Ferris in Washington in November of 1919, 
Sherman Chadlesone, a Kiowa, spoke with great passion against closing the 
school. He reminded the representative that if Rainy Mountain closed there 
would be no school for the Kiowas. But the Comanch~s, Caddos, Delawares, and 
Witchitas on the other hand "will still have their schools." He did not wish to see 
the tribe "deprived of their good school, they loved Rainy Mountain School." In· 
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Chadlesone's opinion all the school needed "was a little more backing by the 
Indian Office and it will do twice as much for the Kiowa children." During its 
time the school had turned out scores of good students who had gone on to 
become successful citizens; they owed their chance in life to Rainy Mountain. "If 
Rainy Mountain School can do these good things for Kiowa children," he asked 
plaintively, "why should it be abolished?" In closing Chadlesone implored Ferris to 
help the tribe. "The Kiowas need their school," he wrote, "they cannot very well 
get along without it."17 
Within days Ferris wrote to the commissioner to make inquiries about the 
situation. Assistant Commissioner E. B. Meritt replied in late November that 
owing to the large number of Kiowa children in public schools, and because of the 
extraordinary expense involved in repairing the plant, the school could not be 
maintained.18 In the meantime, Congressman James McClintic of Oklahoma 
made inquiries to the office about reconsidering its decision. In late January he 
wrote to Sells to tell him that the "rumor" concerning the school's closing had 
reached him. "I do not know of any school that is more ideally located than this 
institution," wrote Mcclintic. "Inasmuch as the attendance is sufficient to 
maintain it I cannot see how your Department could consistently entertain an idea 
looking towards its discontinuance. I trust there is no truth to this report."19 
Like Ferris, McClintic received a curt reply that repeating the office's position. 
This time Assistant Commissioner Meritt added that the $20,000 to $25,000 
necessary for repairs could hardly be justified for "a school plant which is not 
actually required for the education of Indian children."20 
Before long a flurry of telegrams and letters from Rainy Mountain 
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supporters began to pour into the office protesting the school's closing. 
Representative Ferris took a particularly active role. In a series of telegrams to 
high ranking public officials he insisted that the Indian Office was making a 
mistake that would cause great harm to the Kiowas. In separate (but identical) 
pleas to Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, Commissioner Sells, and United 
States Senator Robert Owen of Oklahoma, Ferris attempted to win support. "The 
Kiowa Indians feel hurt that an order has been established abolishing the Rainy 
Mountain School," he wrote. "The Indians are heart broken about it," continued 
Ferris, and had sent a delegation with a petition to Washington. "Will you not be 
good enough to see what can be done for them?"21 Wearied by the browbeating 
his department was taking, Sells shot back a terse answer to Ferris. "It is policy to 
place Indian children in public schools whenever they are available," wired the 
commissioner. Large numbers of Kiowa children were already in those schools. 
Moreover, the sum required to repair the plant was more than $40,000. 
(Apparently the earlier sum of $20,000 did not sway Ferris and others; $40,000 
was a much more intimidating figure.) In reply to Senator Owen, Sells hastened 
to explain that "the closing of the Rainy Mountain School will not deprive any 
Indian child ... and I feel it is the proper course to pursue."22 
Representative McClintic personally took the tribe's petition to 
Commissioner Sells. Signed by 146 members of the tribe, including many former 
students, the petition was a plea against taking the school from a tribe that very 
much wanted and needed it. In a letter to Kiowa spokesman Robert Onco, 
McClintic promised to continue to discuss with Sells what he considered "the 
unjustness of the order." He went on to say that the suddenness of the decision 
266 
had caught him off guard. "I have watched the Indian legislation ... in order that 
the appropriations for the maintenance of the Indians in western Oklahoma would 
not be reduced." When the Committee on Indian Affairs did not take any action 
indicating a drastic reduction in the number of the state's government boarding 
schools, McOintic said he felt sure that no significant changes were going to be 
made. Unimpressed by the commissioner's suggestion that nearly $40,000 was 
needed to put the plant in working order, McClintic told Onco that he had 
commissioned a friend in nearby Gotebo to investigate the facts and report as 
soon as possible. In the meantime, McClintic would push the issue as hard as he 
dared. Adopting a less dogmatic stance, Sells courteously notified the senator in 
mid-March that he "had not entirely completed my further consideration of the 
situation" and would be happy to give it and the tribe's petition "due attention."23 
The petition submitted by the tribe suggested that the emotional bond to 
the school felt by many Kiowas was much stronger than the Indian Office knew. 
It also revealed a deeply felt devotion to the school. Rainy Mountain represented 
a vital link to .the non-Indian world for their children; many Kiowa parents and 
adults believed that it was virtually the only chance their children would have to 
.receive the training and instruction necessary to make successful lives. Although 
agents and inspectors had complained over the years about the occasional 
obstinance of the Kiowas, it was equally true that the school filled to capacity 
every year. As Parker McKenzie observed, his parents as well as many others 
never doubted the school's importance and never tried to keep their children 
away. Losing it meant having to send their youngsters to public schools, where 
they were not welcomed, or to the agency's other boarding schools, which were . 
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not as conveniently located and which were populated by other tribes. Despite 
the concerns that many parents about health conditions and other circumstances 
at the school, it nonetheless represented an important opportunity for Kiowa 
children. 
"To discontinue the institution would mean the removal of the very 
backbone of the tribe," began the petition. Rainy Mountain was where their 
children got their first knowledge of the outside world. Sending them to white 
schools was impractical and dangerous. "No white teacher ... who even has an 
interest and sympathy for the Indian child will long endure the patience required 
to remold" that child. The circumstances of Kiowa life would only "breed 
contempt for the Indian children in public schools." The petition charged that 
several local school districts had gone so far as to refuse to enroll Indian children; 
another had relegated them to separate rooms. Prejudice and mistrust ran deep 
in the white communities and Kiowa parents feared the worst if their children 
were forced to attend public schools. "The best Indian pupil in every respect ... 
is the one that has been in attendance at a Government school long enough to 
learn to speak English, understand the necessity of cleanliness, good health, right 
living, and the general habits of the whites."24 
The petition closed with a plea for the rights of the Kiowa tribe. "We need 
more education and better education," it said, "but little progress will be made if 
the circumstances cited above are permitted." Discontinuing the school might 
seem wise for financial reasons, "but the welfare of the tribe ought to be 
paramount." The tribe requested that a member of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners be authorized to investigate the matter thoroughly; it was sure that 
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such an investigation would recommend that the school be continued because, 
very simply, "We need it."25 
Given its less than stellar condition, it seems unlikely that the tribe would 
have rallied such support for the school. Yet that is precisely what occurred. For 
some the school was a simple matter of an obligation to be borne by the 
government. Others properly feared the consequences of losing Rainy Mountain; 
sending their children to white schools or oven to the agency's other schools was a 
distasteful alternative. Still others seem to have known that despite the limitations 
at Rainy Mountain, it at least gave their children something resembling an 
education. Shortly after the commissioner received the petition, Agent 
Stinchecum wrote to him with evidence that he believed damaged the tribe's 
claims. Stinchecum had shown the petition to the agency's day school inspector 
who "carefully analyzed" it and determined that many of its signers in fact had 
little to do with the school. According to his findings, Stinchecum wrote that most 
of the petition's signers either had no children in the school, did not live in the 
Rainy Mountain district, had children in public schools or other boarding schools, 
had withdrawn their children from Rainy Mountain, or refused to send them to 
school. Fifty-six, for example, were listed as either having no children at the 
school, or as being too old or too young to have children.26 This was misleading 
at best. Many of those labeled as having no children in the school, for example, 
were former students who could presumably speak from personal experience with 
regard to the school's importance. Only twenty-nine were listed as having children 
in public schools; only four had children in other boarding schools. Three were 
listed as refusing to send their children to Rainy Mountain. Overall, Stinchecum's 
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notations of the list did not reveal any legitimate complaints. He appears simply 
to have been reaching for any support he could find. 
On the matter of an independent review from the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, he noted that Warren K. Moorehead of the Board had visited the 
agency. Stinchecum, however, characterized Moorehead's opinions as "of really no 
value." He had not actually visited the school and according to Stinchecum "in 
fact knows nothing whatever concerning the matter other than the fact the Indians 
oppose the closing of the school at this time." The decision to close the school 
was sound, Stinchecum concluded, and he would be "much disappointed to know 
the Office reaches any other conclusion."27 
The Indian Office answered the tribe's petition with the same explanations 
that it had given all other interested parties. In late February the assistant 
commissioner replied in writing to the tribe's representatives that it was the settled 
policy of the government to place Indian children in public schools where it was 
possible to do so. This was done out of a concern for economy and because it · 
represented the "best interests of the Indian children." Furthermore, records 
showed that a "large percentage" of the district's children had access to public 
schools. Finally, Rainy Mountain was in the poorest condition of the agency's 
boarding schools and would require "a great deal of money to put it in good 
condition." The letter gave no indication that the tribe's protest had produced any 
reconsideration of the matter.28 
Having rebuffed the Kiowas, the Indian Office still had to deal with a 
second source of resistance in the form of white school officials and parents. 
Their anger was no less immediate than that of the Kiowas and some of the same 
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fears drove it. Like the Kiowas, whites were less than willing as a rule to have 
their children in the same schools as Indian children. It was not their fault that 
the school had fallen on hard times and they were not happy about suffering 
because of it. And at least one citizen saw sinister events unfolding. J. W. 
Dellinger of Gotebo wrote somewhat breathlessly to Representative McClintic in 
January 1920 to call his attention to "a rumor now agitating our people recently." 
The government, according to Dellinger, had "sold all the Indian School property 
to the Catholic Church and hereafter they will be conducted under that 
denomination." It was his duty to inform McClintic that "against such action all 
the citizenry of this country enter their solemn protest right now."29 
If the test of the area's whites failed to see a papist plot unfolding before 
their very eyes, they at least saw something they did not like and did not intend to 
tolerate. Mr. J.M. Rule, president and manager of The Democrat-Chief of Hobart 
began the attack with a letter to Senator Owen in mid-February 1920. A thinly 
tirade attack against allowing Indian children to attend public schools, Rule's letter 
revealed a sentiment typical of many whites in the area. "This school is necessary 
for the proper ... education of the Indian children," wrote Rule, "who pick up 
their education slowly and cannot be given proper attention by instructors in the 
public schools." The citizens of Hobart were unanimously in favor of keeping the 
school open, he concluded, and he was sure that Owen would lend his valuable 
assistance to seeing that Rainy Mountain survived.30 
Mrs. J. F. Baldridge, chairman of the Kiowa county chapter of the 
American Red Cross, and writing on its letterhead to Senator Owen, was more 
direct. Her group's reasons for opposing the school's closing were twofold. First, 
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the local schools were already crowded beyond capacity. Closing Rainy Mountain 
would only encumber an already overburdened school system. Second, and more 
important, she argued that the Kiowa children were not ready to enter public 
schools. "The Indian standard of living is centuries behind that of the ordinary 
American," she wrote. The Indian child did not know how "to keep clean, how to 
eat at a table, how to sleep in a bed, or even how to wear citizen's clothing." 
Although schools like Rainy Mountain worked diligently to give Indian children 
instruction in these and other areas, it was a slow process fraught with dangers. 
"The Indian child is a menace to all of his associates until he has been taught the 
laws of hygiene and clean living," she continued, and that could only occur in a 
place like an Indian boarding school. If Rainy Mountain closed Kiowa children 
would lose their only chance "to learn how to live in a clean, sanitary way."31 
Hers was a terribly provincial world view, and it was typical of the local 
communities. 
The superintendent of the Hobart public schools took his turn next. In late 
February F. A. Balyeat brought the issue up in a letter to Senator Owen. Echoing 
Baldridge, he confirmed for the senator that the Hobart schools were, in fact, 
badly overcrowded and unable to accommodate any more students. Moreover, it 
was his opinion as a professional educator that Indian children were unfit for 
public classrooms. "It has been the experience of our teachers," he wrote, "that 
the Indians cannot be started in school ... without crippling the work of the room 
and greatly retarding the progress of the Indians." He observed that most of the 
Kiowa children spoke little or no English and thus suffered badly in comparison to 
their more accomplished white counterparts. Indian children responded "very 
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reluctantly" to public school methods of instruction; his school was not equipped 
to provide the special environment that Indians needed. Even if he had the staff 
and was willing to accept such a task (and he was not), here was a fact that no 
school could undo; "we submit that the Indian is greatly handicapped by this futile 
attempt to civilize him by trying to get him to learn what he cannot 
understand. "32 
Even if Indian children were capable of learning at the same pace as whites 
(and Balyeat clearly believed they were not), they would not be welcome. He told 
the senator that "with few exceptions the Indian children who attended the Hobart 
Schools are unwelcome and repulsive to the whites." Because Indian children 
were almost always dirty and bred disease, they were unable to mix comfortably 
with whites. Teachers occasionally refused to accept rooms that had Kiowa 
children in them; After careful consideration Balyeat concluded that Indian 
children would be a menace to the safety and progress of his schools. He closed 
by observing that he had lived among Indians since his boyhood and did not, of 
course, wish to see them deprived of their schooling. By the same token he did 
not wish to see them mixed in among his system's students and encouraged Owen 
to prevent the closing of Rainy Mountain.33 
A flood of similar complaints eventually reached the Indian Office. Most 
of them were based on the belief that Indians were unfit for schooling in the 
public system. From the chamber of commerce in Mountain View came the 
revelation that "sixty.percent of the Indian children have trachoma and are not in 
condition to be placed in public schools. Will not take much more than regular 
amount to run school and put in fairly good repair." The president of the school 
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board at Mountain View noted that all of the local public schools were badly 
overcrowded. "White people protest against Indian children attending schools to 
which they pay no taxes. Unsanitary Indian children not desired in public 
schools." The Hobart Commercial Club struck a pose of righteous indignation: 
"We have lived in this country too long for a new comer from the extreme east .. 
. not experienced with the Indian to make us submit to any such" change. The 
club generously offered to host a tour of the school's grounds for the Indian 
Office "so they can see actual conditions. School has approximately 150 students, 
some of them wearing blankets. Believe expense in 1920 would not exceed 
1919."34 
The Gotebo Chamber of Commerce noted that it had actually visited the 
school and found that a "very small amount of money will be needed for repairs .. 
. . The Superintendent of the Indian Agency at Anadarko has never seen fit to 
spend any reasonable amount for repairs." Absorbing Kiowa children into the 
white schools was characterized as "a big mistake," and the chamber believed that 
the commissioner's estimate for repairs was badly exaggerated; any "reasonable 
man" would see that something like $4,000 would put the school in good order. 
The Bank of Gotebo agreed and its spokesman argued that $5,000 would be 
sufficient. It called Sells' estimates "ridiculous." The Farmer's and Merchant's 
National Bank of Hobart added its opinion by noting that Rainy Mountain was 
"the only school in the county that can afford necessary facilities for Indian 
children. "35 
Of course, this was the kind of thing the Indian Office did not want to 
hear. Stinchecum quickly attempted to soften the impact of such protests by 
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drafting a letter to Sells in mid-March. As to the concern about the health of 
Rainy Mountain's pupils he assured the commissioner that this was a very 
infrequent problem. "As a rule our Indians are fairly tidy," he wrote, "and are at 
all times in reasonably presentable condition." On the whole he believed they 
would blend nicely with white school children. The recent protests were merely 
an attempt, he was certain, to influence the commissioner's office. Stinchecum 
argued that for every case in which an Indian child had been found unsuitable for 
schooling due to health reasons he could just as easily find one involving a white 
child. On the "one or two occasions" when investigation had revealed problems 
with Indian children every necessary step had.been taken to remedy the situation. 
On the issue of Indian children as unwanted in the public schools he told Sells 
that "as a matter of fact, our pupils have been, in nearly every case, actually 
welcomed as public school pupils."36 
How Stinchecum could arrive at this opinion is not clear. The 
overwhelming majority of the messages received in his office and in that of the 
commissioner bitterly opposed the action and showed a clear desire to resist it. 
Agency records, moreover, indicate that Stinchecum did not visit Rainy Mountain 
more than twice a year; his knowledge of the details surrounding the case seems 
to have been largely second-hand. That he wished the school closed is certain. 
The place had been troublesome for years. No doubt he was anxious for a 
permanent solution to its problems. He also resisted simply transferring Rainy 
Mountain's students to the agency's other boarding schools. That was inconsistent 
with government policy and would have kept him directly responsible for several 
hundred school children of whom he was ready to be rid. Quite possibly he 
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sympathized with local whites, for his attitude toward the Kiowas was not notably 
compassionate or even friendly. Still, his instructions were to close the school and 
place its students in the area's public systems, and this he did. 
As the spring of 1920 came and went it was clear that the appeals by the 
tribe and local whites to keep the school open would fail. In May Stinchecum 
wrote Sells to say that the date for closing had been set at June 30. The only staff 
necessary after that date would be a small contingent to harvest the school's small 
crops, look after the buildings, "and close up affairs generally." He requested 
$2,500 for fiscal 1921 to cover those costs. The Indian Office replied that in its 
opinion the proceeds from the crops ought to be sufficient to cover any expense 
incurred in shutting down the place.37 At the end of June the students were sent 
home and the buildings were closed. 
Now the Indian Office took up the matter of what to do with the school. 
With buildings, tools, supplies, and land appraised at more than $98,000, the office 
hoped to sell most or all of it to the highest bidder.38 In August most of Rainy 
Mountain's beds, mattresses, laundry equipment, and dry goods were shipped to 
the agency's other schools.39 Disposing of the physical plant was all that 
remained to be done. In late summer a solution appeared. A number of people 
approached the Indian Office about transforming Rainy Mountain into a 
sanitorium for tubercular veterans. At the end of June the chairman of the 
Oklahoma City chapter of the Red Cross, presidents of the chambers of 
commerce, Lion's Club and Kiwanis Club, and YMCA, chairman of the Soldier's 
Welfare Committee, and the chaplain of the American Legion Post wired a 
telegram to Owen. In it they urged him to arrange the transfer of the school to 
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the Public Health Service for use as a tuberculosis treatment center. "Not a single 
bed in the state of Oklahoma available for a tubercular soldier," went their 
message. "All men are sent outside of the state and suffer from homesickness and 
do not recover as they would in Oklahoma City. Have a heart." Similar pleas 
went to Representative Ferris. Owen and Ferris forwarded the messages to the 
Indian Office. Commissioner Sells responded that he would take the matter 
under consideration and wired Owen that he had already tendered the offer to 
Public Health. If it wanted the school Sells indicated he would gladly approve the 
action.40 
On August 6 Sells wired the adjutant of the Charles B. Burke American 
Legion Post in Madill, Oklahoma, to inform him that the Public Health Service 
"has my consent to use Rainy Mountain School· as hospital [for] ex-soldiers. 
Understand Surgeon General has matter under consideration." At the end of the 
month he sent a similar message to the adjutant of the Dobb-Frazier American 
Legion Post in Duncan. "This Office has already consented to the use of the 
plant for hospital purposes," wrote Assistant Commisioner E. B. Meritt, "and 
understands that the United States Public Health Service ... has the matter under 
advisement."41 At the agency Stinchecum was busy disposing of the school's 
property and equipment. In early October he informed Sells that the school's 
remaining livestock, desks, and chairs had been shipped to the agency's other 
schools. Anticipating the arrival of a physician to administer the hospital at Rainy 
Mountain he requested approval to reserve one of the cottages for a residence.42 
In late October, however, the office ordered Stinchecum to hold further 
action at the school in abeyance; apparently Public Health officials had not in fact 
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come to a decision.43 At the end of the month the Surgeon General's office 
informed the Indian Office that it would not take Rainy Mountain afterall; the 
school's isolation and remoteness rendered it impractical. In addition, the 
Surgeon General was of the opinion that "climatically and structurally it is not 
adapted to the purposes for which the Public Health Service are in need."44 
Stinchecum closed the school's building and removed the rest of its supplies and 
equipment. That fall, for the first time in twenty-seven years, Rainy Mountain sat 
empty and unused. 
From 1910 to the school's closing in 1920, its fortunes steadily declined. 
The shifting priorities of the Indian Office during the Progressive era meant that 
schools everywhere suffered the effects of willfully limited programs. The 
narrowing view of education's role, buttressed by Rainy Mountain's continuing 
poor circumstances, marked the school as an easy target for elimination. It might 
have survived longer had the era's policymakers been more optimistic in their 
evaluation of Indians; they were not, and Rainy Mountain proved helpless in the 
face of that fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
As Parker McKenzie wandered across the ruins of the Rainy Mountain 
campus one August afternoon in the summer of 1990, he came across the concrete 
base of the school's flagpole. Hidden by grass, McKenzie did not see it until he 
stepped on it. Looking down to see what he had found, McKenzie said "How 
about that," and immediately stood at attention and placed his hand over his 
heart, a lesson learned from his years at Rainy Mountain almost a century ago. A 
moment later he resumed his story about his life as a young boy on the Kiowa-
Comanche Reservation. I was struck by the seeming contradictions; an hour 
earlier McKenzie had been giving me driving directions in Kiowa, carefully 
explaining the differences in tense, inflection, and tone. He talked easily of this 
Indian family or that Indian family, and of the survival of various Kiowa cultural 
traditions. Finding the flagpole base, however, took him back to a time and place 
that stood in stark relief to all that he had been busily telling me; indeed that 
earlier era had been intended to make conversations like the one we were having 
impossible. 
Like many other former students, McKenzie is an example of how the 
boarding schools simultaneously failed and succeeded. They failed inasmuch as 
they did not destroy Kiowa identity or culture. Cutting children's hair, dressing 
them in new clothing, and teaching them to farm, bake, or sew did not necessarily 
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transform identity. Given the circumstances at Rainy Mountain it was unlikely 
that such a transformation could have been achieved anyway. Yet the school 
succeeded in important ways, another contradiction considering the conditions that 
often prevailed. Hundreds of young Kiowas went through the place and gained 
important experience and skills that they used after leaving school. Obviously, 
fluency in English was a critical factor; most students appear to have left the 
school with varying levels of proficiency but also with enough knowledge to 
survive. The vocational instruction they received likewise made it possible for 
them to make their way in the world that lay outside the campus. It was not a 
perfect preparation, and it was not what they deserved, but it helped to ease the 
transition from the life that their parents had led to the very different one that 
they faced. 
The irony is that in the process of beginning their new lives, most students 
did so by combining two worlds. Ruby Williams, for example, came from a Kiowa 
family that kept the sacred Kiowa sun dance talisman called the taime. By the 
time she entered boarding school at Riverside in the 1930s, however, her family 
had converted to Christianity and were faithful Baptists. Yet she had strong ties 
to the heritage and culture represented by the taime. Her great-grandmother, who 
lived with Ruby's family when Ruby was a child, was born in the 1820s, lived until 
the 1920s, and witnessed enormous changes in Kiowa culture. 
Ruby and her siblings remember being told by their great-grandmother that 
being Kiowa in the early twentieth century meant accepting a new and different 
world. Learn English, go to church, and get an education, they were told, but 
never stop being Kiowa. It was possible, they discovered, to keep their Kiowa 
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identity alive even in the midst of great cultural change and adaptation. Today 
Ruby and her children remain deeply involved in the cultural life of the Kiowa 
community in and around Fort Cobb and Carnegie. Every July, for example, they 
attend the annual gathering of the Kiowa Gourd Clan. An old and venerated 
society through which many Kiowas affirm the ties and relationships that ensure 
the maintenance of Kiowa identity, the Gourd Clan is a critical component in the 
survival of contemporary Kiowa culture. It was possible, indeed it was necessary, 
to join different worlds together in order to keep Kiowa identity viable. Thus the 
seeming contradiction of going to boarding school and staying Indian was not so 
much a contradiction or surprise as it was simply a fact of life; Kiowas had 
changed many times during their history, the boarding schools were only the latest 
in a long series of similar events. Learning English, for example, or learning a 
trade, were the very things that made it possible to function in the modern world, 
but not at the cost of retaining important cultural ideas. Indeed, it was the 
maintenance of their cultural base that made it possible for many Kiowas to 
endure the world around them.1 
Other students expressed similar feelings. James Silverhorn went through 
the boarding schools but remained closely associated with important tribal 
institutions. He joined the Native American Church around 1932, for example, 
and assumed prominence as one of its leaders in the Kiowa community. As an 
adult he kept four of the Kiowa sacred medicine bundles. Fred Bigman also 
joined the Native American Church, and like many former students used it as an 
avenue to maintain his culture. Harry Tofpi, Sr., left Riverside School in the 
1930s, served in the military for nearly thirty years, and retired to Meeker, 
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Oklahoma where he became a stalwart in the Native American Church and Kiowa 
Gourd aan. When asked if the schools ever took his cultural identity away he 
replied, they "couldn't, I didn't let that happen." Billy Evans Horse also attended 
Riverside in the 1930s and like Tofpi became a prominent peyotist and singer. 
Horse's grandfather, himself a product of Rainy Mountain, taught Billy about the 
peyote church, Gourd Clan, and other traditions so that he could maintain his 
sense of identity.2 
The pattern is ,unmistakably clear; former boarding school students retained 
important elements of Kiowa culture, combined it with what they learned at the 
schools, and went on with their lives. Frederick Hoxie attributes this partially to 
the fact that when the federal government scaled back the intensity and breadth of 
the Indian school system during the Progressive era it gave Indians breathing 
room. By retreating from a liberally defin~d assimilationist agenda in which every 
detail was important, to one that accepted limited possibilities for Indians, the 
government ironically removed important impediments to preserving culture. 
Because many experts believed that Indians were on their way to extinction 
anyway, it made little sense to engage in expensive - and futile - attempts to 
change them. According to Hoxie, the irony is that by doing so, the government 
encouraged, even allowed, a plural society to emerge in Indian communities.3 
Sally McBeth concurs. In her examination of western Oklahoma tribes and the 
reservation boarding school experience, McBeth finds that "the very segregationist 
and assimilationist beginnings of the Oklahoma boarding schools effectively, if 
inadvertently,·seetn to have fostered the formation of an Indian identity."4 
Other important changes helped as well. During the 1930s the 
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"evolutionary assimilation" of John Collier's Indian New Deal recognized the 
vitality of native culture and officially forbade its destruction. Collier emphasized 
the usefulness of cultural diversity and allowed students to retain their tribal 
heritage. Forced assimilation would never again figure in the bureau's official 
policies. The foundation established in part by boarding school students like those 
from Rainy Mountain flourished in the decades to come.5 Having survived the 
severe trial of the reservation era, former students retained a core of values, 
actions, and practices that helped to ensure the tribe's identity. 
Rainy Mountain School can barely be seen from the road now. The 
mountain is there, an enduring landmark for new generations of Kiowas. The 
campus, however, is largely gone, save for the tumbledown remains of a few 
buildings. But it remains a powerful place, not least so because most living 
Kiowas have relatives who once lived at the school, roamed its campus, and were 
molded by its forces, good or bad. Kiowas visit the mountain regularly to cut sage 
or cedar for ceremonial use and for many of them the trip to Rainy Mountain is 
much like a pilgrimage; the combination of the mountain's historical importance 
and the school's emotional past is palpably real. Visitors to the mountain 
invariably talk about the school and discuss what it must have been like for the 
grandfathers, great-aunts, or cousins who went there. And they always speak with 
reverence about those people, for as Harry Tofpi, Sr., said, the souls of those 
small children are still there. 
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Notes 
1. Ruby Williams interview, July 2, 1989. For many Kiowas, groups such as 
the Gourd Clan, Black Leggings, and O'hama Society represent vital links to 
traditional tribal culture. Songs play an especially critical part of this process for they 
represent a sort of storehouse that protects and transmits various traditions and 
stories. The survival of the Kiowa language and of these and other institutions 
during the difficult reservation era mark a critical point in the maintenance of 
contemporary Kiowa culture. Almost without exception former boarding school 
students from the early twentieth century formed the core of the groups that 
prevented the eclipse of such knowledge. 
2. James Silverhorn interview, September 28, 1967, T-146, 1, Doris Duke Oral 
History Collection, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma Library 
Archives, Norman, Oklahoma (hereafter cited as DDOH); Fred Bigman interview, 
T-50, 1, DDOH; Harry Tofpi interview, August 3, 1991. 
3. Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indian, 
1880-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 237-244. 
4. Sally J. McBeth, "Indian Schools and Ethnic Identity: An Example from the 
Southern Plains Tribes of Oklahoma," Plains Anthropologist 28(Spring 1983): 120. 
McBeth comments at greater length on this in Ethnic Identity and the Boarding School 
Experience of West-Central Oklahoma American Indians (Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1983). 
288 
5. The literature on the Indian New Deal is copious. The best single source 
remains Kenneth Philp, John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920-1954 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1977). 
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